Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1993, Dr. Dargie was a student at the UT College of Medicine. In 1994, Middle Tennessee Medical Center agreed to pay Dargie’s tuition, fees, and other reasonable expenses for attending UT. After graduation and completion of his residency, Dargie was required to repay MTMC’s grant by either working as a doctor in the medically underserved community of Murfreesboro for four years or repaying two times the uncredited amount of all conditional award payments he received. MTMC paid UT $73,000 on Dargie’s behalf. After completing his medical training in 2001, Dargie chose to practice in Germantown, near Memphis. In 2002, Dargie repaid $121,440.02. In 2005, the Dargies filed an amended tax return for 2002, claiming they had “inadvertently omitted an ordinary and necessary business expense” on their Schedule C for the $121,440 repayment. The IRS disallowed the deduction under I.R.C. 162. The Dargies sued. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the repayment was a personal expense and, regardless, no deduction would be allowed under I.R.C. 265(a)(1) because the amount was allocable to income the Dargies had received tax-free. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the repayment a personal expense.View "Dargie v. United States" on Justia Law

Gentry has psoriasis, a chronic autoimmune condition causing patches of raised skin covered with flaky buildup of dead skin cells that crack and bleed and can interfere with sleeping, walking, sitting, standing, and using one’s hands. She also has psoriatic arthritis, an inflammatory disease that causes fatigue, stiffness and swelling in and around the joints, tenderness, pain and swelling in the tendons, swollen fingers and toes, and reduced range of motion. There is no cure for either condition. Gentry suffered severe injuries to her ankle, arm and wrist, and hip in a 1994 car accident and developed avascular necrosis and post-traumatic arthritis. She requires a brace on her leg to walk, has a limp and waddling gait, and has frequent pain in her leg and foot, back, neck, and hands. She also has deformities in her foot, ankylosing spondylitis cervical radiculopathy, cervical stenosis, lumbar spondylosis, possible sacroilitis or facet arthropathy in the low back, degenerative joint disease in the low back, chronic lumbar strain, possible herniated disc carpal tunnel syndrome, and lumbosacral/thoracic radiculopathy, among other things. In 2004, Gentry (age 29) applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42. U.S.C.401. She had worked 10 years as a pizza maker and delivery driver. She had most recently worked as a receptionist, but was discharged because her psoriasis bled on the paperwork. After Gentry’s application was denied, the case was remanded twice. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial as not supported by substantial evidence. View "Gentry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

In 2011 Rizzo filed a voluntary petition for personal Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a general discharge. Despite his discharge, the Michigan Department of Treasury sent collection letters demanding that he pay $72,286.39 in delinquent Single Business Tax that had been assessed against a company, for which Rizzo had been an officer. Rizzo filed an adversary action, contending that his personal liability for the unpaid SBT had been discharged in bankruptcy. Treasury claimed that liability for the SBT deficiency is a nondischargeable “excise tax” debt under 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8)(E). The bankruptcy court agreed and dismissed. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rizzo’s argument that the debt was derivative, not primary, and therefore not an excise tax. Rizzo conceded that the unpaid SBT was an “excise tax” deficiency as to the company and did not dispute that he was personally liable for the company’s unpaid tax under state law. Michigan law simply confers derivative liability upon Rizzo for precisely the same excise tax deficiency that was assessed against the company. View "Rizzo v. MI Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

Javery began working for Lucent as a software engineer in 1998 and participated in Lucent’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, qualified disability plan, administered by CIGNA. In November 2002, he reported back pain. His family doctor, Dr. Dorado, prescribed medicine and testing, and recommended some time off work. In January 2003, after Lucent transferred him from Ohio to Illinois, Javery sought treatment from another physician, Seymour. The pain worsened. In May 2005, Javery stopped working on Dr. Seymour’s advice. Lucent approved and paid short term disability benefits from until those benefits expired in November 2005. Lucent notified CIGNA that it believed Javery might be eligible for long term benefits. Javery applied, submitting extensive medical evidence of his pain and resulting cognitive impairment and of his successful application for Social Security disability benefits, but the claim was denied. In addition to claiming that Javery had not shown that he was “disabled” as that term is defined in the Plan, CIGNA claimed that Javery should be judicially estopped from pursuing his ERISA claim because Javery failed to disclose the claim in his Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy action. The district court upheld the denial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Javery v. Lucent Tech., Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old girl (SW) ran away from her foster home with only her purse. A friend introduced her to Willoughby, 34-year-old, 360-pound a crack dealer and Toledo pimp. Willoughby told SW that she could live with him and his eight-year-old daughter. SW had no money or driver’s license. Willoughby began having sex with SW. SW felt that she had no choice but to comply with his request that she engage in prostitution, because she was “scared of him.” He instructed her, provided her with various sex trade items, and drove her to customers’ houses, waiting outside. When SW returned to Willoughby’s car, he took the money. Willoughby also took SW to a notorious prostitution “track,” and left her alone, with instructions to “walk” for johns. Willoughby began beating SW. To convince Willoughby to let her leave, SW bit her lip hard enough to draw blood, and made herself vomit, “[t]o make him think I was throwing up blood, I was sick.” Willoughby returned SW to her foster home. SW’s foster parents called the police. The next day, officers obtained a search warrant for Willoughby’s home, where they found evidence of SW’s prostitution. Convicted of sex trafficking a minor through force, fraud, or coercion (18 U.S.C. 1591(a), (b)), Willoughby was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Willoughby" on Justia Law

Slyusar worked as a social worker in Ukraine. She joined a private organization and agreed to record unlawful non-cash pensions distributed by her office. She reported pension fraud, identifying officials by name. Slyusar took the report to a radio station. After it broadcasted the report, Slyusar received threats to her life and her children’s lives. She claimed that at one point, she was taken to a police station, where people screamed at her and ordered her to sign papers confessing to slander, then disrobed and beat her. They allegedly placed Slyusar in a cell, where she was raped by three men. She claims she was poisoned during her week in prison. Slyusar’s husband was living in the U.S., caring for his grandmother. Although she claims to have been in hiding, she divorced her husband after her release. She claims a second detention and beating, after which she was hospitalized. She fled to the U.S., using a Russian passport as Julia Pusharova. She married a citizen and applied for adjustment of status; DHS initiated removal. An IJ denied asylum and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, finding discrepancies between her testimony and the evidence. Slyusar’s asylum application was not timely filed and she failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied review. View "Slyusar v. Holder" on Justia Law

The dismembered remains of Abby’s friend were found in plastic bags on a lawn in Buena Vista. Technicians found Abby’s fingerprints on the bag and bits of the victim’s flesh on a saw that Abby had borrowed. The police charged Abby with murder. Abby retained attorney Gust. Gust entered his appearance on Abby’s behalf. Abby retained another attorney, Piazza, weeks later. Both appeared on Abby’s behalf, sometimes separately and sometimes together. Only Gust was present when Abby’s trial began. After jury selection, Abby objected to proceeding without Piazza. The court indicated that it was inclined to proceed without Piazza. The next morning, both Gust and Piazza appeared. Piazza indicated that Gust was “lead counsel” but that “Abby is on a different plane with that.” The prosecutor rejected a proposal that he lead with less significant witnesses to accommodate Piazza’s schedule. Abby’s conviction was affirmed. The district court rejected a habeas petition in which Abby argued that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and that Gust was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has not held that a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is necessarily violated when his secondary retained counsel has a scheduling conflict precluding attendance at trial. Abby was not prejudices by Gust’s performance. View "Abby v. Howe" on Justia Law

As an assembler with Eaton Corporation, McClain purchased the highest level of long-term disability insurance, which was “designed to replace ... 70 percent of [her] monthly base pay.” She stopped working in January 2008, due to a back injury she suffered on the job in June 2007. She received benefits during the first 24 months under the First Tier of the Plan’s coverage, which defined disability as being “totally and continuously unable to perform the essential duties of your regular position with the Company, or the duties of any suitable alternative position with the Company.” After 24 months, the Plan to an “any occupation” standard, providing Second Tier coverage if “you are totally and continuously unable to engage in any occupation or perform any work for compensation or profit for which you are, or may become, reasonably well fit by reason of education, training or experience--at Eaton or elsewhere.” The Plan denied her claim for benefits because her treating physician opined McClain could work part-time, and a market study identified various part-time positions in the area for which she was qualified. The district court rejected her suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the determination was not arbitrary.View "McClain v. Eaton Corp. Disability Plan" on Justia Law

Officers Hampton and Lyons received a radio communication of a report of an ongoing breaking-and-entering. The caller, Mays, was home and people were attempting to break through her front window. The officers arrived about 10 minutes later, parked their marked cruiser a few houses away, and approached on foot. They noticed McMullin standing close to the caller’s home, then walking toward the officers. Hampton advised McMullin to stop and show his hands. McMullin complied, stating that he was “here for [his] people.” Concerned for their safety and believing that McMullin might be a suspect, the officers frisked McMullin. Mays and her boyfriend, testified that they attempted to tell the officers before the search that McMullin was not the perpetrator. Officer Hampton testified that he had no contact with them before searching McMullin. During the search, Hampton felt a gun in McMullin’s waistband and recovered a revolver. McMullin admitted that he did not have a gun permit and was arrested. Lyons then approached the home and that Mays believed that the perpetrator was her landlord. McMullin was not charged with breaking-and-entering, but was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, under 28 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to suppress, McMullin conditionally pleaded guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers’ reasonable suspicion that McMullin was involved in the crime justified their stop and frisk. View "United States v. McMullin" on Justia Law

Mylan manufactures generic Duragesic, a drug to treat pain. It consists of fentanyl (active ingredient) and a “transdermal system” (patch that delivers the drug). Kelly’s estate claimed that the patch caused Kelly’s death by delivering an excessive amount of fentanyl, alleging strict products liability, negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, warranty, and violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. The district court dismissed, based on Mich. Comp. Laws 600.2946(5), which provides that “drug” manufacturers are immune from suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Michigan defines “drug” using the federal definition, 21 U.S.C. 321: (A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C). Michigan’s definition provides that a “drug” is not a “medical appliance or device.” Immunity might not apply to a product, like the patch, that has mechanical (rather than chemical) effect on the body. Under the federal definition a product might be neither “drug” nor “device” but a “combination product.” Whether a combination product is regulated as a drug or a device is left to the Secretary’s discretion. View "Miller v. Mylan, Inc." on Justia Law