Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hanna, born in 1979, is a citizen of Iraq. Hanna and his family left Iraq in 1990, moving to Canada, with permission to live and work in that country. In 1993 Hanna’s parents obtained U.S. permanent resident status through Hanna’s sister, a citizen. In 1993, Hanna entered the U.S. as a nonimmigrant. Hanna’s parents sought permanent resident status for Hanna. While the petition was pending, Hanna attended school in Canada. By overstaying his visitor’s visas, Hanna attended a U.S. high school, worked at the family business, and obtained a Michigan driver’s license. Hanna was admitted as a lawful permanent U.S. resident in1998. His Canadian permanent resident status expired. In 1996, Hanna, then 17 years old, was arrested for threatening a man with a three-inch folding knife during an argument. Charges were twice dropped, but the state reinstated charges of felonious assault and driving with a suspended license. The court sentenced him to 30 days in jail and two years of probation. The government commenced removal proceedings, charging him as having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), with Iraq as the country of removal. Hanna sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that being a Chaldean Christian placed him at risk in Iraq. After reopening, an IJ stated that an alien who “firmly resettled” in another country before arriving is not eligible for asylum and that Hanna was bound to his first attorney’s concession of removability. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed the holding that Hanna’s admission-concession was binding and remanded for determination of whether Hanna’s offense was a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Hanna v. Holder" on Justia Law

Kentucky law prohibits businesses that sell substantial amounts of staple groceries or gasoline from applying for a license to sell wine and liquor, Ky. Rev. Stat. 243.230(7). A regulation applies the prohibition to retailers that sell those items at a rate of at least 10% of gross monthly sales. A group of grocers sued the Kentucky Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, alleging that the law irrationally discriminated against them in violation of state and federal equal-protection rights; that it violated state separation-of-powers principles by granting the administrative board unfettered discretion to define the law; and that it violated state and federal due process rights by vaguely defining its terms. A liquor store intervened as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to the grocers on the federal equal-protection claim but rejected the other claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, upholding the statute. Applying the rational basis test, the court reasoned that the statute conceivably seeks to reduce access to high-alcohol products, and offends neither separation of powers nor due process principles. View "Maxwell's Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner" on Justia Law

Elyria Detective Welsh asked Powell, a confidential informant and Defendant’s cousin, if he knew of anyone illegally trying to sell guns. Powell called to report that Defendant was trying to sell a handgun and identified a location. Welsh, with officers Fairbanks and Lantz, caught up with Defendant and Powell minutes later at a gas station-convenience store, where Powell was pumping gas while Defendant sat in the passenger seat. When Powell left the gas station, the detectives followed in a marked cruiser. Powell immediately made two left turns without signaling. The detectives attempted to pull the car over. The detectives could see and hear Defendant telling Powell to keep driving. Powell eventually pulled over, but Defendant jumped out of the car and tried to escape on foot. Welsh was right behind Defendant and saw Defendant digging into his waist band. A few seconds later, Welsh saw a handgun in Defendant’s hand. Fairbanks tackled Defendant, sending the loaded gun flying. The detectives searched Defendant and found 2.4 grams of crack cocaine and five hydrocodone pills. Convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Defendant was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motions for discovery and to suppress, but remanded for resentencing bases on the court’s application of the four-point firearm enhancement of U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). View "United States v. Seymour" on Justia Law

Black was arrested for driving without a license. He had a starter pistol in his waistband and a live 7.62 caliber round in his pocket. A search of the car revealed five loaded firearms in its trunk. Black was convicted of three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Because he had three prior convictions for violent crimes, Black was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the National Firearms Act (NFA), 26 U.S.C. 5845(e), resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines base offense level of 34 and a range of 262-327 months. The district court sentenced Black to 300 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings relating to the issue of whether Black suffered from a severe mental disease or defect; to the judge’s refusal to instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity; and to the validity of the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Black also argued that the district court improperly construed the National Firearms Act, which raised his base offense level based on the type of firearm he possessed. See USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). View "Black v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiffs entered into a five-year oil and gas lease covering 47 acres in Ross Township, Ohio, and granting Chesapeake exclusive rights to “all oil and gas and their constituents” for $5.00 per mineral acre per year and a royalty on production. The lease provides for extension, if “Operations” are being “conducted on the Leasehold, or on lands pooled, unitized or combined with all or a portion of the Leasehold.” In 2011, Chesapeake submitted drilling-permit applications for property that did not include Plaintiffs’ property. Later, Chesapeake filed a “Declaration and Notice of Pooled Unit,” consisting of 21 properties, including Plaintiffs’ property, and declared that “operations and/or production … anywhere within the Unit shall be deemed to be operations and/or production on each separate tract sufficient to extend and maintain each included lease in the Unit.” It specified that production from the unit would be allocated among all leases in the unit proportional to the surface area of each lease. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the lease expired; Chesapeake filed a counterclaim. The district court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Chesapeake’s actions did not extend the lease because the lease required that a permit application pertaining to the leased property or a property already unitized with the leased property, be filed before the expiration of the lease. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. View "Henry v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC" on Justia Law

Deleon, a 53-year-old Hispanic male, was employed by the Kalamazoo County Road Commission for 28 years. Beginning in 1995, he was an “Area Superintendent” and generally received positive reviews. Deleon alleges a pervasive atmosphere of racial insensitivity and derogatory comments. In 2008, a vacancy arose for an “Equipment and Facilities Superintendent,” described as being in a garage with exposure to loud noises and diesel fumes. After an interview, Deleon did not receive the position. His computer skills were insufficient. In 2009, Deleon was involuntarily transferred to the position. Deleon objected, claiming that, in applying for the position, he demanded a raise because of the “hazard posed by diesel fumes and poor ventilation.” He did not receive a raise. Deleon claims that he developed bronchitis, a cough, and sinus headaches, and would blow black soot from his nostrils. Deleon’s first evaluation indicated that his performance was “acceptable in most critical areas but [was] not sufficiently above minimum satisfactory level in all areas.” Days after a fractious meeting with his supervisor, Deleon was hospitalized for five days. He claimed a work-induced mental breakdown and took eight months’ FMLA leave. Deleon’s psychiatrist cleared him to return to work, but the Commission had terminated him. Finding that Deleon did not suffer an “adverse employment action,” the district court dismissed his claims of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that there was sufficient evidence of conditions that would support discrimination claims and that the fact that Deleon applied for the position did not disqualify him from showing that the employment action was “adverse.”View "Deleon v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Road Comm'n" on Justia Law

The former miner sued in 1992 and an administrative law judge determined that he was not medically qualified for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901 and indicated that Arkansas Coals was not the “responsible operator” required to pay benefits. About 17 years later, the miner filed a second claim. After finding that his medical condition had worsened and that he was now disabled, an ALJ awarded benefits and determined that Arkansas Coals was the responsible operator. The Benefits Review Board and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the company’s finality, waiver, and collateral estoppel arguments; the miner was entitled to bring a second claim under 20 C.F.R. 725.309(d)(4) and the determination that Arkansas Coals was the responsible operator was not “necessary” to the resolution of the initial claim. Substantial evidence supports the determination that Arkansas Coals is the responsible operator. View "Arkansas Coals, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Maynes, a miner who developed pneumoconiosis after working in Consolidated’s coal mine for 25 years, received benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, from 1997 until he died of respiratory failure in 2003. His widow sought survivors’ benefits. The then-current version of the BLBA conditioned her eligibility for benefits on proof that pneumoconiosis either caused or hastened her husband’s death. Her 2003 claim was denied. The Benefits Review Board and Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, which amended the law so that survivors are automatically entitled to benefits if the miner received BLBA benefits during his lifetime. Congress specified that the changes would apply to claims filed after January 2005, but did not address whether persons whose claims had been denied under the previous eligibility framework, could receive benefits by filing a subsequent claim. The issue was answered in the affirmative by the Benefits Review Board and affirmed by the Third and Fourth Circuits. Although the Department of Labor, an administrative law judge, and the Benefits Review Board agreed Maynes was entitled to benefits, they disagreed about the appropriate commencement date for benefits. The Sixth Circuit rejected Consolidated’s appeal, upholding the 2009 commencement date. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Maynes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s neighbor, Yassine called the Dearborn police and reported that plaintiff was standing in the yard, staring into his window, and appeared to be intoxicated. Sergeant Peer arrived, interviewed Yassine, and approached plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff claims that he had chased his dog into the yard, then returned to his porch, where officers attacked him without warning. Plaintiff did not identify which officers took specific actions. Another neighbor testified that she saw two officers strike plaintiff and that the officers then departed and plaintiff got up and walked away. The officers and Yassine testified that plaintiff lunged at Officer Peer and that other officers took him down, arrested him, and drove directly to the police station. A video showed that plaintiff hit his head against the cage of the patrol car several times, contradicting plaintiff’s account. Medical examinations showed symptoms “suggestive of impaired consciousness.” Younes sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment on state law claims of gross negligence as to the officers and battery as to Peer, but denied summary judgment on other claims, finding that issues of material fact remained concerning immunity. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, reasoning that the officers did not concede the most favorable view of the facts to plaintiff. View "Younes v. Pellerito" on Justia Law

Youngstown police attempted to pull over a stolen Cadillac believed to be involved in an earlier robbery. The driver attempted to flee and hit an unmarked police car that had its lights on as it drove toward the Cadillac. As the pursuit, which involved nine officers, continued, passengers in the Cadillac (driven by Christian) shot rifles at the pursuing police cars. Christian’s first state court trial ended in verdicts of not guilty on nine counts of felonious assault and in a hung jury on the remaining seven counts of complicity to felonious assault. The state sought to retry Christian on the seven complicity counts. Christian filed a habeas petition, claiming violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that complicity to felonious assault and felonious assault are not the same crime and that no ultimate fact necessary for his conviction of complicity to felonious assault was determined by the jury at the first trial. View "Christian v. Wellington" on Justia Law