Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals
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Mateen pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) after police discovered more than 600 images of child pornography on his computer. In 2006, Mateen had pleaded guilty to Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of Ohio Revised Code 2907.05. The state-court plea colloquy indicated that his victim was an eight-year-old girl. The district court imposed a ten-year statutory maximum term of imprisonment, concluding that a statutory enhancement (18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2)) for recidivist sexual offenders did not apply to because Mateen’s prior conviction for Gross Sexual Imposition did not necessarily involve a minor or ward. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state statute under which he was convicted covers several possible offenses and the information concerning the viction was not essential to Mateen’s guilty plea.View "United States v. Mateen" on Justia Law

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Adams and Cooper were among 14 defendants charged, in a 39-count indictment, with conspiring to distribute cocaine and cocaine base (crack cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. Both pleaded guilty. Based on prior offenses, the district court found Adams and Cooper to be career offenders, applied the U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 sentencing enhancement, and sentenced them to 165 months and 120 months of imprisonment, respectively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the application and constitutionality, under the Sixth Amendment, of the career-offender guidelines. Adams’s Tennessee conviction of aggravated assault did not qualify as a crime of violence under the categorical approach, but court documents demonstrated that Adams necessarily pleaded guilty to a Class C felony. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

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Shepard was convicted of three counts of receipt of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and one count of attempted receipt and was sentenced to 168 months in prison and five years on supervised release. The district court also imposed a $400 special assessment, ordered Shepard to pay $3,000 in restitution to a child victim, and imposed special conditions of supervision, prohibiting any access by Shepard to computers, cameras, or video equipment without prior written approval. The Sixth Circuit remanded for retrial, finding error in the court’s failure to replace a juror who asserted he would not view the pornographic images presented as evidence.View "United States v. Shepard" on Justia Law

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Until 2001 Dean and Suiza competed to process and sell bottled milk to retailers. Suiza was the largest U.S. processor of milk and Dean was the second largest. Both purchased raw milk from other entities. DFA, a dairy farmer cooperative, was Suiza’s primary supplier and business partner. Dean obtained its raw milk predominantly from independent farmers. Dean and Suiza merged in 2001, becoming Dean Foods, hoping to obtain “distribution efficiencies and economies of scale,” for millions of dollars in cost savings. Certain agreements were negotiated, with input from the Department of Justice, which approved the proposed merger, subject to divestment of particular milk processing plants. Retailers of processed milk sued, charging violation of 15 U.S.C. 1, the Sherman Antitrust Act, by conspiring with a raw milk supplier-milk processor and the purchaser of the divested processing facilities to divide markets and restrict output. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dean Foods, finding insufficient proof of injury and failure to establish the relevant antitrust geographic market, primarily because plaintiff’s expert’s testimony was excluded. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the expert should not have been excluded and that the conclusions regarding injury were based on flawed propositions. View "Food Lion, LLC v. Dean Foods Co." on Justia Law

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McGuire was convicted of the kidnaping, rape, and aggravated murder of Joy Stewart and was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court summarized the evidence presented in mitigation and determined that the aggravating factors carried sufficient weight to support the sentence. Following sentencing, McGuire’s appellate counsel, which had not represented him at trial or at sentencing, did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the state appellate court affirmed the sentence of death. The Ohio Supreme Court deemed the claim forfeited. A federal district court denied a habeas petition and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a motion under FRCP 60(b), McGuire sought to re-open a claim asserting the ineffectiveness of trial counsel arising from their failure to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of trial, relying upon the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Martinez v. Ryan, and arguing that the procedural default for this claim should be excused because his counsel on state post-conviction review was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial. McGuire did not demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances required to justify relief from final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).View "McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

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The Fillers planned to demolish an unused Chattanooga factory. They knew the site contained asbestos, a hazardous pollutant under the Clean Air Act. Environmental Protection Agency regulations require removal of all asbestos before any demolition. Asbestos materials must be wetted, lowered to the ground, not dropped, labeled, and disposed of at an authorized site. Fillers hired AA, a certified asbestos surveying company, which estimated that it would cost $214,650 to remove the material safely. Fillers hired Mathis to demolish the factory in exchange for salvageable materials. Mathis was required to use a certified asbestos contractor. Mathis applied for an EPA demolition permit, showing an estimated amount of asbestos far less than in the AA survey. The agency’s asbestos coordinator contacted Fillers to verify the amount of asbestos. Fillers did not send the survey, but provided a revised estimate, far less than the survey’s estimate. After the permit issued, the asbestos contractor removed “[m]aybe, like, 1/100th” of the asbestos listed in the AA survey. Temporary laborers were hired, not equipped with protective gear or trained to remove asbestos. Fillers supervised. The work dispersed dust throughout the neighborhood. An employee of a daycare facility testified that the children were unable to play outside. Eventually, the EPA sent out an emergency response coordinator and declared the site an imminent threat. Mathis and Fillers were convicted of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, and violations of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413(c). Fillers was also convicted of making a false statement, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C.1519. The district court sentenced Mathis to 18 months’ imprisonment and Fillers to 44 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Mathis" on Justia Law

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Individual plaintiffs alleged that they were illegally stopped, searched, or detained by the U.S. Border Patrol for the Sandusky Bay Ohio Station, based upon their Hispanic appearance, race and ethnicity. They claimed that in the three years the station has been open, 61.8% to 85.6% of those apprehended have been Hispanic, and use of racial slurs by agents. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief and monetary damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986, and claimed that agents had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The complaint alleged conspiracy between the Border Patrol and municipalities, police chiefs and individual officers, to violate the civil rights of Hispanics. An amended complaint added the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, as a source of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs settled their claims with local agencies. The district court denied plaintiffs’ request to add claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 and dismissed, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to establish waiver of sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The APA section 702 waiver of sovereign immunity extends to all non-monetary claims against federal agencies and their officers sued in their official capacity, regardless of whether plaintiff seeks review of “agency action” or “final agency action” as set forth in section 704.View "Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol" on Justia Law

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The Tribe bought land from the City of Lansing to build a class III gaming facility, using funds appropriated by Congress for the benefit of certain Michigan tribes. The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act provides that land acquired with the income on these funds shall be held in trust by the federal government. Michigan obtained an injunction to prevent the Tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that the submission would violate a compact between the state and the Tribe. That compact requires that a tribe seeking to have land taken into trust for gaming purposes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B), secure a revenue-sharing agreement with other tribes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state did not seek to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, so IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the property at issue will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe. View "Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe" on Justia Law

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Plambeck owned two Kentucky chiropractic clinics that treated patients injured in car accidents, including some State Farm customers. All of the treating chiropractors were licensed to practice in Kentucky. Plambeck was not, although he was licensed elsewhere, and did not treat any patients in Kentucky. State Farm assumed that Plambeck had a license because Kentucky law requires chiropractic practitioners and owners of chiropractic clinics to hold one. When State Farm discovered that Plambeck lacked a state license, it stopped paying the clinics and sued Plambeck to recover all payments since 2000. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm and awarded $557,124.78 in damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Kentucky common law claims for recovery of funds mistakenly paid are based on unjust enrichment. Because State Farm and the clinics never had a contractual relationship, the only applicable theory would require State Farm to show that it paid money to the clinics not due “either in law or conscience.” State Farm did not offer such proof. View "State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Newburg Chiropractic" on Justia Law

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Ogle, born in 1954, worked in underground coal mines for 21 years, most recently in 1996 in Kentucky. Ogle smoked since age 12. He sought black lung benefits in 2007. After the record closed but before the ALJ issued a decision, Congress revived a rebuttable statutory presumption that a coal miner who worked in an underground mine for at least 15 years and suffers from a total respiratory or pulmonary disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). The ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Ogle suffered from totally disabling respiratory impairment, a conclusion with which all medical opinions agreed. The ALJ stated that the presumption shifts the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that either the miner’s disability does not, or did not, arise out of coal mine employment or the miner did not, suffer from pneumoconiosis. The Fund demonstrated that Ogle did not suffer from clinical pneumoconiosis, but failed to rebut the presumption that Ogle suffers from legal pneumoconiosis. The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no evidence that the ALJ improperly restricted the Fund’s ability to rebut the 15-year presumption or that the ALJ applied the wrong standard. View "Big Branch Res., Inc. v. Ogle" on Justia Law