Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint on behalf of two estates, claiming that financial institutions fraudulently transferred real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed on the ground that a non-attorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an estate, even though plaintiffs claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their respective estates. Each signed the notice of appeal as the “Authorized Representative” of the estates. Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 1654. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the sole beneficiary of an estate without creditors may represent the estate pro se. The purpose of protecting third parties is not implicated when the only person affected by a nonattorney’s representation is the nonattorney herself. The tradition that “a corporation can only appear by attorney,” has not been extended to estates. View "Bass v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, targets “independent debt collectors,” but excludes in-house collectors, including “any officer or employee of . . . any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” In Ohio, consumer debts that remain uncollected by a state entity are “certified” to the Attorney General (OAG), which enlists “special counsel” as independent contractors for collections. Actions taken by special counsel are dictated by an agreement, which requires special counsel to comply with FDCPA standards. All collections must be endorsed to the OAG before special counsel is entitled to a fee. Special counsel were orally directed to use OAG letterhead for all collections (including consumer debts, although contrary to Ohio’s code). Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the FDCPA by use of OAG letterhead. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, and that, even if they were, use of OAG letterhead was not a “false, deceptive or misleading” communication. The Sixth Circuit vacated. A jury could reasonably find that the use of the OAG letterhead by the “special counsel,” in the manner and under the circumstances present here, resulted in letters that were actually confusing to the least sophisticated consumer. View "Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC" on Justia Law

Ragozzine was a tenure-track professor at Youngstown State University. He did not produce much scholarship. Ragozzine attributed the delay to his lab’s not being fully operational until his second academic year. In his fifth academic year, his mother and his wife fell ill, with some caretaking responsibilities falling on him. He was granted a year’s delay in the review of his tenure application. Although he met the minimum requirements with a last-minute flurry of publications, he was denied tenure because YSU determined that he lacked promise of consistent scholarly production. Ragozzine sued, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause; that YSU violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and that irregularities in his tenure review violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Ragozzine subsequently moved to disqualify the judge, based on a previously undisclosed dating relationship between the judge and a YSU faculty member, arguing that the relationship created an appearance of impropriety under 28 U.S.C. 455 and the Code of Conduct for Judges. The district court denied that motion, concluding that no reasonable person would question her impartiality. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ragozzine v. Youngstown State Univ." on Justia Law

Colosi lost a wrongful termination suit against her former employer, JLL. As the prevailing party, JLL filed a $6,369.55 bill of costs that the court clerk approved without modification, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Colosi objected to most of the charges and moved to reduce the bill to $253.50. The district court denied the motion, finding each cost reasonable, necessary to the litigation, and properly taxable under statute, 28 U.S.C. 1920. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Most of the costs Colosi challenged related to witness depositions. Necessity is determined as of the time of taking, and the fact that a deposition is not actually used at trial is not controlling. View "Colosi v. Jones Lang LaSalle Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Claimants filed a $2,142,000 non-priority unsecured proof of claim in jointly administered Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. That claim was disallowed by the bankruptcy court; the district court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. As a result of the multitude of filings, strategies employed and positions taken over a six year period, the bankruptcy court sanctioned the attorney, Grossman, the sum of $207,004 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the court’s inherent authority under 11 U.S.C. 105, representing the attorney fees expended by counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and, post-confirmation, the Liquidation Trustee and his counsel, directly or indirectly related to the claim litigation. Grossman appealed the sanction and an order denying a motion which sought the recusal of the bankruptcy judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455. In a separate appeal, Grossman challenged the retention of special counsel to collect the judgment against him and an order requiring him to submit to a debtor’s examination and provide written discovery. Consolidating the appeals, the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Grossman vexatiously pursued arguments and filed documents throughout the litigation that were frivolous; his claims about the judge were misstatements. View "In re: Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

CLC’s principal, Erwin, was general counsel for the bank. CLC deferred invoicing the bank in 2008 when it fell on hard times. In 2009 the Office of Thrift Supervision put the bank into receivership. CLC claims that, days before the takeover, the bank granted it security interests in bank properties. CLC waited months to record attorney liens for the security interests. CLC sought $176,750 in deferred legal fees. The FDIC denied the claim. CLC initially denied possessing the original retainer agreement, claiming oral agreements, until, in 2013, Erwin produced a 1989 agreement. The district court granted the FDIC summary judgment, finding the evidence prejudicial and the delay not “substantially justified.” The fees arrangement did not comply with 12 U.S.C. 1823(e)’s documentation requirements and the security interests were similarly deficient and “taken in contemplation of” insolvency. The court rejected CLC’s argument that the statutory documentation requirements and the D’Oench doctrine (an estoppel rule shielding the FDIC from claims and defenses based on unwritten agreements that reduce bank assets) apply only to secret agreements affecting traditional banking transactions, like loans. The court acknowledged evidence indicating that Erwin and the bank may have backdated the security interests. The Sixth Circuit reversed; D’Oench and its statutory progeny do not apply to its legal services arrangement with the bank. View "Commercial Law Corp., P.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

P&C filed suit on behalf of Penn, LLC against Prosper Corporation, Prosper’s owners, and their counsel, the Arnold Firm, alleging violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the management of Penn and Prosper’s joint venture, BIGresearch. There had been court and arbitration proceedings since 2004, but Penn never before named the Arnold Firm as a defendant. The Arnold Firm served P&C with a letter purporting to satisfy the obligations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, threatening to seek sanctions if the matter was not dismissed, and claiming that the action was frivolous and had been filed for the “improper and abusive purpose” of disrupting the Arnold Firm’s attorney-client relationship with Prosper and its owners. The district court ultimately dismissed the Arnold Firm from the action, but denied a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against P&C. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that the Arnold Firm’s failure to comply with Rule 11’s safe-harbor provision made sanctions unavailable. The Arnold Firm’s warning letter expressly reserved the firm’s right to assert additional grounds for sanctions in its actual motion. View "Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

The district court awarded Naegel, counsel for a prevailing social security disability benefits applicant, significantly reduced attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. 406(b). He claimed that the court should have approved his request for $26,049.73, the 25-percent contingency fee accepted by his client and permitted by statute. The Commissioner of Social Security, representing the interests of the claimant whose benefits pay for the fees, opposed that sum as a “windfall” in light of counsel’s 35.5 hours of work. The district court agreed and awarded $12,780. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that: “Within the 25 percent boundary,” prevailing counsel bears the burden of “show[ing] that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” View "Lasley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Haddad bought his condominium in 1991 and lived in the unit until 2005, when he began renting it out. In 2008, a law firm, representing the association, sent Haddad a notice of delinquency, stating that Haddad owed $803 in unpaid condominium assessments, $40 in late charges, and $55 in legal fees and costs. Haddad notified the firm that he disputed the amount demanded, that he had never missed a monthly dues payment, but that he had been “singled out and charged with various violations” by the management company. Correspondence continued for several months, with the amount owed increasing each month and Haddad contesting the charges. The law firm ultimately recorded a Notice of Lien, which was discharged about six months later. Haddad sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the Michigan Collection Practices Act, alleging use of a false, deceptive or misleading representation in the collection of a debt, and continuing collection of a disputed debt before verification of the debt. The district court rejected the claims on the ground that the debt was commercial because the unit was rented when collection began. The Sixth Circuit court reversed, holding that an obligation to pay assessments arose from the original purchase and constituted a “debt” under the FDCPA. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment, finding that the firm had properly verified the debt and that the collection efforts were not deceptive or misleading. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, based on failure to properly verify the debt. View "Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC" on Justia Law

The Gallia County (Ohio) Public Defender Commission contracted with the non-profit Corporation for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. The Corporation hired Bright, who represented R.G. before Evans, the county’s only trial judge. Bright negotiated a plea agreement, but R.G. hesitated during the plea colloquy. “Mere seconds” later, R.G. informed Bright and Evans that he would take the deal after all. Evans refused. Bright and the prosecutor met with Evans to convince the judge to accept R.G.’s plea. He refused. In pleadings, Bright criticized Evans’s policies as “an abuse of discretion,” “unreasonable,” “arbitrary … unconscionable.” Bright’s language did not include profanity and did not claim ethical impropriety. Evans subsequently contacted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and filed a grievance against Bright and filed a public journal entry stating that Bright’s motion, although not amounting to misconduct or contempt, had created a conflict. He ordered that Bright be removed from the R.G. case. He then filed entries removing Bright from 70 other felony cases. The Corporation terminated Bright’s employment, allegedly without a hearing or other due process. Bright sued Evans, the Board, the Corporation, and the Commission. The district court concluded that Evans was “not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were completely outside of his jurisdiction.” The court held that Bright failed to sufficiently plead that the Board or the Commission retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights or that liability attached under the Monell doctrine, then dismissed claims against the Corporation. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Evans. While Evans’s conduct was worthy of censure, it does not fit within any exception to absolute judicial immunity. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the Board and Corporation; the First Amendment offers no protection to an attorney for his speech in court.View "Bright v. Gallia Cnty." on Justia Law