Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals
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Plaintiffs, salaried employees of Metal Container, participated in the Anheuser-Busch qualified defined-benefits pension plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461 (ERISA). The plan was amended in 2000 to add that upon a change in control, the retirement benefits of a participant “whose employment with the Controlled Group is involuntarily terminated within three (3) years after the Change in Control shall be determined by taking into account an additional five (5) years of Credited Service and ... an additional five (5) years of age.” The amendment followed management’s recognition that the plan was overfunded and might attract a potential acquirer. In 2008, InBev acquired Anheuser-Busch, including its subsidiary Metal Container, in a hostile takeover that was a “change in control” under the amendment. Plaintiffs continued working for Metal Container and remained employees of Anheuser-Busch’s Controlled Group until October 1, 2009, when InBev spun off Metal Container plants in a sale to Ball Corporation. Plaintiffs became employees of Ball. Plaintiffs sought recalculation of their future Anheuser-Busch retirement benefits, claiming that because their employment ended within three years of a change in control, they were entitled to enhanced benefits, regardless of the fact that Ball guaranteed them continued employment with substantially similar salary and benefits. Their claims were denied on the ground that they had not experienced unemployment. The district court dismissed their 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) claims of enhanced retirement benefits and breach of fiduciary duty. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the court’s reading of the 2000 amendment flawed. View "Adams v. Anheuser-Busch Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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In 1991 Charlene filed a paternity suit naming McCarley as the father of her younger son. McCarley stated that he would kill Charlene before paying support. In January 1992 a neighbor went to Charlene’s apartment and found her dead, with a leather strap wrapped around her neck. Both of Charlene’s children were at home. Three-year-old D.P. repeatedly looked at uniformed officers and stated: “It was him. He hurt mommy.” Four days later, he made related statements in the presence of Charlene’s mother, including “Policeman hit my mommy. Put tape on her.” A child psychologist was able to elicit similar statements. In 1995, police officers made a surprise visit to McCarley’s home on an unrelated matter. In his garage, officer Balogh saw a deputy sheriff’s jacket and cap strewn across a moving dolly. Balogh remembered D.P.’s statements from years before and confiscated the jacket and cap. After a second trial in 2007, McCarley was convicted for aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in 20 years. The district court denied habeas relief, rejecting an argument that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established Sixth Amendment law by allowing a child psychologist to read into evidence the testimonial hearsay statements of a three-and-a-half year-old declarant, where the declarant was not subject to any prior cross-examination. The court concluded that the error was harmless. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "McCarley v. Hall" on Justia Law

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A Kalamazoo resident heard gunfire and called 911. Hearing additional gunshots, she peered through her window and saw someone “dart off.” She described a person wearing a baseball cap and an orange, thigh-length coat with fur around the hood. Officers arrived at the apartment complex minutes later and saw Garcia, wearing a white jacket. They decided to follow him. Garcia ran, climbed over a fence, and fell to the ground. As he stood up, an officer noticed that “some objects had fallen from his person.” Garcia then continued to run and fell into some brush. Garcia resisted arrest, but once he was in a squad car Garcia expressed concern about “his hat.” A search of the area where objects were seen falling from Garcia’s person revealed a baseball cap and a silver revolver. Snow had fallen within 24 hours, and there were no tracks except those of Garcia and the officers. The temperature was 23 degrees, but beads of water appeared on the revolver. No fingerprints were found on the gun. No gunshot residue tests were performed. Although the gun was swabbed for DNA, no tests were conducted. Garcia was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Garcia possessed the revolver, that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a government witness during closing arguments, and that the sentence was unreasonable. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

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After observing suspicious activity and marijuana in plain sight, drug task force officers obtained and executed a search warrant at the Corlew residence, where they confiscated 93 pounds of processed marijuana plus 1,287 growing marijuana plants. Officers also seized cash, numerous firearms, and tools used for growing and processing large quantities of marijuana. As the investigation progressed, additional participants were identified as being involved with the physical process of growing, harvesting, and processing the marijuana plants. Dado operated liquor stores in Flint, funded the operation and distributed the finished product, but did not participate in the physical process. He was indicted for conspiracy to manufacture marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 846, and for aiding and abetting in manufacturing marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The Corlews and six others were also charged. With Dado’s consent, officers searched the store and his car and recovered marijuana, a digital scale, and a loaded semi-automatic handgun. Dado had a prior felony drug conviction in 2005, so the government gave him notice that his sentence on any count of conviction would be enhanced. His co-defendants all pled guilty and testified. Dado was convicted and received a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Dado" on Justia Law

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The district court entered summary judgment relieving Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance of its duty to defend Elk Glenn against certain breach of contract and related claims arising from the sale of a residential lot. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal. A certification to appeal under Rule 54(b) requires the district court to determine that there is no just reason for delay, which requires the district court to balance the needs of the parties against the interests of efficient case management. The district court’s only reason supporting immediate appeal was the “real prejudice” Kentucky Farm Bureau would suffer. That reference, without further explication, does not provide reasoning supporting the necessity of immediate review. Without proper certification for an interlocutory appeal under Rule 54(b), an order disposing of fewer than all claims in a civil action is not immediately appealable. The Sixth Circuit declined to order the district court to make the necessary findings supporting jurisdiction. View "Adler v. Elk Glenn, LLC" on Justia Law

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Harmon was born in Liberia in 1984, shortly before the start of the Civil War. She was separated from her parents at four-years-old and recently learned that her parents were killed in that conflict. Harmon was repeatedly sexually molested and raped. In 1992, Harmon’s aunt, Barroar, took Harmon to the Liberian embassy in Gambia, where Barroar worked. Harmon was 10 years old when her aunt brought her to the U.S. on a visitor’s visa to live with Harmon’s brother Herbert. She now has no family or connections in Liberia. Harmon turned 18 in 2002. Months later, Herbert assisted her in obtaining Temporary Protected Status (TPS). When Harmon turned 19, she left Herbert’s home, and was unsuccessful without his assistance. She missed the TPS deadline while trying to collect money for the application fee, had her next application denied, and sent her appeal to the wrong address. In 2007, Harmon tried to enter Canada, thinking that she could get refugee protection, but was stopped by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. She received notice that she was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B) and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied relief on the merits, approved the denial of TPS, and ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Harmon’s appeal and her subsequent motion to reopen. While appeal was pending, Harmon entered Canada and applied for the equivalent of lawful permanent resident status. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Harmon v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Two Ohio counties brought a class action on behalf of a class of all Ohio counties against the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, as bankruptcy conservator for both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The counties sought unpaid real property transfer taxes under Ohio law. The agencies responded that they are exempt, under their federal charters, from such state taxes. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the real property transfer taxes at issue are encompassed in the statutory exemptions from all taxation. Real property transfer taxes are excise taxes rather than taxes on real property which are an exception to those tax exemptions. Congress had the power to enact the exemptions under the Commerce Clause, and the enactment does not violate any constitutional provision. View "Bd. of Comm'rs of Montgomery Cnty. v. Fed Hous. Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

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In 2006, American Copper & Brass received an unsolicited advertisement on one of its facsimile (fax) machines for a product sold by Lake City. The fax had been send by B2B, a “fax-blasting” company employed by Lake City. American filed suit, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 and sought class-action certification under FRCP 23. B2B, brought in as a third party, failed to appear. The district court granted class certification and entered summary judgment in favor of American. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the approved class definition included individuals who lacked standing to assert TCPA claims, based on the “successfully sent” language in the statute and that the class was not objectively ascertainable. Rule 3.501(A)(5) of the Michigan Court Rules (MCR), which prohibits class actions in TCPA lawsuits, does not apply to TCPA suits in federal court. View "Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prods, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2006, the Affiliated Group, including AmTrust, entered into a tax-sharing agreement (TSA) to allocate tax liability. In 2009, AFC, the parent of AmTrust, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Office of Thrift Supervision closed AmTrust and placed it into FDIC receivership. AFC filed a consolidated 2008 tax return for the Affiliated Group showing a net operating loss of $805 million, with AmTrust’s losses accounting for $767 million of that total. After AFC claimed that any refund would belong to its bankruptcy estate, the parties agreed to deposit refunds in a segregated account pending adjudication. The IRS issued the Affiliated Group’s $194,831,455 refund to AFC. The FDIC claimed that $170,409,422, plus interest, belonged to AmTrust because that portion resulted from offsetting AmTrust’s 2008 net operating loss against its income in prior years. AFC concedes that AmTrust’s tax situation generated the refund. The FDIC sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted AFC summary judgment, stating that the TSA’s use of terms such as “reimbursement” and “payment” established a debtor-creditor relationship between AFC and its subsidiaries as to tax refunds. The FDIC offered extrinsic evidence that the parties intended to create an agency or trust relationship under Ohio law with respect to tax refunds, but the district court rejected those arguments without analysis. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the FDIC’s evidence. View "Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. AmFin Financial Corp." on Justia Law

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In 2005 Detroit created not-for-profit corporations and issued debt instruments through those corporations, which passed the proceeds from sales of certificates on to the city, to fund pensions. The city covered the principal and interest payments. Some of the certificates had floating interest rates. To hedge that risk, the service corporations executed interest-rate swaps with banks. When interest rates fell below a threshold, the city had to pay the banks, which was offset by low interest rates owed to investors. If interest rates rose, the city would owe debtholders more interest, but received swap payments. Investors were unwilling to buy certificates and banks were unwilling to execute swaps unless an insurer guaranteed the obligations. Syncora insured the city’s obligations ($176 million in certificates; $100 million in swaps). A 2009 credit downgrade gave the banks the right to terminate the swaps and demand payment ($300 million). To avoid that, the city agreed (Syncora consented) to give the banks an optional early termination right, effectively ending the hedge protection, and established a “lockbox” system, under which the city would place excise taxes it receives from casinos into an account to be held until the city deposits its swap obligations (about $4 million per month). The agreement authorized the banks to “trap” the funds in the event of default or termination. In 2013 Syncora served notice that default had occurred. The city obtained a restraining order requiring release of the funds. The city filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 one week later. The bankruptcy court held that Syncora had no right to trap tax revenues, which were protected by the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(3). The district court declined to consider an appeal, pending appeal of a determination that the city was an eligible debtor. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for mandamus, requiring the court to rule. View "In re: Syncora Guar. Inc." on Justia Law