Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hocker drank a six-pack of beer and drove to the home of his sometimes-girlfriend. A protective order directed Hocker not to go to her house. The woman called 911, reporting that Hocker was “highly intoxicated” and “suicidal” and that he had just left her home in a red Honda. Officers saw a red Honda with its headlights off speed past their police cruisers. They gave chase, using lights and sirens. Hocker denies seeing or hearing the officers during the seven-mile pursuit. After Hocker pulled off the road into a gravel driveway and stopped, the officers exited their cruisers with guns drawn and ordered Hocker to show his hands and turn off his car. Hocker put his vehicle in reverse, accelerating, and rammed a cruiser, moving it 30 feet. The officers opened fire on Hocker’s vehicle and forcibly removed a severely wounded Hocker from his car. After pleading guilty to wanton endangerment, fleeing or evading police, and driving under the influence, Hocker sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The district court rejected the claims on grounds of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Hocker v. Pikeville City Police Dep't" on Justia Law

McKenzie’s creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2008. McKenzie filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition a month later. The cases were consolidated and converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Several weeks before the involuntary petition was filed, McKenzie executed a promissory note and a pledge in favor of GKH for unpaid legal fees. The pledge listed several entities in which McKenzie held an interest, ranging from an “auto mall” to a farm. GKH filed a proof of claim for $750,000, describing the collateral as “Real Estate” and “Other” and sought relief from the automatic stay. The Trustee opposed relief on the ground that the pledge constituted a preferential transfer. The bankruptcy court granted relief with respect to certain real estate, but denied relief as to equity interests. The bankruptcy court held that McKenzie had not validly conveyed his equity interests in certain entities to GKH, that the Trustee could use his hypothetical lien-creditor status and avoidance powers defensively to defeat GKH’s security interest, and that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because of GKH’s conduct. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that GKH had the burden of establishing the validity of its claimed security interest and that a trustee may use his hypothetical lien-creditor status and avoidance powers to oppose relief from the automatic stay after expiration of the statutory limitation on avoidance actions under 11 U.S.C. 546(a)(1)(A).View "In re: Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison v. Still" on Justia Law

Ramage, born in 1933, worked for Island Creek for 28 years, five years underground and 23 years on the surface. In 2007 he sought black lung benefits. While the claim was pending, Congress revived a statutory rebuttable presumption that a coal miner who worked in an underground coal mine for 15 years and suffers from a total respiratory or pulmonary disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4), applicable to pending claims filed after January 1, 2005. The ALJ noted that x-rays did not show pneumoconiosis, that Ramage could not complete a pulmonary function test due to a tracheostomy, and that arterial blood-gas studies were qualifying under the federal standards. The ALJ summarized the medical opinions of five doctors, including one who emphasized that it was impossible to distinguish between the damage due to coal dust as opposed to the damage due to smoking. The ALJ awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, holding that the ALJ’s determinations were reasoned and reasonable and that the legislative provisions creating the presumption are self-executing.View "Island Creek KY Mining v. Ramage" on Justia Law

The FBI investigated Alwan, an Iraqi living in Bowling Green, after his fingerprints appeared on an improvised explosive device in Iraq, and introduced Alwan to a confidential source (CHS), who recorded their conversations. CHS convinced Alwan that he was part of a group supporting Jihad. Alwan assisted in sending what he believed to be money and weapons to the Mujahidin several times and eventually asked to lead the fictional terrorist cell. CHS instructed Alwan to recruit others. Hammadi agreed to join, stating that he had participated in IED attacks on American troops and had been arrested, but bribed his way free and fled to Syria. In Syria, he applied for refugee status to immigrate to the U.S. and answered “no” when asked if he had engaged in terrorist activity. Hammadi had moved to Bowling Green on the recommendation of Alwan, whose family he knew from Iraq and whom he had met in Syria. The two transported $100,000 from CHS to a truck, believing that it would find its way to Iraq, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A. They hid rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, plastic explosives, and sniper rifles in another truck, for transport to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B. They loaded Stinger missiles into another truck and plotted to murder a U.S. Army Captain. Hammadi pleaded guilty to 10 terrorism and two immigration offenses. Rejecting claims of entrapment and sentencing manipulation, the district court imposed a life sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Hammadi would not qualify for a departure under either theory.View "United States v. Hammadi" on Justia Law

Off-duty Richmond Kentucky Police Officers visited the apartment of April McQueen by invitation, where the four adults engaged in sexual activity that “included bondage and discipline, dominance and submission and sadism and masochism.” Later, McQueen visited her neighbor, and, concerned about her appearance because she was going to meet another man, explained what had happened and asked for an ice pack or medicine for her bloodied, swollen mouth. The neighbor insisted, over McQueen’s reluctance, that the incident be reported. An investigation ensued, but McQueen refused to cooperate. Her account of the extent of her consent varied. She stated that she wanted to “forget the whole damn thing.” During grand jury testimony, McQueen stated that she allowed the men to urinate in her mouth only because one had slapped her and scared her with his aggressiveness: “That part was not consensual.” She testified that she was still scared. McQueen also testified about pressure being applied by Sheriff Department personnel. After they were found not guilty, the officers filed suit against those who had been involved in the investigation and prosecution. The district court dismissed claims against two prosecuting attorneys, on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Rogers v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

CCRC employee Henschel was covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provided for seniority rights. Hel was involved in a motorcycle accident that resulted in amputation of his left leg. CCRC hired a temporary excavator operator for Henschel’s position. Henschel had hauled the excavator to the site 70 percent of the time and other CCRC employees, 30 percent. CCRC specified hauling as a function of Truck/Tractor Driver, but did not include hauling in its Operator-Excavator job description; it included an “Other duties assigned” task. Henschel sought a waiver to maintain his commercial driver’s license. The Michigan Traffic Safety Division requested, from CCRC, an evaluation of Henschel’s ability to perform essential job functions of a truck driver, including driving a manual transmission. CCRC did not limit testing to essential functions of a truck driver, but tested Henschel for every CCRC position. The Division allowed Henschel to retain his CDL, limited to automatic-transmission vehicles. CCRC did not try to return him to the excavator but attempted to find him a truck driver position in an automatic transmission truck. The lowest seniority truck driver declined to give up his truck. Before firing Henschel, CCRC did not ask other qualified drivers if they would be willing to haul the excavator. The district court entered summary judgment or CCRC. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the essential functions of the excavator operator position. View "Henschel v. Clare Cnty. Rd. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 1993, Dixon and Hoffner beat their friend Hammer, tied him to a bed, stole his wallet and his vehicle, and then drove him into a remote area and buried him alive. One month into the investigation, Hoffner led police to Hammer’s body and Dixon provided a tape-recorded account of the kidnaping, robbery, and murder. At trial, Dixon presented no evidence and cross-examined only three of the government’s 15 witnesses. The jury convicted and recommended the death penalty, which the court imposed. Ohio courts rejected appeals and a post-conviction petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Dixon filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, improper exclusion of mitigating evidence at sentencing, and a violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state court thoroughly and thoughtfully reviewed the instructional error, and cured any error that may have occurred. Dixon presented no evidence of what his mitigation witnesses might have testified to and offered minimally helpful supporting affidavits. The state court’s conclusion that the exclusion of Dixon’s wrongful incarceration as a result of a prior false allegation was harmless was not contrary to clearly established federal law.View "Dixon v. Houk" on Justia Law

In 2009, Debtor had received an IRS Notice of Deficiency for tax year 2004, claiming additional taxes of $143,445.00, plus penalties of $28,689.00. Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in 2011. In 2011, Debtor received a Notice of Deficiency for tax years 2007 and 2008 claiming that $138,907.00 in additional taxes for 2007, plus penalties of $27,781.40, and an additional $109,648.00 in taxes for 2008, plus penalties of $21,929.60. Debtor challenged the notices. The Tax Court dismissed with respect to the notices for 2007-2008 because of the automatic stay. Post-petition, the Debtor received a $86,512.32 tax refund, based on his 2005 tax return. The Trustee claimed the refund, but Debtor returned the check to the IRS. The Trustee sought turnover of the refund; Debtor objected. The IRS tendered a check for $32,555.15 to Debtor, relating to 2005 taxes, which was received by the Trustee. Debtor sought a determination of tax liability pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 505(a)(1) and turnover of funds if the IRS’s claim was disallowed. The bankruptcy court held that the IRS’s claim of $226,142.85, pertaining to 2004 taxes, was nondischargeable and that the tax refund check for $86,512.32, which erroneously issued to the Debtor, was not property of the estate. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed as to priority and nondischargeability, because the lower court did not address the limitations period. View "In re: Winter" on Justia Law

Johnson stored marijuana in his Arkansas home for distribution in Tennessee. A conspiracy headed by others obtained large quantities of marijuana from a Texas supplier, who delivered to Johnson’s Blytheville home. Police observed three incidents of drug trafficking at Johnson’s home. Following a group of the conspirators in Blytheville, DEA agents arrested one of the drivers, who admitted to delivering four 300-pound loads of marijuana to Johnson. The officers subsequently stopped Johnson at his new Blytheville home and received permission to search it. In one bedroom and in a hallway closet, the officers found 237 pounds of marijuana and a handgun. They also seized $15,000 in cash, a black scale and three vehicles. Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell marijuana. Johnson accepted the facts as stated in his pre-sentence report, but objected to a two-level enhancement for using his home to distribute drugs. The district court applied the enhancement, sentencing Johnson to 97 months in prison, the low end of the guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The amount of marijuana and the length of time he kept it there (eight months) justified the enhancement.View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Ortega, a U.S. citizen, began an 11-day sentence of home confinement for driving under the influence on March 18, 2011. He had to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times. With prior approval, he could go to work, the doctor and church. The corrections department received a detainer for Ortega from federal immigration authorities, who issued the detainer after seeing Ortega’s DUI conviction and noticing that Ortega’s name and birth date resembled, but did not exactly match, those of an unlawful alien. As a matter of policy, the local department incarcerates any individual with an immigration detainer. On March 19, officers took Ortega to the local jail, where he remained until his release on March 22. The department did not conduct its own investigation of Ortega’s citizenship. Ortega filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. The district court dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that city officers violated his rights against deprivations of liberty without due process and against unreasonable seizures when they carried out the detainer and that the immigration agent caused those violations by issuing the detainer, and stating that qualified immunity protects all but “the plainly incompetent,” View "Ortega v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law