Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Goldberg, a medical malpractice attorney, appeared before Judge Maloney in several cases. Following complaints that Goldberg concealed assets and retained unearned fees, Maloney ordered Goldberg to pay the estates involved. Goldberg failed to do so. Maloney directed him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Following a hearing, Maloney found Goldberg to be in criminal contempt and cited Goldberg for attempting to suborn witnesses, charges that did not appear on the hearing notice. Goldberg received a sentence of 18 months. An Ohio appellate court affirmed. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Goldberg argued for the first time that he had not received sufficient notice of the charges and ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to raise this notice claim. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2004, the district court granted habeas relief on the basis that Goldberg received constitutionally inadequate notice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Goldberg had procedurally defaulted on his lack-of-notice claim by failing to raise it in the state court of appeals. On remand, the district court determined that Goldberg had not demonstrated sufficient cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default, and denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Goldberg v. Maloney" on Justia Law

Judge DeWeese sentenced Griffeth to prison for sexual battery and later oversaw his supervised release. Mayer supervised the agency responsible for monitoring Griffeth and suspected that his wife, Leech, was having an affair with Griffeth. Plaintiffs alleged that Mayer conspired with other officers and DeWeese to harass Griffeth. Mayer’s marriage ended. Plaintiffs allege that Mayer, who had been drinking, saw Griffeth and Leech in a car, pursued them, and called police to have Griffeth arrested for violating curfew. Mayer’s supervisor ordered that Mayer have no further involvement in Griffeth’s case. Plaintiffs allege that Mayer met with DeWeese and arranged to transfer Griffeth’s case to Mayer’s friend. DeWeese imposed a condition prohibiting Griffeth from contact with Leech or with her minor daughter. Griffeth was accused of associating with Leech and lying about it. Judge DeWeese refused to recuse himself, sentenced Griffeth to six months in community control, and ordered Leech removed from Griffeth’s home. The district court held that DeWeese had not established absolute judicial immunity to a claim concerning removing non-party Leech from her home. The Sixth Circuit reversed. DeWeese’s order requiring compliance with the no-contact condition of supervised release by removing Leech from the house fell within DeWeese’s subject matter jurisdiction over supervised release. View "Leech v. DeWeese" on Justia Law

The Legislative Ethics Commission conducted a hearing regarding fund-raising by Kentucky Senate President Williams, which attorney Berry attended. Following an executive session from which the public, the media, and Berry were excluded, the Commission dismissed. Berry wrote a letter criticizing disposition of the matter and disseminated copies to the media. The Inquiry Commission of the Kentucky Bar Association issued a warning asserting that the letter violated Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(a), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer,” by publicly implying that the Commission did not conduct its review appropriately. The disciplinary complaint against Berry was dismissed. Berry did not appeal because Kentucky does not provide for an appeal of the Commission’s findings. Berry sued, alleging that he wished to engage in further criticism of the investigation but has refrained from such speech because he fears professional discipline. The district court granted the KBA summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed; Rule 8.2(a) is unconstitutional as applied to Berry’s speech.View "Berry v. Schmitt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs invested in oil-and-gas exploration companies and lost money when the companies’ wells produced little oil or gas. They sued the companies and their officers, claiming violations of state and federal law in selling unregistered securities and in making other material misrepresentations and omissions. They also sued Durham, the lawyer who represented the companies. Durham drafted the documents, including joint-venture agreements and private placement memoranda that provided details about the investment opportunity, and told prospective investors he was available to answer questions. Plaintiffs allege that Durham knew the documents contained material misrepresentations and omissions and that the securities were neither registered nor exempt from registration. District courts ruled in favor of Durham. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Kentucky Securities Act imposes liability on anyone who “offers or sells a security” in violation of its terms and any “agent” of the seller who “materially aids” the sale of securities, defined as someone who “effect[s] or attempt[s] to effect” the sale. Ky. Rev. Stat. 292.480(1),(4); 292.310(1). An attorney who performs ordinary legal work, such as drafting documents, giving advice and answering client questions, is not an “agent” under the Act. View "Bennett v. Durham" on Justia Law

Mitchell was a partner in the Cleveland law firm from the early 1980s until 2006. There was no formal partnership agreement; each partner practiced in a different area of law, and each represented his clients with essentially no oversight, but shared evenly in the firm's profits. Mitchell was indicted for his involvement in a long-running scheme to bribe the auditor of Cuyahoga County into awarding overvalued contracts for appraisal work to a company formed by his law partners. The indictment charged conspiracy to commit bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, 18 U.S.C. 371; bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2); and conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. The district court granted Mitchell acquittal on the Hobbs Act charge, but a jury convicted him of the remaining two counts. He was sentenced to 97 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the jury instruction that deliberate ignorance, in some instances, can constitute knowledge, and a challenge to the sentence. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendants, two of three lawyers who represented several hundred Kentucky clients in a mass-tort action against the manufacturer of the defective diet drug "fen-phen," settled the case for $200 million, which entitled them under their retainer agreements to approximately $22 million each in attorney fees. By visiting clients and obtaining their signatures on "confidential settlements," for lesser amounts, the two actually disbursed slightly more than $45 million, less than 23 percent of the total settlement. The lawyers kept the remainder for themselves and associated counsel, transferring much of it from the escrow account to various other accounts, including out-of-state accounts. The scheme was discovered; the lawyers were disbarred and convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. One was sentenced to 240 months, the other to 300 months. They were ordered to pay more than $127 million in restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a variety of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and trial procedures.

Hardesty, a resident of Utah, solicited Schneider, a physician and resident of Ohio, for an investment involving purchase of medical-malpractice insurance from Hardesty's foreign-based company. The investment was to provide federal-tax benefits and make him a partial owner of an insurance company. Hardesty's $500,000 was transferred and eventually frozen because of SEC proceedings against a Ponzi scheme involving more than $100,000,000. Hardesty hired Nelson, a Utah attorney, to recover the funds. Nelson corresponded with Schneider and the defendants, but did not recover the money. Schneider sued multiple defendants, including Hardesty and Nelson, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. Schneider alleged that letters written by Nelson contained false statements by which Nelson furthered the scheme to defraud Schneider. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, as opposed to the prima facie standard, in determining whether Schneider pleaded facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Nelson, but the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process and is proper under Ohio's long-arm statute even under the more demanding standard.

Plaintiffs Carol Metz and others filed a putative class action against fifty-five banks, including Fifth Third. The claims arose out of a Ponzi scheme involving bogus promissory notes. Five months later, attorney Daniel Morris filed a motion to intervene on behalf of his clients. Attached to the motion was a complaint similar to Metz's complaint except it was premised on promissory notes issued by different entities. The district court granted the motion to intervene. After the district court had dismissed Fifth Third with prejudice, Morris filed an intervenors' complaint against Fifth Third. The complaint was virtually identical to the complaint attached to the motion to intervene Morris filed earlier. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice and granted Fifth Third's request for sanctions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the imposition of sanctions, holding (1) the district court's imposition of sanctions under the bad faith standard was proper; (2) the record set forth sufficient evidence to support the district court's decision; (3) the district court properly sanctioned Morris under its inherent authority even though Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 also applied; (4) the district court did not deny Morris due process; and (5) the amount of fees awarded was not excessive.

Petitioner, convicted of a non-fatal shooting, was sentenced as a habitual offender to 29-1/2 to 60 years for assault with intent to commit murder, to run concurrently with a sentence of 40 to 60 months for a felon-in-possession conviction, and a consecutive term of two years for a felony firearm conviction. He claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney fell asleep while he was being cross-examined. Michigan state courts rejected appeals. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At most, the attorney was asleep for part of a single cross-examination; a petitioner must show that his attorney slept through a substantial portion of the trial for the "Cronic" presumption of prejudice to attach. Noting the overwhelming evidence, the court stated that petition did not show a reasonable probability that counsel could have prevented prejudicial events from occurring had he been awake, much less that it would have affected the outcome of the trial. Although the attorney was later arrested for cocaine use, there was no evidence that he was using cocaine during the trial..

Defendant, convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 of conspiracy to defraud the United States while serving as in-house general counsel to the company involving the company's filing of false tax returns with the IRS. He was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution to the IRS. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The jury instructions adequately addressed the elements of conspiracy. There was no need for mention of the attorney-client privilege or of an attorney's potential obligation to report illegal activity. The government’s theory of liability was not dependent on whether defendant had an affirmative duty to inform, yet failed to do so; conviction did not turn on whether defendant's actions were governed by the attorney-client privilege. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.