Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

TVA's “15-foot rule” provided that TVA would remove all trees from rights-of-way if the trees had the potential to grow over 15 feet tall, even if the trees did not pose a threat to power lines. Owners claimed that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the TVA to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the rule because it was a new major federal action. Following two remands, TVA conceded that the rule violated NEPA and asserted that it had published a notice in the Federal Register to inform the public that it would prepare a programmatic EIS to evaluate the 15-foot rule. The court issued an injunction but stated that the plaintiffs would need to file a separate lawsuit to challenge the sufficiency of the EIS. TVA later successfully moved to dissolve the injunction, claiming that it had held a statutory public comment period and issued a final programmatic EIS, rejecting the 15-foot rule and adopting “Alternative C: Condition-Based Control Strategy.”The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court has not yet determined, in light of the administrative record, whether TVA took a hard look at the environmental consequences of its action, and TVA’s action has not been shown to be so different from the 15-foot rule as to warrant a whole new suit to obtain judicial review. View "Sherwood v. Tennessee Valley Authority" on Justia Law

Hurst sought a loan modification in 2018. Caliber notified Hurst that her application was complete as of April 5, 2018, that it would evaluate her eligibility within 30 days, that it would not commence foreclosure during that period, and that it might need additional documents for second-stage review. On May 1, Caliber requested additional documents within 30 days. Although Hurst responded, she did not meet all of Caliber’s requirements. On May 31, Caliber informed Hurst that it could not review her application. Hurst sent some outstanding documents on June 7, but her application remained incomplete. Caliber filed a foreclosure action on June 18. Hurst spent $13,922 in litigating the foreclosure but continued working with Caliber. Caliber again denied the application as incomplete on August 31 but eventually approved her loan modification and dismissed the foreclosure action.Hurst filed suit under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that Caliber violated Regulation X’s prohibition on “dual tracking,” which prevents a servicer from initiating foreclosure while a facially complete loan-modification application is pending, 12 C.F.R. 1024.41(f)(2); failed to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining documents and information necessary to complete her application, section 1024.41(b)(1); and failed to provide adequate notice of the information needed to complete its review (1024.41(b)(2)). The district court granted Caliber summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the “reasonable diligence” claim. Hurst identified communications where Caliber employees provided conflicting information and had trouble identifying deficiencies. View "Hurst v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying the motion filed by Protect the Peninsula, Inc. to intervene as a matter of right in an action brought by a group of wineries and an association representing their interests (collectively, the Wineries) against a Michigan municipality over several zoning ordinances that regulate vineyards, holding that the district court erred.Protect the Peninsula, Inc., a local advocacy group, moved to intervene in this action brought against Peninsula Township challenging the zoning ordinances regulating the vineyards' activities as unconstitutional and in violation of state laws. Protect the Peninsula moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), but the district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Protect the Peninsula satisfied each of Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements. View "Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass'n v. Township of Peninsula, Michigan" on Justia Law

After a judicial foreclosure proceeding for delinquent property taxes, the county generally sells the land at a public auction and pays any proceeds above the delinquency amount to the owner upon demand. Ohio's 2008 land-bank transfer procedure for abandoned property permits counties to bring foreclosure proceedings in the County Board of Revision rather than in court and authorizes counties to transfer the land to landbanks rather than sell it at auctions, “free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.” The state forgives any tax delinquency; it makes no difference whether the tax delinquency exceeds the property’s fair market value. The Board of Revision must provide notice to landowners and the county must run a title search. Owners may transfer a case from the Board to a court. After the Board’s foreclosure decision, owners have 28 days to pay the delinquency and recover their land. They also may file an appeal in a court of general jurisdiction. Owners cannot obtain the excess equity in the property after the land bank receives it.After Tarrify’s vacant property was transferred to a landbank, Tarrify sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the transfers constituted takings without just compensation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Tarrify’s motion to certify a class of Cuyahoga County landowners who purportedly suffered similar injuries. While the claimants share a common legal theory—that the targeted Ohio law does not permit them to capture equity in their properties after the county transfers them to a land bank—they do not have a cognizable common theory for measuring the value in each property at the time of transfer. View "Tarrify Properties, LLC v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

In 2001, Presbyterian, a nonprofit, organized a partnership to operate an affordable housing community under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), 26 U.S.C. 42, program. SunAmerica, the limited partner, contributed $8,747,378 in capital for 99.99% of the $11,606,890 LIHTC credit. The partnership agreement gave Presbyterian (for one year following the 15-year LIHTC Compliance Period) a right of first refusal (ROFR) to purchase the property for less than the fair market value and a unilateral option to purchase for fair market value under specific circumstances. Before the end of the Compliance Period, Presbyterian expressed its desire to acquire the Property. After the Compliance Period, the General Partners told SunAmerica that they had received a bona fide offer from Lockwood and that Presbyterian could exercise its ROFR. SunAmerica filed suit.The district court granted SunAmerica summary judgment, reasoning that the Lockwood offer did not constitute a bona fide offer because it was solicited for the purpose of triggering the ROFR. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. The ROFR provision must be interpreted in light of the LIHTC’s goals, including making it easier for nonprofits to regain ownership of the property and continue the availability of low-income housing. The district court erred in concluding that the evidence “overwhelming[ly]” showed that the General Partners did not intend to sell. View "SunAmerica Housing Fund 1050 v. Pathway of Pontiac, Inc." on Justia Law

Barber owns land adjacent to Mill Pond and the Mill Pond Dam (built 1836) in Springfield Township, Michigan. Parts of her property “run directly into the Mill Pond” and include parts of the pond itself. The Township and the County (Defendants) are jointly responsible for maintaining the Dam. In 2018, Oakland County conducted a study. The Township ultimately recommended removing the Dam. Defendants hired engineering firms and allocated money to the project. A local newspaper article titled “Mill Pond Dam to be Removed Next Year,” ran in March 2021. Barber alleges that removing the Dam, among other things, will decrease her property value, interfere with her riparian rights, deprive her of her right to use and enjoy her land, physically damage her property, “will likely pollute, impair and destroy natural resources, including . . . surface water, wetlands, and wildlife and natural habitat,” and “may cause flooding and property damage.” She sought to enjoin the Dam-removal project, alleging that it would constitute a taking under the federal and Michigan constitutions and a trespass under Michigan law.The district court granted the Defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding Barber’s claims ripe, and that she has standing to sue. She plausibly alleges that she faces a risk of “concrete” and “particularized” injuries. Plaintiffs may sue for injunctive relief even before a physical taking has happened. View "Barber v. Charter Township of Springfield, Michigan" on Justia Law

The Rice family planned to annex their 80-acre farm into the Village of Johnstown and have it zoned for residential development. The Johnstown Planning and Zoning Commission rejected the Rice application at the preliminary stage. The family claimed that Johnstown had unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Commission, violating its due process rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The district court held that because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in adjacent Monroe Township, the family lacked standing to bring its claim and granted Johnstown summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Whatever the merits of the claim, the family has standing to bring it. Because the Johnstown ordinance has since been amended, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Only the claim for damages survives. Establishing standing at the summary judgment stage requires “a factual showing of perceptible harm.” The family alleges that because of Johnstown’s unconstitutional delegation to the Commission, its zoning application was subjected to a standardless and conclusive review by allegedly private parties who acted for arbitrary reasons; they have shown a procedural injury. While a procedural right alone is insufficient to create Article III standing, the family’s procedural injury is tied to its economic interest in developing its property. Without the Commission’s approval, their development plans could not proceed; the family is no bystander. View "Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio" on Justia Law

Under 26 U.S.C. 170(h), taxpayers who donate an easement to a land conservation organization may be eligible to claim a charitable deduction on their federal income tax returns if the easement’s conservation purpose is guaranteed to extend in perpetuity. A Department of Treasury rule, 26 C.F.R. 1.170A-14(g)(6), provides that if unforeseen changes to the surrounding land make it “impossible or impractical” for an easement to fulfill its conservation purpose; the conservation purpose may still be protected in perpetuity “if the restrictions are extinguished by judicial proceeding and all of the donee’s proceeds . . . from a subsequent sale or exchange of the property are used by the donee” to further the original conservation purpose. Proceeds are calculated by a formula in 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), the “proceeds regulation.”After the IRS denied its charitable deduction, Oakbrook challenged the proceeds regulation, arguing that, in promulgating this rule, Treasury violated the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act; that Treasury’s interpretation of section 170(h) is unreasonable; and that the proceeds regulation is arbitrary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in rejecting those arguments. Oakbrook’s deed to the conservation trust violated the proceeds regulation by ascribing a fixed rather than proportionate value upon judicial extinguishment, and by subtracting from this amount any post-donation improvements that Oakbrook made to the land. View "Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The Army Corps of Engineers designed a stormwater diversion system for Pond Creek, which drains into a large watershed in the Louisville area. It included Pond Creek’s tributary, Fishpool Creek, and a nearby basin, Vulcan Quarry. The Corps suggested connecting the two through a spillway. The Corps partnered with Metro Sewer District (MSD). MSD filed an eminent domain action. The court awarded MSD only an easement over the quarry and refused to impose water treatment obligations on the easement. MSD’s stream construction permit from the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet did not require treatment of the water or cleaning up any pollutants.In 2000, the project was completed. South Side bought Vulcan Quarry in 2012 and claimed that MSD had exceeded its easement by diverting all of Fishpool Creek. In 2018, South Side sent MSD notice of its intent to sue for violations of the Clean Water Act’s (CWA) “prohibition on the dumping of pollutants into U.S. waters,” the easement, and Kentucky-issued permits. The district court dismissed certain claims as time-barred and others because the notice failed to identify sewage as a pollutant, provide dates the pollution took place, and describe the source of the pollution.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MSD did not need a CWA discharge permit when it built the spillway and does not need one now. The waters of Fishpool Creek and Vulcan Quarry are not meaningfully distinct; the spillway is the kind of water transfer that is exempt from the permitting process. View "South Side Quarry, LLC v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District" on Justia Law

Canton’s 2006 Tree Ordinance prohibits the unpermitted removal, damage, or destruction of trees of specified sizes, with exceptions for agricultural operations, commercial nurseries, tree farms, and occupied lots smaller than two acres. If Canton issues a permit, the owner must replace removed trees on its own or someone else’s property or pay into Canton’s tree fund. For every landmark tree removed, an owner must replant three trees or pay $450. For every non-landmark tree removed as part of larger-scale tree removal, an owner must replant one tree or pay $300.In 2016, Canton approved the division of F.P.'s undeveloped property, noting the permitting requirement. The parcels were bisected by a county drainage ditch that was clogged with fallen trees and debris. The county refused to clear the ditch. F.P. contracted for the removal of the trees and debris and clearing other trees without a permit. Canton determined that F.P. had removed 14 landmark trees and 145 non-landmark trees. F.P. was required to either replant 187 trees or pay $47,898. F.P. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for F.P. on its as-applied Fifth Amendment claim; although the ordinance, as applied to F.P., was not unconstitutional as a per se physical taking, it was unconstitutional as a regulatory taking and as an unconstitutional condition. Canton has not made the necessary individualized determination; the ordinance fails the “rough proportionality” required by Supreme Court precedent. View "F.P. Development, LLC. v. Charter Township of Canton" on Justia Law