Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bowers joined Ophthalmology Group as an employee in 1999 and, in 2002, became one of six partners. In November 2009, Bowers tendered a resignation letter to her partners. Although she did not give a date of departure, the partnership agreement required a one-year notice. In March, 2010, the partners voted to expel Bowers from the partnership, stating that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy and creditors’ proceedings and other personal conduct were detrimental to the Partnership.” After exhausting administrative remedies, Bowers filed suit, alleging: gender discrimination under Title VII; wrongful termination in breach of contract or in violation of public policy under Kentucky common law; gender discrimination under Kentucky statutes; retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. and the state law; and misappropriation of name for commercial advantage. Bowers moved to disqualify defendant’s counsel because another attorney at the firm previously represented Bowers in a substantially related matter. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because Bowers, as a former partner, was not an “employee” under Title VII and denied the motion to disqualify “as moot.” The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment and granted the motion to disqualify.View "Bowers v. Ophthalmology Grp." on Justia Law

A nursing home resident and her community spouse (husband) were penalized based on husband’s purchase of an annuity for himself using funds from his IRA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(f)(1) precluded the transfer of assets because it exceeded husband’s community spouse resource allowance. Section 1396p(c) requires a state to impose a transfer penalty (a period of restricted coverage) if either spouse disposed of assets for less than fair market value during the look-back period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the transfer occurred before the Ohio agency determined that wife was eligible for Medicaid coverage and section 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) permits an unlimited transfer of assets “to another for the sole benefit of the individual’s spouse.” View "Hughes v. Colbert" on Justia Law

In 2008, Hughes pled guilty to federal drug (crack cocaine) and gun charges. The district court sentenced him to 121 months on the drug charge plus 60 months on the gun charge. Hughes was then subject to a ten-year mandatory-minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack and a five-year mandatory sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. The Sixth Circuit vacated. By the time of Hughes’s resentencing, the basis for the remand had been extinguished by the Supreme Court’s rejection of a Sixth Circuit decision. The district court resentenced Hughes in January 2011. Hughes argued for application of the Fair Sentencing Act, which had taken effect four months earlier and reduced the mandatory-minimum sentence for the crack offense to five years, rather than ten. The district court rejected the argument and reimposed the same sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting retroactive application of the FSA despite the government’s equitable arguments in favor of resentencing. View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Williams had worked at Marathon’s Ashland, Kentucky, facility for 25 years, most recently as a senior barge welder. Williams alleged that he sustained a long thoracic nerve injury to his right shoulder while replacing parts of a barge in 2003. His injury was likely the result of the cumulative effect of his heavy lifting. Williams has not returned to work and has been seen by several physicians, but they do not agree on a common diagnosis. Following a remand the Benefits Review Board of the U.S. Department of Labor affirmed an administrative law judge’s award of permanent and total disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901. On a second appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Williams is permanently and totally disabled and is unable to perform the alternative employment identified by Marathon’s vocational expert. The court granted Williams leave to seek attorney fees under 33 U.S.C. 928(a). View "Marathon Ashland Petroleum v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, collectively, the Affordable Care Act require that most businesses employing 50 or more individuals provide female employees with health-insurance coverage that includes, at no cost to the employee, “such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.” 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4). Those guidelines require plans to cover “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.” Eden Foods, Inc., and Potter sought an injunction to prevent federal agencies from enforcing that mandate against them. They contend that offering such contraceptive services to the employees of Eden Foods would substantially burden the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and contravene protections under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb–2000bb-4 (RFRA). The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A for-profit corporation is not a “person” capable of religious exercise as intended by RFRA and individual shareholders/owners of a corporation have no standing to challenge provisions of laws that the corporation must obey. View "Eden Foods, Inc v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

On January 21, 2009, Amburgey sought treatment for his persistent pneumonia from Dr. Alam at a Whitesburg, Kentucky clinic run by MCHC. He died that same day from a severe allergic reaction to an intravenous contrast dye that was administered in preparation for a CT scan, despite an allergy notation in his chart. His wife, Delma, sued Dr. Alam, MCHC, and, because MCHC is an agency of the federal government, the United States. On January 20, 2011, Delma mailed the required form for asserting a wrongful-death claim against the government to MCHC. MCHC received the form four days later and in turn forwarded it to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the appropriate federal agency for notification purposes under 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The district court dismissed the claim as untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Delma’s claim did not accrue until after she had received the autopsy report in April 2009 View "Amburgey v. United States" on Justia Law

Moore and friends left a strip club in Lexington, as the club closed, Moore claims that he noticed a SUV that needed a jump start and walked over to help. Moore claims he spotted a pistol sticking out of the waistband of the man who got out of the driver’s seat, heard a click, turned back around and saw the pistol pointed straight at him. Moore “went after the gun,” and the pistol went as the men wrestled for it. King dropped the pistol. Moore grabbed the pistol, ran, jumped into the backseat of his friend’s car and threw the gun at his feet as the car drove away. Three witnesses contradicted Moore’s version of what happened, and one supported it. Police stopped the car in which Moore was riding, found the gun, and he was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court should have instructed the jury about his affirmative defense that he possessed the gun out of necessity. The court noted that Moore bypassed several opportunities to surrender the gun. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the district court denied pauper status to Coleman-Bey in his civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, although one of his previous dismissals was still on appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Counting a third dismissal still on appeal as a strike does not lead to the anomalous conclusion that the third dismissal was itself precluded from being appealed by the three-strikes rule. Each of the three civil cases that Coleman-Bey filed while incarcerated counts as a strike under the PLRA. View "Coleman v. Tollefson" on Justia Law

Shultz, convicted under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a) of receiving and possessing child pornography, including depictions of young children engaged in sadistic, masochistic or violent behavior, appealed the district court’s imposition of two special conditions of lifetime supervised release, to follow 168 months in prison: condition four, which restricts his contact with children, and condition six, which restricts his possession of sexually arousing material. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conditions, rejection challenges of violation of the sentencing statute, the Article III non-delegation doctrine, First Amendment rights of association and assembly, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against vague laws and his right to interact with his own family. View "United States v. Shultz" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tyler had accumulated $1,041 of debt on his Chase credit card. DHC, assignee of the debt, filed suit in Kentucky, seeking collection of the debt, plus 21% interest, and attorney’s fees. The complaint had not been served when Tyler filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, three months after the suit was filed. Tyler did not list this suit as debt or his potential Fair Debt Collection Practices Act counterclaims as assets on the bankruptcy schedules. Tyler did list a debt owed on a Chase credit card, of “Unknown” amount. Chase did not participate and Tyler was granted a discharge. Eight days later, DHC served process on Tyler. DHC filed a voluntary Notice of Dismissal without prejudice after it learned of Tyler’s bankruptcy, but Tyler filed a purported federal class action, alleging violations of the FDCPA and Kentucky’s usury laws. The district court dismissed, finding that Tyler “elected to forego filing compulsory counterclaims” and that Tyler’s claims were “rooted in the allegations in DHC’s state court complaint” and thus part of the bankruptcy estate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the claim was not barred under res judicata principles, the claim was based on a pre-petition violation and, thus, property of the bankruptcy estate.View "Tyler v. DH Capital Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law