Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lawrence committed four bank robberies in central Ohio during 2004-2005. During the last attempted robbery, Lawrence shot and killed Officer Hurst. Officer Hurst returned fire, however, and Lawrence was injured. Lawrence aborted fled. He was arrested and confessed to having committed all four robberies. Lawrence was charged with armed robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d); brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); brandishing and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii); attempted bank robbery resulting in the killing of Officer Hurst, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d) and (e); and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence to commit murder with malice aforethought, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and (j). The indictment alleged that Lawrence was eligible to be punished by death. A jury convicted Lawrence and sentenced to death. The Sixth Circuit held that the sentencing verdicts were not inconsistent or irrational and reinstated the sentence of death. On appeal of the conviction, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting 24 claims, including a challenge under the Federal Death Penalty Act, based on the fact that Lawrence is African American; Hurst was white and all 12 jurors were white. View "United States v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

An officer found a tool bag outside the McNamara Federal Building. Thinking it was lost property, the officer stored the bag in the building for three weeks without inspecting it. Eventually, someone x-rayed of the bag and discovered objects consistent with an explosive device. The Detroit Police Bomb Squad detonated the bag, resulting in a sizable secondary explosion. The bag containing the bomb was sold exclusively at a chain hardware store that also sold the particular timer used in the device. Investigation led to identification of Mikulich, who was charged with attempting to destroy a government building by means of explosive while creating a substantial risk of injury to a person, 18 U.S.C. 844(f)(1)–(2); using and carrying a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(ii); and possessing an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). Mikulich exhibited erratic behavior during his first appearance. After he was adjudged incompetent and remanded for treatment, the government requested that he be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs. The district court rejected Mikulich’s argument that the government lacked a sufficiently important interest in trying him, that he faced civil confinement in the absence of criminal sanction, and that he intended to raise an insanity defense The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mikulich did not demonstrate that any special circumstances weaken the government’s clear interest in trying him for the serious crimes of which he is accused.View "United States v. Mikulich" on Justia Law

Hampton was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 (18 counts), access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(5) (four counts), and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1)), based on use of fraudulent merchant accounts, ACH payments, and credit card transactions. The government sought forfeiture of substitute property. Hampton’s Rule 11 Plea Agreement provided that, with dismissal of remaining charges, Hampton would plead guilty to one count each of wire fraud and access device fraud, and included a stipulation that her conduct involved intended losses of $141,769.77 and estimated actual losses of $77,312.86. Hampton agreed to restitution of actual losses and to entry of a judgment of forfeiture of approximately $77,312.86. Because she had insufficient resources to pay restitution, the parties agreed that any assets located through forfeiture would be applied to the victims and the forfeiture reduced accordingly. Because no specific assets derived from the proceeds were identified, the requirements for forfeiture of substitute assets under 21 U.S.C. 853(p) were established. After it was determined that the amount of actual loss was $69,540.01, the district court ordered mandatory restitution in the corrected amount and imposed concurrent (below-Guidelines) sentences of 18 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a forfeiture money judgment may not be entered against future assets. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Southern Rehabilitation Group and its medical director sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services and past and present Medicare contractors, seeking review of the Secretary’s final decision on 6,200 claims for Medicare reimbursement. The district court remanded so that the Secretary could pay the disputed amount. After payment, the case returned to the district court, which concluded that the claims for payment were moot and dismissed remaining constitutional and statutory claims as barred by jurisdictional provisions of the Medicare Act. The court also held that plaintiffs did not show that they were eligible to collect interest on their claims and that it did not have jurisdiction over 8,900 other claims that plaintiffs alleged were still in the administrative process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims and on the 8,900 claims still in the administrative process, but reversed summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for interest. The Secretary could not rely on her unreasonable interpretation of the “clean-claims” statute as a basis for summary judgment concerning interest. View "S. Rehab. Grp. v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Rachells, an African-American account executive in the Cleveland region since 2001, received numerous sales awards, consistently exceeded company sales goals by the greatest margin among his co-workers, and, in 2003, earned the top performance review among his Cingular peers. In 2004, Cingular acquired AT&T and eliminated five of nine existing Cingular and AT&T account executive positions. Although Rachells exceeded his 2004 sales goals by a greater margin than in 2003, he received the lowest 2004 performance review score of any candidate for retention and was ranked seventh out of nine in the overall selection process. Rachells was notified that he would be terminated and sued for racial discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to Cingular on all claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Rachells had produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. View "Rachells v. Cingular Wireless Employee Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Patel, a citizen of India, entered the U.S. on a one-year visitor’s visa in 1999. He overstayed and began looking for a job. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his first petition for an employment visa in 2006 because the employer (Deluxe) was unable to pay the proffered wage, 8 C.F.R. 204.5(g)(2). In 2010 Peshtal offered him a job as Lodging Manager at an Indiana hotel. Peshtal did not apply for its own labor certification from the U.S. Department of Labor, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(3)(C), that there are no qualified U.S. workers available for the job and the alien’s employment “will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions” of other workers. Instead Peshtal sought an employment visa on Patel’s behalf, attaching the labor certification that Deluxe had received for the 2006 Michigan Lodging Manager position. CIS denied the petition. The district court dismissed an appeal for lack of prudential standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that disembodied notions of statutory purpose cannot override what the statute actually says. The alien is the one who is entitled to the employment visa. The alien’s interest is within the zone of interests protected by the statute. Patel suffered an injury that is fairly traceable to CIS and that is redressable in this lawsuit. View "Patel v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigrations Servs." on Justia Law

YA, a nonprofit corporation serving at-risk youth, transported young people to an event using vans that it owned. After the event four people were unable to board because a van was full. A YA employee requested that 16-year-old Lee, a YA participant who had driven to the event in a separate vehicle, drive them home. Lee agreed. Lee did not possess a valid driver’s license and the car that he was driving had been stolen during a carjacking. Police saw Lee driving erratically, ran a license plate check, and gave chase. Lee lost control and hit a tree. Lee survived, but all four passengers were killed. Their estates filed suit. YA requested defense and indemnification under policies issued by Indemnity: a commercial general liability policy with a $1 million limit and a commercial excess liability policy with a $2 million limit. Indemnity provided a defense, but disputed coverage and sought a federal declaratory judgment. YA counterclaimed that Indemnity breached its duty of good faith and violated the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, by misrepresenting coverage and failing to affirm liability within a reasonable time. The district court held that Indemnity was obligated under the CGL policy but not under the excess policy. The state court action settled with Indemnity’s payment of the $1 million limit of the CGL policy, plus $800,000 of the excess policy. The federal court dismissed the bad-faith counterclaims, reasoning that, as a matter of law, Indemnity’s coverage position had not been taken in bad faith. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc." on Justia Law

Nurse Turetzky and Doctor Desai opened a clinic in 1976. They fought, and sometimes the fights turned physical. In 1983, they agreed to dissolve their partnership once Desai repaid Turetzky’s investment. Weeks later, police found Turetzky dead in a parking lot, having been strangled. Gorski and Adams worked at Desai’s clinic. Gorski testified that, before the murder, Adams told him repeatedly that Desai wanted Turetzky killed. After the murder, Adams confessed to Gorski that he had killed Turetzky and that Desai wanted him to leave Michigan. State prosecutors charged Desai and Adams with first-degree murder in 1995. The month-long joint trial began in 2001. There was evidence that Desai solicited a hitman in 1982, took out insurance on Turetzky in 1983, asked whether Turetzky’s body had been found before it was discovered, drove to the crime scene that day, and gave Adams $2,000 after the murder. A jury found Desai guilty of murder; the judge imposed a life sentence. The jury failed to reach a verdict for Adams. Desai’s challenge to reliance on Adams’ confession was rejected by Michigan courts. A federal district court granted Desai’s habeas petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Confrontation Clause no longer applied to non-testimonial hearsay such as confession from Adams to Gorski. On remand, the district court granted Desai’s habeas petition based on his due process claim, after it was rejected by state courts. The Sixth Circuit again reversed. View "Desai v. Booker" on Justia Law

Peoplemark is a temporary-employment agency that used an application form that asked applicants whether they had a felony record and conducted an independent investigation into the criminal records of all applicants. Scott, an African American with a felony conviction, submitted an application and was not referred for employment. She filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Peoplemark’s attorney stated that clients knew of the policy and some had told Peoplemark not to refer felons. A review of more than 18,000 documents showed that Peoplemark had referred felons to job opportunities. The EEOC sent a letter indicating that Peoplemark had violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(A), based on its conclusion that a companywide policy of rejecting felon applicants had a disparate impact on African Americans. Attempts to conciliate failed. The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Scott and a class of similarly situated persons. Additional discovery revealed that there was no company policy and the case was dismissed. The district court awarded Peoplemark $751,942.48 in fees and costs, including attorney’s fees from October 1, 2009, finding that as of that date the claim was unreasonable. The award also included Peoplemark’s expert fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award.View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Peoplemark, Inc." on Justia Law

Debtor was married to Plaintiff’s son, John. Plaintiff and John had an extensive model train collection. After John died, Plaintiff sued, seeking $25,000 for Debtor’s alleged conversion of the collection. Debtor was appointed administratrix of John’s probate estate. After completion of an inventory, Plaintiff and Debtor, individually and as administratrix, entered into a settlement resolving the state court litigation and matters in Probate Court, identifying parts of the collection as belonging to Plaintiff and requiring Debtor to surrender possession of those parts. The remainder of the collection was to be sold at auction and the proceeds were to be split. The court subsequently entered multiple orders directing Debtor to turn over certain trains and accessories to Plaintiff and imposed penalty of $100.00 per day. Finally, the court entered judgment in the amount of $32,186.90 plus interest based on Debtor’s “willful contempt.” Debtor then filed a bankruptcy petition and Plaintiff sought to except from discharge the entire debt owed to him pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(7). The bankruptcy court held that the entire amount ($32,186), not just $9,386.90, was nondischargeable under 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. View "In re: Nicodemus" on Justia Law