Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

T-Mobile proposed to build a cellular tower in an area of West Bloomfield Township, Michigan, that had a coverage gap. After deciding that sites in the township zoning ordinance’s cellular tower overlay zones were infeasible, T-Mobile decided that the best option would be to construct a facility at a utility site on property owned by Detroit Edison. The facility contained an existing 50-foot pole, which T-Mobile wanted to replace with a 90-foot pole disguised to look like a pine tree with antennas fashioned as branches. The township denied special approval. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of T-Mobile in a suit under the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Five stated reasons for denial of the application were not supported by substantial evidence and the denial had “the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services” in violation of 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). View "T-Mobile Central, LLC v. Twp. of W. Bloomfield" on Justia Law

Frankenmuth, “Michigan’s Little Bavaria,” is a tourist destination, famous for Bavarian-themed stores, family-style restaurants, and the world’s largest year-round Christmas store. Plaintiffs own a 37-acre tract just outside city limits. A 2003 property-tax appraisal valued the land at $95,000. It has been used as farmland for nearly 100 years. Under a joint agreement with the township, about 15 acres on the western portion of the property was zoned as Commercial Local Planned Unit Development, with the remaining 22 acres designated as Residential Planned Unit Development. In 2005, the plaintiffs agreed to sell 23.55 acres to Wal-Mart for $125,000 per acre. Wal-Mart had 180 days to determine the feasibility of its plan and was permitted to, for any reason, cancel and receive a refund of the $50,000 deposit.” The city first enacted a moratorium and then rezoned a relatively small area, including the property. Wal-Mart cancelled the agreement and a jury awarded plaintiffs $3.6 million for selective zoning. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the city harbored animus against the plaintiffs, as opposed to animus against Wal-Mart and gave inaccurate instructions on damages. View "Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth" on Justia Law

A Stonefire loan officer, contacted the Lees and convinced them that they could refinance and lower their mortgage payment, get rid of private mortgage insurance, and consolidate credit card debt. They signed papers that they did not read, agreeing to pay Stonefire a brokerage fee of $7000.00 and a processing fee of $995, and that the exact amount of “additional compensation,” would be disclosed at closing. The additional compensation was the “Yield Spread Premium,” to lower up-front closing costs. The lender paid a Premium of 3.5 percent, which increased the interest rate on the loan. The Lees received a variable rate a five percent higher than the fixed rate on their prior loan. At closing, they signed a HUD-1 settlement statement that described a “[p]remium pd to broker by lender to Stonefire” of $5670 paid outside closing. The district court granted summary judgment to the lender on conspiracy and civil fraud claims and to Stonefire on the claim of civil conspiracy. The Lees and Stonefire settled. With respect to the lender, the Sixth Circuit affirmed as to fraud, but reversed on the civil conspiracy claim; Ohio case law prohibits lenders from knowingly conspiring with brokers to conceal mortgage costs, from borrowers. View "Lee v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued behalf of themselves and all other purchasers of title insurance in Ohio from March 2004 through the present. They alleged that 22 title-insurance companies and the Ohio Title Insurance Rating Bureau violated antitrust laws (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; Ohio Rev. Code 1331.01) by conspiring to set unreasonably high title-insurance rates. The title-insurance companies filed rates with the Ohio Department of Insurance through OTIRB, a properly licensed rating bureau. Plaintiffs claimed that it was impossible for the Department to review the reasonableness of the rates collectively set by defendants because those rates are based principally on undisclosed costs, which allegedly included “kickbacks, referral fees and other expenses designed to solicit business referrals.” The district court dismissed, holding that the filed-rate doctrine applied to title insurance, and foreclosed claims for monetary damages and that Ohio statutes (Title XXXIX) completely foreclosed federal and state antitrust claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that there are at least 45 similar cases, nationwide. The filed-rate doctrine, which limits antitrust remedies available to private parties, is irrelevant because the actions are barred by state law. View "Katz v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins." on Justia Law

The debtors are limited partnerships that own real estate on which they operate low-income housing. In their Chapter 11 cases, the bankruptcy court concluded that, for purposes of determining the value of the secured portion of the bank’s claims under 11 U.S.C. 506(a), determination of the fair market value of various apartment complexes included consideration of the remaining federal low-income housing tax credits. The court also concluded that various rates and figures used by the bank’s appraiser were more accurate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A major component of the value of the bank’s claims was determination was whether the value of the remaining tax credits would influence the price offered by a hypothetical willing purchaser of the property that serves as collateral for the claims. View "In re: Creekside Senior Apts" on Justia Law

Washington Mutual foreclosed on property before receiving assignment and transfer of the promissory note and the delinquent home mortgage and before recording it. The homeowner brought a lawsuit for an allegedly false claim of ownership under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, against the law firm acting for the purported mortgagee. She claimed violation of the Act, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. The district court dismissed, finding that she did not state a claim under the Act and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The filing of foreclosure action by the law firm, claiming ownership of the mortgage by its client, constituted a "false, deceptive or misleading representation" under the Act because the bank had not obtained transfer of the ownership documents. The homeowner adequately alleged that the misidentification caused confusion and delay in trying to contact the proper party concerning payment and resolution of the problem. View "Wallace v. WA Mut. Bank, F.A." on Justia Law

In 2007, Debtor purchased a manufactured home, borrowing the funds from Creditor and granting a security interest. Creditor filed an application for first title and a title lien statement in Whitley County, Kentucky. The seller of the manufactured home is located in Whitley County. Debtor resided at the time in Laurel County, Kentucky. Later, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet issued a Certificate of Title for the Manufactured Home showing the lien as being filed in Whitley County. In 2010, Debtor filed his voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The Chapter 7 Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court avoided the lien, 11 U.S.C. 544. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The statute requires that title lien statements be filed in the county of the debtor’s residence even if the initial application for certificate of title or registration is filed in another county under KRS 186A.120(2)(a). View "In re: Pierce" on Justia Law

In 2001, the Conservancy sold a 100.10 acre farm in Garrard County, Kentucky to the Sims for $60,084, in addition to a $244,939 charitable pledge from the Sims to the Conservancy. The property appraised at $260,400 without the easement at issue, which requires that the land "be retained forever substantially undisturbed in its natural condition and to prevent any use . . . that will significantly impair or interfere with the Conservation Values of the Protected Property." The Conservancy received an annual right to enter and inspect the property. In January 2005, the Conservancy inspected and documented several violations that concerned excavating and filling a sinkhole. The Sims corrected several other violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the Conservancy, concluding that, although the easement allowed some changes to the topography in conjunction with authorized activities, like plowing for commercial agriculture, the easement specifically prohibited the substantial alteration of filling in a sinkhole with an estimated 6,269 cubic yards of fill. The court awarded the Conservancy $99,796.41 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Wife serves in the U.S. Air Force and executed a military power of attorney designating husband as her attorney-in-fact during her deployment overseas. Husband presented a photocopy of this instrument to the Fayette County Clerk to recording an original deed and mortgage in the real property index records. The clerk’s office rejected the copy as inauthentic and refused to record the documents. The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which claimed that rejection of the power of attorney violated 10 U.S.C. 1044b. That statute sets the minimal requirements for executing a military power of attorney and prohibits states from imposing additional requirements. During the pendency of appeal, the couple submitted an original military power of attorney and the documents were recorded. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The unnotarized copy of the power of attorney lacked an essential element of a military power of attorney and did not qualify for 1044b(a) protections.

Federal tax assessments against husband arose out of his failure to file returns, report income, or pay tax, 1986 through 1993. Unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest totaled $901,052.17 as of January 2010. Wife paid $40,227.30 in full satisfaction of a separate assessment based on an audit of her 2000 return, resulting in dismissal of claims against her personally. The district court granted summary judgment to the government with respect to the assessment against husband and reduced the tax liability to judgment. The government moved for foreclosure of the lien and sale of the entire property. Since the property was held by the couple as tenants by the entirety, husband’s individual tax lien attached to his partial contingent survivorship interest in the property, which would have minimal value if sold separately. The court found that the property would bring $160,000 at a foreclosure sale and was subject to a mortgage of $14,572.36. Wife, age 60, testified to her limited income and sentimental attachment to the home where she had lived for 29 years. The court declined to force a sale (26 U.S.C. 7403). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for reconsideration under the "Rodgers" factors.