Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Laster is an African American male who worked as a Public Safety Officer for the KDPS for 23 years. He alleges that KDPS subjected him to heightened scrutiny, selectively enforced policies, and was complicit when individual employees harassed and discriminated against him, and that the disparate treatment was attributable to race or to his complaints about discrimination. He specifically cited a 2006 performance evaluation downgrade, followed by a grievance and reversal; denials of a request to attend outside training and of other requests; reprimands; and tampering with his Obama screensaver. Laster filed two charges with the EEOC. While those were pending, Laster was involved in a conflict with other KDPS officers at an event during which President Obama was present. Information about the incident was released to a newspaper. Laster resigned and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court analyzed the claims for “Race Discrimination” and “First Amendment Retaliation” and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded, stating that activity protected by the First Amendment is different than the type of activity protected by Title VII. Analysis of the Title VII race discrimination claim was insufficient for dismissing the Title VII retaliation claim; the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII retaliation claim is substantially different from the “adverse employment action” element of a Title VII race discrimination claim. That Laster cannot show that he was constructively discharged is not dispositive of the retaliation claim, given evidence of other adverse actions. View "Laster v. City of Kalamazoo" on Justia Law

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1202(a) allows states to enact and administer regulatory programs consistent with federal standards, subject to federal approval. Kentucky’s Department for Natural Resources assumed responsibility for SMCRA implementation through its Division of Mine Permits, Ky. Rev. Stat. 350.028, .465(2). Its program has been approved by the U.S. Department of the Interior since 1982. A typical surface mining operation also requires permits under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251: a 401 permit for “discharge into the navigable waters;” a 402 permit for “discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants;” and a 404 permit for “discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” A 404 permit is issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in compliance with EPA guidelines, 33 U.S.C. 1344(b)(1). Kentucky authorized a Perry County surface mining operation; the operator obtained 404 permit from the Corps, authorizing it to “mine through” and fill surface stream beds, which are already in a degraded state, requiring offset of the limited environmental effect by improving other streams in the watershed. Opponents argued that the National Environmental Policy Act required the Corps to consider the public health impacts related to surface mining in general, and that the Corps violated the CWA by using flawed analysis of the mitigation plan. The district court rejected the arguments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Driving a stolen vehicle and wearing face masks, Jackson and Ivery arrived at a bank, intending to commit robbery, but were confronted by an off-duty Canton police officer working security. The officer drew his weapon and yelled “police!” After gunfire between Ivery and the officer, Jackson ran across the street. In a parking lot, he approached Sara Binegar, driving her car. Jackson opened the door, pointed a gun, and told her to “scoot over,” then tried to sit on her. Bineger escaped through the passenger door. Jackson drove away in Bineger’s car. Jackson was convicted of aggravated robbery and attempted kidnapping. At sentencing, Jackson argued that the convictions were for allied offenses of similar import under Ohio law and requested merger. The court denied the request, after comparing the elements of the offenses and stating that “one could [commit] the offense of kidnapping without committing the offense of aggravated robbery and vice versa.” The court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years for aggravated robbery and five years for attempted kidnapping. State courts rejected appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state court decision was not contrary to or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law concerning Double Jeopardy. View "Jackson v. Smith" on Justia Law

The employers were formerly contributing members of the Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan. In 2007-2008 each employer reached an agreement with the Plan to terminate its membership. They were required to pay, and have paid, “withdrawal liability” reflecting each employer’s share of unfunded, vested pension benefits under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1381–1461. Under the Act, if the plan is terminated altogether by a “mass withdrawal” of the remaining members within three years, the earlier withdrawing members may be subject to additional “reallocation liability.” Disputes about the amount of such reallocation liability are subject to mandatory arbitration. The employers claim that a 2009 mass withdrawal was expedited to occur within the three-year period in order that they would be subject to reallocation liability. The Plan trustees sought more than $12 million in additional funds from the employers. The district court dismissed their suit for failure to complete arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Act requires that the claim of “sham” mass withdrawal be arbitrated. View "Knall Beverage, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan" on Justia Law

In 2011, an Ohio man released more than 50 exotic animals before committing suicide. Partially in response, the state enacted the Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, Ohio Rev. Code 935.01–935.99. All persons in possession of dangerous wild animals before September 5, 2012, were required to register with the Ohio Department of Agriculture and to microchip each registered animal upon registration. The Act prohibits possession of a dangerous wild animal after January 1, 2014. A person already in possession of a dangerous wild animal and wishing to continue to possess the animal after that date may obtain a wildlife shelter permit or a wildlife propagation permit. Owners of exotic animals challenged the Act as violating First Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech, arguing that the permitting requirements are so onerously expensive that the only viable means of compliance would be to join the Association of Zoos and Aquariums or the Zoological Association of America, for which there are exemptions. They argued that they are compelled to associate with those organizations and to subsidize the organizations’ speech and that the microchipping requirement constitutes a physical taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The owners are not compelled to join the AZA or ZAA and the Act does not effect a physical taking.View "Wilkins v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Mitchell was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A Presentence Investigation Report classified Mitchell as an “armed career criminal” under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) on account of having committed three violent felonies: a 1988 conviction for robbery under now-repealed Tenn. Code 39-2-501(a); (2) a 2003 conviction for robbery under Tenn. Code 39-13-401; and a 2003 conviction for intentionally evading arrest in an automobile. The Report assigned Mitchell a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Mitchell to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the two robbery convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Caspeta, a Mexican citizen born in 1973, attempted to enter the U.S. in 1999, using a border pass issued to another individual, and was sentenced to 90 days of custody and 2 years of supervised release for violating 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(3). The sentence was suspended. He was escorted across a bridge back to Mexico and was given an Order instructing him that he was prohibited from re-entering the U.S. for five years and that if he wished to re-enter the U.S. he would first need to obtain the permission of the Attorney General. The Notice included a warning that violation would be subject to prosecution for a felony. In 2012, Caspeta was convicted of a traffic offense in Detroit and was charged with unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). He argued that once more than five years had elapsed since his removal, so that the statute did not require him to obtain consent prior to reentry. He was found guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutory scheme does not eliminate the need for consent after five years, but only makes consent possible after five years. View "United States v. Romero-Caspeta" on Justia Law

Elmore pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography and received a below-guidelines sentence of 51 months in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting arguments that the district judge unfairly treated Elmore’s abusive childhood as an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor in sentencing; placed unreasonable weight on the need to punish and deter Elmore; and skewed the sentence upward by comparing Elmore’s sentence to a harsher regional subset of cases, rather than looking to sentencing practices nationally, and relying on a “gut feeling,” rather than informed reason. The court properly weighed the various competing sentencing objectives and accorded due weight to factors calling for leniency in Elmore’s case. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Foythong, a Thai citizen, came to the U.S. in 2001 as a non-immigrant visitor and did not leave when his visa expired. In 2004, Foythong, still married to his Thai wife, married a U.S. citizen, Langevin, who sought to adjust Foythong’s status to lawful permanent resident based on the marriage. After investigating, DHS issued notice of intent to deny the petition on the ground that the marriage was a sham, based on significant discrepancies in testimony. Langevin withdrew the petition; the marriage ended. In 2010, Foythong married again, 12 days before a scheduled removal hearing. His third wife, Clark, a U.S. citizen, requested a marriage-based visa on his behalf. DHS denied the petition. Michigan does not recognize consular divorces, rendering ineffective Foythong’s effort to divorce his Thai wife through a consulate in Chicago. DHS stated that the fraudulent marriage to Langevin precluded Foythong from any future adjustment of status based on marriage. The immigration judge ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. In 2013, Foythong asked the Board to reopen his case, stating that he had legally divorced his first wife and married Clark. The Board denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit denied review, citing 8 U.S.C. 1154(c), which imposes a one-strike rule, so that, after one prior finding of a sham marriage, immigration authorities must reject all future efforts at adjustment of status based on marriage. View "Foythong v. Holder" on Justia Law

Rorrer worked as a Stow firefighter from 1999 until July, 2008. On July 4, 2008, Rorrer lost all vision in one eye in a bottle-rocket accident unrelated to his work. The city terminated Rorrer because of his monocular vision. In September, 2008, the surgeon who operated on Rorrer’s eye cleared Rorrer to return to work without restriction. Rorrer arranged a return-to-work physical with Dr. Moten, the Department physician. After examining Rorrer, Moten’s colleague, Dr. Henderson, told Rorrer he should be able to return to duty without restriction, but qualified this statement by written cautions about using a self-contained breathing apparatus and driving at high speeds. Fire Chief Kalbaugh took the position that Rorrer was unfit to return to work and told Rorrer to call Moten, who told Rorrer that he “was sorry” for the “confusion” but that Rorrer could not return to work because “fire regs” would not allow it. National Fire Protection Association guidelines state that monocular vision compromises the firefighter’s ability to safely perform an essential Job Task. Rorrer claimed that the city had never adopted or applied those guidelines. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims of disability discrimination and impermissible retaliation (for Rorrer’s opposition to discipline of another firefighter) under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ohio law, and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of First Amendment and ADA retaliation claims, but reversed as to the other ADA and Ohio discrimination claims.View "Rorrer v. City of Stow" on Justia Law