Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Binno, a legally blind individual, unsuccessfully applied for admission to law schools. He then filed suit against the American Bar Association (ABA), under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that his lack of success was due to a discriminatory admissions test “mandated” by the ABA. Thar examination, the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) is used by nearly all U.S. law schools. Binno claimed that the LSAT's questions have a discriminatory effect on the blind and visually impaired because a quarter of those questions “require spatial reasoning and visual diagramming for successful completion.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, concluding that Binno does not have standing to sue the ABA because his injury was not caused by the ABA and because it is unlikely that his injury would be redressed by a favorable decision against the ABA. The LSAT is written, administered, and scored by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC), which is not part of the ABA. The LSAC provides ADA accommodations (42 U.S.C. 12189) for persons with disabilities who wish to take the LSAT. The law schools to which he applied, not the ABA, determine what weight, if any, to give Binno’s LSAT score. View "Binno v. Am. Bar Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2006, the district court adopted a consent order to resolve Dispatch's suit for an accounting of the gold from the S.S. Central America shipwreck. The order required defendants to produce financial documents regarding the period starting January 1, 2000. The court later issued a contempt order, citing defendants’ failure to produce an inventory of the gold recovered and sold. Defendants then produce an inventory of gold that they sold to California Gold Group from February 15 to September 1, 2000. They did not produce any prior inventories, which would have provided a complete accounting of treasure recovered from the ship. At a 2007 contempt hearing, the parties argued about whether the defendants possessed any earlier inventories. The court issued another contempt order in 2009. Defendants continued to assert that they had no such inventories. In 2013, Dispatch obtained the appointment of a receiver that it had first sought in 2008 to take control of and wind down the defendants. The receiver recovered found numerous inventories created before the California Gold sale, in a duplex owned by defendants' attorney and leased to defendants. The court concluded that defendants’ attorney engaged in bad-faith conduct, rejected Dispatch’s request for $1,717,388 (its total litigation expenses) and limited sanctions to the cost of pursuing the motion for sanctions, plus the expenses to uncover the fraud and locate the inventories. Dispatch submitted bills for $249,359.85. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a reduced award of $224,580. View "Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

The Hargers were Jones’ neighbors. Police reports indicate that there were issues between the neighbors for several years. Grad worked for CarMeds, ostensibly owned by Jones’ mother and run by Jones, occasionally visiting Jones’ home. Grad claimed to have been assaulted after such a meeting. At the police station, Grad identified Harger from a photo line-up. Ultimately, charges were dropped. The Hargers sued Grad and Jones, asserting conspiracy to have Harger falsely arrested. Meanwhile, Jones filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Hoover, the Hargers’ attorney, moved to modify the automatic stay and filed an adversary complaint, alleging that Jones's debt was non-dischargeable and seeking denial of discharge based on the assertion that Jones lied about the ownership of CarMeds. The bankruptcy court later dismissed the adversary proceeding on the Hargers’ motion, and set a hearing sua sponte, directing the Hargers and Hoover to show that they had reasonable grounds for filing. The court found that Hoover violated Rule 9011 by filing without specific evidence and made intentional misrepresentations in his filings; directed him to pay $26,000 in attorneys’ fees; revoked Hoover’s electronic bankruptcy filing authority; and referred the matter for possible prosecution. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Panel reversed, holding that the bankruptcy court relied on clearly erroneous factual findings ;erred as a matter of law in awarding fees on a sua sponte basis; and abused its discretion in imposing any sanctions. View "In re: Jones" on Justia Law

A Chapter 7 petition was filed against Connolly in 2001. Shapiro, then the bankruptcy trustee, initiated an adversary proceeding. In 2007, the bankruptcy court concluded that Shapiro and his attorney had breached their discovery obligations due to gross negligence and dismissed Shapiro’s claims with prejudice. Connolly’s unsecured creditors, including Coface, successfully sought to remove Shapiro as trustee. French, Shapiro’s successor, then commenced an adversary proceeding against Shapiro, his law firm, and his professional-liability insurer. The parties reached a court-approved settlement. The bankruptcy court recognized that at least some of the work that Coface paid its attorneys to do substantially benefitted the bankruptcy estate and the unsecured creditors, and contributed greatly to a significant increase in funds that unsecured creditors would receive. Coface sought reimbursement of $164,336.28 in attorney fees and costs under 11 U.S.C. 503(b). The bankruptcy court denied Colface’s motion. The district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that administrative expenses are allowable in these circumstances under section 503(b) in a Chapter 7 case. Denying creditors reimbursement of administrative expenses in such circumstances would disincentivize participation in the bankruptcy process and would impugn the fundamental notion of bankruptcy as equitable relief View "Coface Argentina v. McDermott" on Justia Law

Colleen O’Toole is currently a judge and announced her intention to run for election in 2016 to one of the three contested seats on the Supreme Court of Ohio. O’Toole and her judicial campaign committee challenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, including Rule 4.4(E) and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction only with respect to Rule 4.4(E) which states that: The campaign committee of a judicial candidate may begin soliciting and receiving contributions no earlier than one hundred twenty days before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May of the year in which the general election is held. If the general election is held in 2012 or any fourth year thereafter, the campaign committee of a judicial candidate may begin soliciting and receiving contributions no earlier than one hundred twenty days before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of the year in which the general election is held. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the campaign committee failed to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits or likelihood of irreparable harm. View "O'Toole v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

After obtaining terrorism convictions, then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Convertino came under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). An unidentified DOJ source leaked information about that investigation to Ashenfelter, a reporter. The Detroit Free Press published details, including allegations that Convertino withheld Brady materials and threatened a defense lawyer with a baseless criminal investigation. DOJ’s attempts to find the source were unsuccessful. The terrorism convictions were vacated. The defendants’ claims against Convertino under 42 U.S.C. 1983 were dismissed based on prosecutorial and qualified immunity. Convertino was found not guilty of obstruction of justice. Convertino sued DOJ, alleging that the investigation, leak, and disciplinary measures were in retaliation for his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. Ultimately, a single claim remained--that DOJ violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, when its unidentified official leaked confidential information to Ashenfelter. The district court granted the motion to compel production from Ashenfelter. Ashenfelter asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at two depositions. The district court found that Ashenfelter had a reasonable basis for fearing that answering the questions would entail self-incrimination, sustained the assertion of privilege, and reduced its ruling to two written opinions—one public, and one sealed. Convertino unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, citing a statement by then-Attorney General Holder that the DOJ “will not prosecute any reporter.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the claims of privilege. View "Convertino v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

After obtaining terrorism convictions, then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Convertino came under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). An unidentified DOJ source leaked information about that investigation to Ashenfelter, a reporter. The Detroit Free Press published details, including allegations that Convertino withheld Brady materials and threatened a defense lawyer with a baseless criminal investigation. DOJ’s attempts to find the source were unsuccessful. The terrorism convictions were vacated. The defendants’ claims against Convertino under 42 U.S.C. 1983 were dismissed based on prosecutorial and qualified immunity. Convertino was found not guilty of obstruction of justice. Convertino sued DOJ, alleging that the investigation, leak, and disciplinary measures were in retaliation for his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. Ultimately, a single claim remained--that DOJ violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, when its unidentified official leaked confidential information to Ashenfelter. The district court granted the motion to compel production from Ashenfelter. Ashenfelter asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at two depositions. The district court found that Ashenfelter had a reasonable basis for fearing that answering the questions would entail self-incrimination, sustained the assertion of privilege, and reduced its ruling to two written opinions—one public, and one sealed. Convertino unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, citing a statement by then-Attorney General Holder that the DOJ “will not prosecute any reporter.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the claims of privilege. View "Convertino v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint on behalf of two estates, claiming that financial institutions fraudulently transferred real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed on the ground that a non-attorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an estate, even though plaintiffs claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their respective estates. Each signed the notice of appeal as the “Authorized Representative” of the estates. Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 1654. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the sole beneficiary of an estate without creditors may represent the estate pro se. The purpose of protecting third parties is not implicated when the only person affected by a nonattorney’s representation is the nonattorney herself. The tradition that “a corporation can only appear by attorney,” has not been extended to estates. View "Bass v. Leatherwood" on Justia Law

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, targets “independent debt collectors,” but excludes in-house collectors, including “any officer or employee of . . . any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” In Ohio, consumer debts that remain uncollected by a state entity are “certified” to the Attorney General (OAG), which enlists “special counsel” as independent contractors for collections. Actions taken by special counsel are dictated by an agreement, which requires special counsel to comply with FDCPA standards. All collections must be endorsed to the OAG before special counsel is entitled to a fee. Special counsel were orally directed to use OAG letterhead for all collections (including consumer debts, although contrary to Ohio’s code). Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the FDCPA by use of OAG letterhead. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, and that, even if they were, use of OAG letterhead was not a “false, deceptive or misleading” communication. The Sixth Circuit vacated. A jury could reasonably find that the use of the OAG letterhead by the “special counsel,” in the manner and under the circumstances present here, resulted in letters that were actually confusing to the least sophisticated consumer. View "Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC" on Justia Law

Ragozzine was a tenure-track professor at Youngstown State University. He did not produce much scholarship. Ragozzine attributed the delay to his lab’s not being fully operational until his second academic year. In his fifth academic year, his mother and his wife fell ill, with some caretaking responsibilities falling on him. He was granted a year’s delay in the review of his tenure application. Although he met the minimum requirements with a last-minute flurry of publications, he was denied tenure because YSU determined that he lacked promise of consistent scholarly production. Ragozzine sued, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause; that YSU violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and that irregularities in his tenure review violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Ragozzine subsequently moved to disqualify the judge, based on a previously undisclosed dating relationship between the judge and a YSU faculty member, arguing that the relationship created an appearance of impropriety under 28 U.S.C. 455 and the Code of Conduct for Judges. The district court denied that motion, concluding that no reasonable person would question her impartiality. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ragozzine v. Youngstown State Univ." on Justia Law