Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Volkman, an M.D. and a Ph.D. in pharmacology from University of Chicago, was board-certified in emergency medicine and a “diplomat” of the American Academy of Pain Management. Following lawsuits, he had no malpractice insurance and no job. Hired by Tri-State, a cash-only clinic with 18-20 patients per day, he was paid $5,000 to $5,500 per week. After a few months, pharmacies refused to fill his prescriptions, citing improper dosing. Volkman opened a dispensary in the clinic. The Ohio Board of Pharmacy issued a license, although a Glock was found in the safe where the drugs were stored. Follow-up inspections disclosed poorly maintained dispensary logs; that no licensed physician or pharmacist oversaw the actual dispensing process; and lax security of the drug safe. Patients returned unmarked and intermixed medication. The dispensary did a heavy business in oxycodone. A federal investigation revealed a chaotic environment. Cup filled with urine were scattered on the floor. The clinic lacked essential equipment. Pills were strewn throughout the premises. Months later, the owners fired Volkman, so he opened his own shop. Twelve of Volkman’s patients died. Volkman and the Tri-State owners were charged with conspiring to unlawfully distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); unlawful distribution of a controlled substance leading to death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 24(c)(1) and (2). The owners accepted plea agreements and testified against Volkman, leading to his conviction on most counts, and a sentence of four consecutive terms of life imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Volkman" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court held that a district court judgment entered against the Debtor was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court properly gave the district court’s findings preclusive effect as to whether the judgment was the result of the Debtor’s willful and malicious injury. View "In re: Barlow" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of murder and rape in connection with the 1987 deaths of two officers in the Army Nurse Corps, was sentenced to death in Tennessee state court. After exhausting state remedies, he sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The district court denied his petition in its entirety, but granted a certificate of appealability on a claim that the state improperly excluded mitigation evidence at his resentencing hearing. The Sixth Circuit expanded the certificate to cover claims concerning alleged prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal at resentencing; ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing; suppression of favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, improper review of the exclusion of mitigation evidence at the resentencing; and unconstitutional vagueness in the Tennessee aggravating factor applied at resentencing. The court then affirmed, except with respect to the claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The court granted a conditional writ based on the prosecutor’s statements comparing defendant to two of the most widely despised criminals of the then-recent past, repeated references to defendant as “the evil one,” and reference to the Lord’s Prayer, creating an inference “that the death penalty is mandatory through their appeal to a higher authority.” View "Cauthern v. Bell" on Justia Law

In 2004, Lampe won a $25,000 judgment against Kash. Kash could not pay his debts and sought bankruptcy protection in 2012. When he submitted a list of creditors, under Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a) Kash omitted Lampe’s residential address, listing her in care of the law firm that represented her eight years earlier. The firm stopped working for Lampe in 2004, and the notice never reached Lampe, who did not participate in the bankruptcy case, which discharged the judgment debt. After the discharge, Lampe returned to the district court, seeking to revive her judgment. The district court rejected her claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A debt is a creditor’s property, and the Due Process Clause entitles her to service of notice “reasonably calculated” to reach her before she is deprived of that property. Notification to a former attorney provides little assurance that the notice will reach the creditor. Lawyers have “no general continuing obligation” to pass information along to people they no longer represent. Nothing in the record suggested that the search for Lampe’s address would have imposed an unreasonable burden on Kash; without further investigation, any belief that the firm still worked for Lampe in 2012 was unreasonable. View "Lampe v. Kash" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2004, 1st Source Bank entered into secured transactions with the debtors for the sale or lease of tractors and trailers. The agreements granted 1st Source a security interest in the tractors and/or trailers, accounts, and in proceeds from that collateral. 1st Source filed financing statements that identified the collateral as including the specified tractors/and or trailers, and “all proceeds thereof, including rental and/or lease receipts.” The financing statements did not refer to “accounts,” “accounts receivable,” or any similar language. Later, defendant banks also entered into secured transactions with the debtors and filed financing statements that specifically referred to a security interest in “all accounts receivable now outstanding or hereafter arising.” In 2009, the debtors defaulted. 1st Source undertook repossession of the collateral securing the agreements and attempted to claim a perfected security interest and first priority in debtors’ accounts, arguing that the term “and all proceeds thereof” included accounts receivable. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that 1st Source’s financing statements were not sufficient to put defendants on notice that 1st Source claimed a security interest in accounts receivable, and holding, as a matter of Tennessee law, that “proceeds,” as used in a company’s financing statement, does not include its accounts receivable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

While employed at an insurance company, Huff used customer information to obtain credit cards, and, with the help a teenager, cell phone contracts, resulting in loss of more than $350,000. Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371; identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7); and access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2). The plea agreement stipulated that the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual applied, calculated an offense level of 22, and agreed that no other adjustments applied. There was no upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust or for use of a minor. The pre-sentence report included upward adjustment for abuse of trust, adjustment for more than 10 victims, and adjustment for use of a minor: a net offense level of 25 after acceptance of responsibility. Huff’s criminal history included prior offenses for forgery theft and attempted misuse of a credit card with concurrent sentences. The district court used the 2006 manual, applied the abuse of trust enhancement and imposed concurrent 60-month prison terms. Huff’s attorney allegedly stated that the judge would be unhappy if reversed and would impose a sentence substantially greater than originally imposed. Huff dismissed an appeal. Huff later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that an evidentiary hearing was necessary on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Huff v. United States" on Justia Law

Inmate Santiago, complaining of severe pain and a rash, was seen by Dr.Mosher on January 31. Mosher prescribed Tylenol for pain and antibiotics to treat what she thought might be Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The next day Dr. Ringle diagnosed erythema nodosum (EN), an uncomfortable but non-dangerous skin inflammation that typically disappears in about six weeks but may recur. EN has no known cure. Ringle prescribed an anti-inflammatory and an antibiotic. Four days later, Santiago was transferred to OSU Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with EN and arthralgias, a severe joint-pain condition, and prescribed an anti-ulcer agent and a different anti-inflammatory. Santiago was seen on February 20 by an OSU dermatologist, who recommended a topical steroid, compression hose, and SSKI, which may help treat EN but is not standard treatment. Each day, February 22- 25, Santiago asked prison nursing staff about the treatments. Staff denied knowledge until, on the 25th, nurses found Santiago’s unsigned chart on Ringle’s desk. Ringle had been on vacation. Mosher signed the order on February 27. Santiago received the topical steroid on February 29 and compression stockings on March 10. Santiago waited longer for the SSKI, which is a non-formulary drug. The district court rejected Santiago’s suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on the delays. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Santiago did not prove that the delay caused a serious medical need or deliberate indifference.View "Santiago v. Ringle" on Justia Law

Crockett’s former law firm subscribed to a LexisNexis legal research plan that allowed unlimited access to certain databases for a flat fee. Subscribers could access other databases for an additional fee. According to Crockett, LexisNexis indicated that a warning sign would display before a subscriber used a database outside the plan. Years after subscribing, Crockett complained that his firm was being charged additional fees without any warning that it was using a database outside the Plan. LexisNexis insisted on payment of the additional fees. The firm dissolved. Crockett’s new firm entered into a LexisNexis subscription agreement, materially identical to the earlier plan; it contains an arbitration clause. Crockett filed an arbitration demand against LexisNexis on behalf of two putative classes. One class comprised law firms that were charged additional fees. The other comprised clients onto whom such fees were passed. The demand sought damages of more than $500 million. LexisNexis sought a federal court declaration that the agreement did not authorize class arbitration. The district court granted LexisNexis summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “The idea that the arbitration agreement … reflects the intent of anyone but LexisNexis is the purest legal fiction,” but the one-sided adhesive nature of the clause and the absence of a class-action right do not render it unenforceable. The court observed that Westlaw’s contract lacks any arbitration clause.View "Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

In her representation of a client charged with alien smuggling, 8 U.S.C. 1324, Migdal, an attorney who has served as an Assistant Federal Public Defender for nearly 25 years, had a number of disagreements with the federal prosecutor, who ultimately moved for sanctions against Migdal. The prosecutor failed to follow Department of Justice policy requiring supervisory approval of sanctions requests. Despite the government withdrawing the motion and indicating that it did not believe that Migdal acted in bad faith, the district court entered orders strongly publicly reprimanding Migdal. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that the record does not support any basis for the orders. View "United States v. Llanez-Garcia" on Justia Law

Letters sent between LaDeau and his incarcerated brother, David, came to the attention of authorities. The letters, written in code, allegedly communicated ways to obtain and conceal child pornography. Investigators executed a search warrant at LaDeau’s residence and discovered flash drives containing child pornography. LaDeau was indicted for possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(A), which carried a sentencing range of zero to 10 years’ imprisonment. LaDeau moved to suppress inculpatory statements and evidence seized from his home, claiming that officers had interviewed him in a hospital while he was attending to his wife and improperly coerced his responses by threatening to inform his wife about their investigation moments before she underwent life-threatening surgery. The court granted the motion; there was no longer any admissible evidence that LaDeau had possessed child pornography. Five days before the scheduled trial the government obtained a superseding indictment, adding David as a codefendant and charging both with conspiracy to receive child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2), which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, based on evidence that had been in its possession since before the initial indictment. A charge of conspiracy to possess would not have carried the same mandatory sentence. The district court held that the charging decision warranted a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, because there was a realistic likelihood of retaliation for the successful suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ladeau" on Justia Law