Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); the plea agreement stated that his offense involved 109 grams of cocaine base and that the parties would recommend a sentence within the range in the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. The district court accepted the plea. Defendant was subject to a statutory minimum sentence of 240 months of imprisonment because the prosecution moved for a downward departure for Defendant’s substantial assistance to its investigation. The district court granted further reductions for acceptance of responsibility and timely indication of intent to plead guilty, yielding an advisory range of 130 to 162 months. The court imposed a sentence of 130 months. Four years later, the Fair Sentencing Act amended the cocaine base sentencing statute (21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)). The district court found Defendant ineligible to have his sentence reconsidered. The Sixth Circuit vacated, to “give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency.” Plugging the new statutory minimums and amended Guidelines into Defendant’s original sentencing formula would yield a sentence of 70 months. The government petitioned for rehearing en banc and, while the motion was pending, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

In 2000, Rochow sold his interest in Universico to Gallagher and became President of Gallagher. As an employee of Gallagher, Rochow was covered under a LINA disability policy. In 2001, Rochow began to experience short term memory loss, chills, sweating, and stress at work. Gallagher demoted Rochow to Sales Executive-Account Manager. Because of his inability to perform his job, Gallagher forced Rochow to resign in January, 2002. In February 2002, Rochow experienced amnesia, was hospitalized, and was diagnosed with HSV-Encephalitis, a rare, severely debilitating brain infection. LINA repeatedly denied Rochow benefits stating that Rochow’s employment ended before his disability began. In 2004, Rochow sued Cigna, LINA’s parent company, alleging breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, 29 U.S.C.1104(a). In 2007 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a decision that denial of Rochow’s claims was arbitrary, not the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process, and did not appear to have been made solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries or the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries as required by ERISA. Rochow died in 2008. In 2009, the district court ordered an equitable accounting of profits and disgorgement of $3,797,867.92 under an equitable theory of unjust enrichment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Rochowl v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America" on Justia Law

Krafsur, a federal administrative law judge, hears social security disability claims, including deciding how much to award successful claimants in attorney’s fees. Krafsur alleges that Davenport, the chief judge in his office, told him that his fee awards were too low. Krafsur’s refusal to make higher awards allegedly prompted Davenport to reprimand him, deny him leave and withhold paychecks. Krafsur complained about Davenport’s actions to the Office of Special Counsel, which handles grievances from federal employees. Before the Special Counsel responded, Krafsur filed suit, claiming that Davenport’s actions violated the First and Fifth Amendments, citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, which creates a cause of action against federal officers for constitutional violations; the Administrative Procedure Act; and the Tucker Act, which authorize lawsuits against the United States for constitutional violations, 5 U.S.C. 702, 28 U.S.C. 1346. The district court dismissed on the ground that the Civil Service Reform Act remedial framework is exclusive. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Krafsur’s interpretation of the Act would make a muddle of its text, a shambles of its structure and a lost cause of its purpose. View "Krafsur v. Davenport" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Blewetts were convicted of crack cocaine offenses and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 10 years each under the 100-to-1 crack cocaine law. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as implemented by new sentencing guidelines, substantially reduced crack cocaine sentences, including the mandatory minimum sentences, 21 U.S.C. 841(b). If the Blewetts were sentenced today the quantity of crack would fall below the threshold for any statutory minimum. The district court denied retroactive resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)2 and 28 U.S.C. 994(u)3. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the old crack cocaine ratio led to mass incarceration of thousands of nonviolent prisoners under a law widely acknowledged as racially discriminatory. Although the Act was not made explicitly retroactive by Congress, the court stated that judicial perpetuation of the discriminatory mandatory minimum crack sentences would violate the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, en banc, the court held that the Act does not retroactively undo final sentences. The court noted a 142-year-old congressional presumption against applying reductions in criminal penalties to those already sentenced, 1 U.S.C. 109, and the 2012 Supreme Court decision,n Dorsey v. United States. View "United States v. Blewitt" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs allege that they ingested metoclopramide, the generic equivalent of the prescription drug Reglan, and, as a result, developed a serious neurological disorder, tardive dyskinesia. The labeling for the drugs recommends short-term use for heartburn and acute and recurrent bloating: up to 12 weeks in adults for heartburn. Reglan and metoclopramide have not been shown to be either efficacious or safe for long-term treatment; the drugs affect the brain’s movement center, typically causing involuntary, repetitive movements. Overuse can result in symptoms including tardive dyskinesia, dystonia, and akathisia, Parkinsonism, and Reglan-induced tremors. Reglan and metoclopramide have also been associated with central nervous system disorders, depression with suicidal ideation, visual disturbances, and other problems. The plaintiffs sued both the generic and brand-name manufacturers, alleging various product-liability claims. The district court dismissed, finding the metoclopramide claims preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-399f, and that the brand-name manufacturers are not liable because none of the plaintiffs ingested Reglan. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a proposed question to the Tennessee Supreme Court. View "Speed v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc." on Justia Law

A title services company may not pay a real estate agent a fee in exchange for a referral, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2607(a), with an exemption for “affiliated business arrangements.” The defendants are related title and real estate agency companies and met three prerequisites for the exemption. Home buyers claimed that the defendants fell outside the safe harbor’s coverage because they failed to satisfy a fourth condition announced in a Department of Housing and Urban Development policy statement. The district court held that the policy statement is not binding on the Department, is not otherwise entitled to deference, and does not supplement the Act’s existing safe-harbor conditions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants qualify under the exemption for affiliated businesses. View "Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Sections 401 and 402 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. 481, 482, regulate union elections and authorize the Secretary of Labor to bring suit to enforce these provisions, after a union member exhausts or attempts to exhaust internal union remedies and files an administrative complaint with the Secretary. The complaining member has one calendar month to file his administrative complaint, measured from the latest of either the date he “exhausted” his internal union remedies or the date three months after the member invoked internal union remedies “without obtaining a final decision.” In this case, the Secretary argued that a member exhausted the union’s remedies when he received the union’s final decision. The union, representing police officers working for the United States Postal Inspection Service, argued that the member’s one-month limitations period ran from the date the union sent out its final decision. The district court dismissed on the grounds that the complaining member had not filed his administrative complaint within the prescribed time period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a member has not “exhausted” his internal union remedies until he receives the union’s final decision. View "Solis v. Postal Police Officers Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff financed a purchase of residential property. Residential Finance was the lender; Chase serviced the loan. In 2011 Plaintiff sent Chase a “Qualified Written Request” under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605(e), requesting information about the amount owed on the loan, the identity of the “current holder,” the date Chase began servicing the loan, and a breakdown of accrued charges. Plaintiff disputed late fees and other charges and stated that Chase had refused a loan modification for which she qualified and had failed to provide a copy of the Note as requested. Chase sent some material, but stated that any requested information not included was either unavailable or considered proprietary; the letter did not provide the identity of the loan’s owner or information on the correctness of Plaintiff’s account, and did not provide contact information for obtaining assistance. Plaintiff sued, alleging that she made excess payments that Chase failed to credit, violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1641(f)(2), RESPA, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and conversion. Chase finally identified the owner of the loan: Fannie Mae. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to TILA, but reversed dismissal of the RESPA claim, finding that Plaintiff adequately alleged causation of damages. View "Marais v. Chase Home Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

Debtors owed delinquent real estate taxes to Summit County, Ohio, which sells outstanding tax obligations to investors as tax lien certificates. An investor purchasing such a certificate obtains a lien against the property and the right to pursue the taxpayer for the unpaid taxes, O.R.C. 5721.30-43. Plymouth filed a certificate showing its purchase of the Debtors’ tax obligation for $4,083.73 with a negotiated interest rate of 0.25%, “offered, sold, and delivered on November 3, 2010.” On October 3, 2011, Plymouth filed a second certificate, with a price of $2,045.44 and a negotiated interest rate of 18.00%. On April 17, 2012, Summit County filed a tax lien foreclosure complaint against the Debtors pursuant to pursuant to Plymouth's request for foreclosure. In May, 2012, the Debtors filed a chapter 13 plan and petition, proposing to pay interest on the tax certificates at the interest rates listed on the certificates. Plymouth filed a proof of claim based on both certificates in the amount of $10,521.46, including $2,120.00 in fees and the principal balance of $7,781.19 plus 18% interest from June 1, 2012 on both certificates. The Bankruptcy Court held that under Ohio law the appropriate interest rate for Plymouth’s tax claim was 0.25%. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Bowers" on Justia Law

Marshall pled guilty to receiving child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a) and (b)) from the time he was 15 until he was 20 years old. The district court varied downward from the guideline range and sentenced him to five years in prison, the mandatory minimum sentence for the offense, expressing concerns about the perceived harshness of that sentence. Marshall has a rare physiological condition, Human Growth Hormone Deficiency, which he believes entitles him to the Eighth Amendment protections accorded to juveniles. Although diagnosed with an I.Q. score of 87 and a mental age of 15, Marshall attended a community college part-time for four semesters, pursuing a career as a lab technician and paying his own tuition. He worked as a machine operator for a commercial bakery. He owned a car and had a credit card. He claimed that he felt like he was viewing images of his peers and that he often felt like a 15 or 16-year-old individual because of his small frame and stature. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Marshall was an adult at the time of his crimes. View "United States v. Marshall" on Justia Law