Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Plaintiffs entered into a five-year oil and gas lease covering 47 acres in Ross Township, Ohio, and granting Chesapeake exclusive rights to “all oil and gas and their constituents” for $5.00 per mineral acre per year and a royalty on production. The lease provides for extension, if “Operations” are being “conducted on the Leasehold, or on lands pooled, unitized or combined with all or a portion of the Leasehold.” In 2011, Chesapeake submitted drilling-permit applications for property that did not include Plaintiffs’ property. Later, Chesapeake filed a “Declaration and Notice of Pooled Unit,” consisting of 21 properties, including Plaintiffs’ property, and declared that “operations and/or production … anywhere within the Unit shall be deemed to be operations and/or production on each separate tract sufficient to extend and maintain each included lease in the Unit.” It specified that production from the unit would be allocated among all leases in the unit proportional to the surface area of each lease. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the lease expired; Chesapeake filed a counterclaim. The district court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Chesapeake’s actions did not extend the lease because the lease required that a permit application pertaining to the leased property or a property already unitized with the leased property, be filed before the expiration of the lease. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. View "Henry v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fillers planned to demolish an unused Chattanooga factory. They knew the site contained asbestos, a hazardous pollutant under the Clean Air Act. Environmental Protection Agency regulations require removal of all asbestos before any demolition. Asbestos materials must be wetted, lowered to the ground, not dropped, labeled, and disposed of at an authorized site. Fillers hired AA, a certified asbestos surveying company, which estimated that it would cost $214,650 to remove the material safely. Fillers hired Mathis to demolish the factory in exchange for salvageable materials. Mathis was required to use a certified asbestos contractor. Mathis applied for an EPA demolition permit, showing an estimated amount of asbestos far less than in the AA survey. The agency’s asbestos coordinator contacted Fillers to verify the amount of asbestos. Fillers did not send the survey, but provided a revised estimate, far less than the survey’s estimate. After the permit issued, the asbestos contractor removed “[m]aybe, like, 1/100th” of the asbestos listed in the AA survey. Temporary laborers were hired, not equipped with protective gear or trained to remove asbestos. Fillers supervised. The work dispersed dust throughout the neighborhood. An employee of a daycare facility testified that the children were unable to play outside. Eventually, the EPA sent out an emergency response coordinator and declared the site an imminent threat. Mathis and Fillers were convicted of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, and violations of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413(c). Fillers was also convicted of making a false statement, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C.1519. The district court sentenced Mathis to 18 months’ imprisonment and Fillers to 44 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Mathis" on Justia Law

A title services company may not pay a real estate agent a fee in exchange for a referral, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2607(a), with an exemption for “affiliated business arrangements.” The defendants are related title and real estate agency companies and met three prerequisites for the exemption. Home buyers claimed that the defendants fell outside the safe harbor’s coverage because they failed to satisfy a fourth condition announced in a Department of Housing and Urban Development policy statement. The district court held that the policy statement is not binding on the Department, is not otherwise entitled to deference, and does not supplement the Act’s existing safe-harbor conditions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants qualify under the exemption for affiliated businesses. View "Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff financed a purchase of residential property. Residential Finance was the lender; Chase serviced the loan. In 2011 Plaintiff sent Chase a “Qualified Written Request” under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605(e), requesting information about the amount owed on the loan, the identity of the “current holder,” the date Chase began servicing the loan, and a breakdown of accrued charges. Plaintiff disputed late fees and other charges and stated that Chase had refused a loan modification for which she qualified and had failed to provide a copy of the Note as requested. Chase sent some material, but stated that any requested information not included was either unavailable or considered proprietary; the letter did not provide the identity of the loan’s owner or information on the correctness of Plaintiff’s account, and did not provide contact information for obtaining assistance. Plaintiff sued, alleging that she made excess payments that Chase failed to credit, violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1641(f)(2), RESPA, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and conversion. Chase finally identified the owner of the loan: Fannie Mae. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to TILA, but reversed dismissal of the RESPA claim, finding that Plaintiff adequately alleged causation of damages. View "Marais v. Chase Home Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

Debtors owed delinquent real estate taxes to Summit County, Ohio, which sells outstanding tax obligations to investors as tax lien certificates. An investor purchasing such a certificate obtains a lien against the property and the right to pursue the taxpayer for the unpaid taxes, O.R.C. 5721.30-43. Plymouth filed a certificate showing its purchase of the Debtors’ tax obligation for $4,083.73 with a negotiated interest rate of 0.25%, “offered, sold, and delivered on November 3, 2010.” On October 3, 2011, Plymouth filed a second certificate, with a price of $2,045.44 and a negotiated interest rate of 18.00%. On April 17, 2012, Summit County filed a tax lien foreclosure complaint against the Debtors pursuant to pursuant to Plymouth's request for foreclosure. In May, 2012, the Debtors filed a chapter 13 plan and petition, proposing to pay interest on the tax certificates at the interest rates listed on the certificates. Plymouth filed a proof of claim based on both certificates in the amount of $10,521.46, including $2,120.00 in fees and the principal balance of $7,781.19 plus 18% interest from June 1, 2012 on both certificates. The Bankruptcy Court held that under Ohio law the appropriate interest rate for Plymouth’s tax claim was 0.25%. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Bowers" on Justia Law

The Youth Re-Entry Program helps young people re-enter society after foster care or juvenile detention. About 80 percent of its members are black. The program moved to the Cleveland suburb, Lakewood, to house clients in apartments in Hidden Village. Lakewood’s building commissioner (Barrett) took the position that this was a prohibited institutional use. The program nonetheless moved into Hidden Village. Barrett ordered removal, but the planning commission reversed his decision. The police department sent officers a memo stating that “[c]itations and arrests are the preferred course of action for violations ... in the vicinity of [Hidden Village].” Program participants began complaining about harassment, such as tickets and astronomical fines for jaywalking, failure to attach a license plate to a bicycle, and walking on railroad tracks. The mayor stated that he intended to remove the program. Police, an officer in SWAT attire, a canine unit, and fire and health department workers visited Hidden Village, unannounced and without a warrant, to conduct a “joint inspection.” Another fire inspection followed a week later. Hidden Village sued, 42 U.S.C. 1981-1983. The Youth Program did not participate. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment and held that individual defendants did not enjoy qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Hidden Village produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendants discriminated on the basis of race. View "Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, OH" on Justia Law

Miller and his pastor Wellons wanted to buy investment land for $790,000. Miller formed Fellowship, with eight investment units valued at $112,500 each, to purchase the land and recruited investors. Miller and Wellons did not purchase units, but Miller obtained a 19.5% interest as Fellowship’s manager and Wellons obtained a 4.5% interest as secretary. Miller secured $675,000 in investments before closing and obtained a loan from First Bank, representing that DEMCO, one of Miller’s development companies, needed a $337,500 loan that would be paid within six months. Because DEMCO pledged Fellowship’s property, First Bank required a written resolution. The resolution contained false statements that all Fellowship members were present at a meeting, and that, at this nonexistent meeting, they unanimously voted to pledge the property as collateral. Fellowship’s members, other than Miller and Wellons, believed that the property was being purchased free of encumbrances. After the closing, $146,956.75 remained in Fellowship’s account. Miller then exchanged his ownership in Fellowship for satisfactions of debts. Despite having no ownership interest, Miller modified and renewed the loan. Later Miller told Fellowship members the truth. Miller was convicted of two counts of making false statements to a bank, 18 U.S.C. 1014, and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The Sixth Circuit affirmed conviction on one count of false statements, but vacated and remanded the other convictions. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

REX was unsuccessful in privately obtaining easements from defendants to install an interstate natural-gas pipeline authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under a coal mine in Ohio and had to condemn the easement, 15 U.S.C. 717f. REX built the pipeline and gas began flowing in 2009. Defendants believed that safety concerns regarding the pipeline would delay its mining permits and accelerated its mining, resulting in unanticipated costs associated with inefficient mining techniques. In valuing the easement, the district court determined that the defendants suffered no compensable damages to its coalmining operations as a result of the pipeline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that FERC found as a matter of fact that the pipeline would not compromise mining and that the two operations could co-exist. View "Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC v. 4.895 Acres of Land, More or Less" on Justia Law

Tompkins was injured when she slipped in a pool of water on the floor and fell at McNamara Terminal in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport (DTW). She sued Northwest Airlines, which she alleged had possession and control of McNamara at the time; Wayne County Airport Authority (WCAA), which owns DTW; and Kimco, which provided janitorial services. Contractors involved in the installation and repair of an allegedly leaky roof were brought into the suit as third party defendants. Her claims against WCAA were for liability under the public building exception to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 691.1406; claims against Northwest and Kimco were based on theories of failure to inspect and maintain the premises. The district court granted the contractors, WCAA, and Kimco summary judgment, but denied Northwest’s motion on procedural grounds. A jury awarded $3,198.80 in damages, of which only $1,439.46 was attributable to Northwest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Northwest had constructive notice of the condition. View "Tompkins v. Crown Corr, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007 Hamilton Township imposed impact fees of about $2,100 per lot on developers of residential property. Salt Run, a residential developer, sought to avoid the fees by annexation to the Village of Maineville. Unable to stop the annexation in court, Hamilton Township imposed a lien on the property. Salt Run ultimately defaulted on its loan as a result of funding an escrow so that it could sell the property, despite the lien. Salt Run sued the Township, alleging a takings claim. While the case was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Hamilton Township had no authority to impose the fee. The district court granted judgment in favor of Salt Run on some claims but denied its claim that the lien amounted to an unconstitutional taking. Salt Run appealed that ruling and sought attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Salt Run was not a prevailing party and characterizing the suit as, at most, asserting an improper “collection mechanism.” View "Vill. of Maineville, OH v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law