Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates
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Tammy Livingston, individually and as a beneficiary and co-trustee of the Livingston Music Interest Trust, sued her mother, Travilyn Livingston, over the termination of copyright assignments and associated royalties for songs authored by Jay Livingston. Jay had assigned his copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company owned by Travilyn. Travilyn later invoked her statutory right to terminate these copyright grants and filed termination notices with the U.S. Copyright Office. Tammy challenged these terminations, claiming her rights as a beneficiary were affected.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Tammy's complaint, holding that it failed to state a claim. Tammy appealed the decision, arguing that the termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid, and that she retained a state law right to receive royalties from the songs covered by the terminated agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the 2003 California probate court order, which declared that the Family Trust held no ownership interests in Jay's copyrights, precluded Tammy's claims. The court also found that Jay had validly executed the copyright grants as an individual, not as a trustee, and that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music at the time of the assignments. Additionally, the court rejected Tammy's arguments regarding the termination notices' compliance with federal requirements, noting that she failed to plead specific factual allegations for most of the notices. Finally, the court held that Tammy did not identify a state law basis for her claim to royalties, thus failing to meet the pleading standards under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). View "Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc." on Justia Law

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Lester Warren Martin, a renowned pediatric surgeon and successful investor, passed away in 2020, leaving behind a substantial estate. He had created a revocable trust in 1990, which was to be distributed equally among his five children. After one of his daughters, Sarah Stewart, passed away, her share was to be divided between her two children, Daniel Stewart and Rachel Kosoff. In 2018, Lester gave his son, David Martin, power of attorney and made him the trustee of the revocable trust. David distributed $13,930,000 from the trust, mostly to Lester’s four living children, with a smaller portion to Daniel and Rachel.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that David breached his fiduciary duties by making distributions without specific written authorization from Lester, as required by the trust. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on liability and dismissed their remaining claims. A jury trial determined that David owed Daniel and Rachel $2,086,000 in damages. David later filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not have a legal right to sue under Ohio law. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Daniel and Rachel had Article III standing, as they alleged a concrete monetary injury traceable to David’s actions and redressable by the court. The appellate court vacated the district court’s order granting relief from judgment and remanded the case for the district court to rule on David’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding the necessity of expert testimony to prove damages. The appellate court affirmed the denial of David’s motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs’ damages testimony. View "Stewart v. Martin" on Justia Law

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John O’Hara pleaded guilty to wire fraud and bank fraud for misappropriating funds from his mother, Sally Thrush. Thrush passed away shortly after his plea, leaving O’Hara as the sole beneficiary of her estate. At sentencing, the district court ordered O’Hara to pay over $300,000 in restitution to Thrush’s estate, despite knowing that O’Hara would likely receive the restitution as the estate’s beneficiary. Four years later, the district court amended the judgment to direct O’Hara to pay the federal Crime Victims Fund instead of the estate.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky initially sentenced O’Hara to twenty-six months in prison and ordered him to pay restitution to his mother’s estate. After O’Hara’s release from prison, the district court, prompted by the government, amended the judgment to substitute the Crime Victims Fund as the payee, reasoning that allowing O’Hara to receive his own restitution would be contrary to the intent of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court did not have the authority to modify the final judgment to substitute a new payee. The appellate court held that the MVRA, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2), does not provide the statutory authority to amend a restitution order post-judgment. The court emphasized that a final restitution order can only be modified under specific statutory provisions, none of which applied in this case. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case. View "United States v. O'Hara" on Justia Law

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Joel M. Guy, Jr. murdered his parents in 2016 with the intent to collect the proceeds from his mother’s insurance plans. His mother had life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance through her employer, naming Guy and his father as beneficiaries. Guy was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and abuse of a corpse by a Tennessee jury.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee determined that Guy would be entitled to the insurance proceeds if not disqualified. However, the court ruled that Guy was disqualified under Tennessee’s slayer statute or federal common law, which prevents a murderer from benefiting from their crime. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Guy’s family members, who argued that Guy was not entitled to the benefits. Guy appealed, arguing that ERISA preempts Tennessee’s slayer statute and that no federal common-law slayer rule applies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that ERISA does not explicitly address the issue of a beneficiary who murders the insured, and thus, either Tennessee law or federal common law must apply. The court found that both Tennessee’s slayer statute and federal common law would disqualify Guy from receiving the insurance proceeds. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that Guy’s actions disqualified him from benefiting from his mother’s insurance plans under both state and federal law. View "Standard Insurance Co. v. Guy" on Justia Law

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Gayle died in 2006. Attorney Johnston filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions on behalf of Gayle in 2016 and 2018 at the request of Gayle’s daughter, Elizabeth, the Administratrix of her mother’s probate estate. After the dismissal of the 2018 petition, Elizabeth, pro se, filed three Chapter 13 petitions on Gayle’s behalf. The Chapter 13 Trustee sought sanctions against Bagsby after she filed yet another Chapter 13 petition.The bankruptcy court ordered Johnston to show cause why he should not be subject to sanctions for filing the two Chapter 13 petitions on behalf of a deceased person. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court reopened the first two cases and issued sanctions sua sponte against Johnston and Bagsby. The bankruptcy court determined that Johnston failed to conduct any inquiries or legal research, there was no basis in existing law to support a reasonable possibility of success, and the cases were filed for the express purpose of delaying foreclosure actions. The bankruptcy court concluded Johnston violated Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sanctions order. Johnson had admitted to the factual findings. The bankruptcy court was not required to find that Johnson acted in bad faith, in a manner “akin to contempt of court,” or with a specific mens rea but only whether Johnston’s conduct was reasonable. View "Johnston v. Hildebrand" on Justia Law

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Born in 1967, Carroll was raised by a single mother near Albert Barber's property. Albert’s younger sister was Arlene. Albert died in 1998. . In 2000, Arlene informed the Geauga County Probate Court that she had lost Albert’s will and possessed only an unsigned copy. She filed an application to probate the will. The court found that all interested parties were given appropriate notice and admitted the will. The court distributed most of the estate— land worth $232,000 and slightly over $30,000 in other assets—to Arlene under the will.Carroll claims that in 2018, Arlene told her that Albert was Carroll’s father. Carrol sued, claiming that Arlene submitted an invalid version of Albert’s will to an Ohio probate court and that she should have inherited Albert’s estate. The district court concluded that she lacked standing and that the probate exception to federal jurisdiction barred it from hearing her claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing her lack of standing. Carroll has not plausibly pleaded that the Barbers’ misconduct injured her, that they left her any worse off. Even given an opportunity to contest Albert’s will, Carroll would not have been eligible to contest Albert’s will under Ohio law when he died. View "Carroll v. Hill" on Justia Law

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The Blasingames filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. CJV purchased their debts to two banks, each arising from personal guarantees made to secure loans to businesses that failed. The Blasingames claimed that they owned no real property, owned personal property worth $5,700, and had a total monthly income of $888. The bankruptcy trustee and CJV successfully argued against the discharge of their debts. The bankruptcy court noted that the debtors had repeatedly concealed assets, including through the use of closely-held, interconnected corporations and trusts. CJV sued the Blasingames, their children, and those entities and trusts. CJV prevailed on two fraudulent transfer claims for transfers of money and of real property to trusts. CJV appealed the dismissal of claims based on reverse alter ego or reverse veil piercing; the denial CJV’s motion to certify to the Tennessee Supreme Court the question of whether Tennessee would recognize such theories; and the denial of CJV’s motion for leave to amend its complaint to add to its legal theories that the trusts were “self-settled.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding “no persuasive data” to conclude that Tennessee’s high court would embrace the reverse piercing claims; reverse piercing is not a novel or unsettled area of law and certification was unnecessary. The failure of CJV to realize it could have made claims under a self-settled theory is not an adequate reason for a nearly five-year delay; the prejudice to defendants was apparent and substantial. View "Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Earl Blasingame" on Justia Law

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Winget created the Trust, retaining the right to revoke the Trust at any time and to receive income generated by the trust property during his lifetime. He also served as the trustee with broad powers. Venture (a company owned by Winget) sought a loan from Chase. Winget guaranteed the loan both in his individual capacity and as a representative of the Trust. Venture defaulted on the loan, Chase sued. During one of six previous appeals, the Sixth Circuit held that the guarantee agreement limited Winget’s personal liability to $50 million but did not limit the Trust’s liability. Winget paid Chase $50 million; the Trust has not satisfied its obligation and now owes $750 million. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Chase could recover that money from the Trust property. Under Michigan law trusts can enter into contracts and satisfy their contractual obligations through the trust property. Creditors can sue to recover from the trust property, just like with any other contract. Under Michigan law and the trust agreement, Winget had the power to enter into contracts on behalf of the Trust. The court rejected Winget’s argument that he “owns” the trust property because he can revoke the Trust and pays taxes on the trust property and that Chase cannot take the property to satisfy the Trust’s obligation. The trust property would not be used to satisfy Winget’s personal liability but would be used to satisfy the Trust’s liability. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget" on Justia Law

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Robert was admitted to a nursing home multiple times. During his final stay, he fell out of bed, sustained a head injury, and later died. His estate sued in state court, alleging negligence, negligence per se, violations of Kentucky’s Residents’ Rights Act, KRS 216.515(26), corporate negligence, medical negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. The nursing home sought to enforce an arbitration agreement in federal court. The district court held that no valid agreement covering the final visit existed. An Agreement dated January 5, 2015 displays a mark of some kind in the “Signature of Resident” block, but it is difficult to read. Bramer’s estate alleges that this scrawl is a forgery; Robert's widow stated in an affidavit that neither she nor Robert signed that form. On an Agreement dated January 26, 2015, the widow signed in the “Signature of Resident” block. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreements are identical, bind successors and assigns, and require arbitration of a wide range of disputes. They purport to remain in effect through discharge and subsequent readmission. Although signing the Agreement was not a condition of admission, it was presented as part of the admissions packet. The estate presented evidence that the staff implied that signing the Agreement was required. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. By requesting a second agreement on January 26, the nursing home effectively abandoned the first agreement. Lacking Robert’s consent, there was no valid agreement to arbitrate. View "GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek v. Estate of Bramer" on Justia Law

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Robert died in July 2015, owing a mortgage amount of $113,358.12 on his Detroit home; the monthly mortgage payments. For five months following his death, the mortgage went unpaid. Bayview Loan Servicing sent a delinquency notice to the home in December 2015, showing an unpaid balance of $5,813.95. In November 2016, Bayview foreclosed and purchased the home by sheriff’s deed at public auction. Bayview sold the home to Tran. In May 2017, Robert’s estate filed a complaint, alleging four causes of action against Bayview, including lack of standing to foreclose under the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. 1701j-3 and MICH. COMP. LAWS 445.1626. The district court held that the Garn-St. Germain Act does not authorize a private right of action and did not apply to the’ claims. The Sixth Circuit vacated, concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the federal statute does not create a cause of action, and the federal issue nested inside the state law cause of action is not substantial. View "Estate of Cornell v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law