Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Aleris supplied aluminum to Behr under a requirements contract until a labor dispute forced Aleris to close its Quebec factory in 2008. After learning of the closure, Behr took delivery of aluminum worth $2.6 million from Aleris without paying for it and scrambled to obtain aluminum from other suppliers, which Behr says increased its costs by $1.5 million. Behr filed suit in Michigan state court. That suit was stayed in 2009 when Aleris’s parent company filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. Aleris filed for bankruptcy in Canada. Aleris sued Behr in federal court seeking recovery of $2.6 million for the aluminum delivery. Behr asserted numerous defenses and counterclaims including a setoff for its increased costs after the factory closure. The district court abstained from adjudication of Behr’s counterclaim, characterizing it as “part and parcel of the stayed state-court proceedings,” then granted summary judgment to Aleris in the amount of $1.1 million and closed the case. Behr satisfied the judgment. The state court declined to lift the stay. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the decision gave Behr full value for its untested counterclaim and has the impact of depriving the Canadian estate of monies to which it might be entitled. View "RSM Richter, Inc. v. Behr America, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1994 an Ohio jury convicted Mason of aggravated murder, rape, and having a weapon while under disability; the court adopted a recommendation that Mason be sentenced to death. Mason’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal; state court collateral attack was unsuccessful. In 1999, Mason sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit granted a conditional writ to “result in the vacation of his death sentence unless the state of Ohio commences a new penalty-phase trial against him within 180 days from the date that the judgment in this matter becomes final.” On remand, the district court entered its own conditional writ recalculating the date on which the 180-day period began. The period set by the Sixth Circuit expired, and no retrial had commenced. Mason was subsequently removed from death row, and a new sentencing proceeding was scheduled. The district court rejected an argument that the state should be prevented from seeking the death penalty for failure to comply with the deadline. The Sixth Circuit modified, holding that the district court erred by recalculating the beginning of the 180-day period without authority, but that the state may, nonetheless, seek the death penalty at the penalty-phase retrial. View "Mason v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After her child was murdered by his father, the mother sued employees of county and state Child Protective Services (CPS) and others,, alleging negligence; violations of constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. 1983); and violation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act--Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. 670, and of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 5106. The complaint alleged that from 1998-2007, CPS received numerous complaints about the father’s abuse and neglect of the child and his siblings. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contours of the substantive due process right to be free from government action increasing the risk of harm was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that pursuing the father for use of a cattle prod, while failing to immediately remove the child, would violate the child’s substantive due process rights. Given previous cases, it is not clear that a reasonable CPS official would understand that failure to seek termination of parental rights would constitute denial of procedural due process. Without ignoring the father’s role in causing the child’s death, CPS employees’ conduct cannot be said to be the “most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of the injury. View "Jasinski v. Tyler" on Justia Law

On May 12, 2009, Stewart arrived from Japan with two laptop computers. A Customs Officer randomly approached him and found Stewart’s responses “confrontational.” Searching one computer, the officer found thumbnail images that he believed to be child pornography; he called ICE Agent Young, who told Stewart that they were detaining his laptops for further examination, but he was free to leave. Young secured a warrant. Forensic examination led to an indictment on September 8, 2009. On February 5, 2010, Stewart moved to suppress, arguing that the “extended border search” was without reasonable suspicion. On May 24, 2010, the district court denied the motion. Stewart moved to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, arguing that his June 15, 2010, trial date meant that he would not be brought to trial within 70 nonexcludable days of indictment. The district court dismissed without prejudide, stating that its calendaring program mistakenly kept Stewart’s motion to suppress under advisement for 67 days, when it should have excluded only 30 days. One month later, a grand jury returned a new indictment, charging two counts of transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in dismissing the earlier indictment without prejudice, rather than with prejudice; in denying his motion to suppress; in admitting two prosecution exhibits; and by not, sua sponte, instructing the jury on the statutory definition of “identifiable minor.” View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Denson was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). One month later, he was detained for allegedly supplying a shotgun to an informant who planned a robbery. Denson pled guilty to the felon-in-possession charge and a probation officer prepared a presentence report that identified two state felony convictions that increased the base-offense level, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), 4B1.1, 4B1.2. Denson objected to inclusion of an Ohio conviction for inciting to violence as a predicate crime of violence. The district court reasoned that the Ohio incitement statute meets the career-offender guideline’s requirement of “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” The court also rejected Denson’s argument that his sentencing range should be reduced because he accepted responsibility, stating that it was “hard to imagine something” that could negate acceptance of responsibility more than another firearm offense involving the sale of a shotgun to a would-be felon. The district court imposed a sentence of 72 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The facts of the Ohio conviction necessarily establish that the species of incitement to which he pled guilty isa crime of violence. The district court properly declined to apply an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. View "United States v. Denson" on Justia Law

Grand Resort, which has operated in the Great Smoky Mountains since 1982, claims that TripAdvisor’s publication of a survey that concluded that Grand Resort was the dirtiest hotel in America caused irreparable damage to its business and that TripAdvisor used a flawed rating system that distorted actual performance and perspective. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the “dirtiest hotels” list is protected opinion; it reflects TripAdvisor’s users’ subjective opinions and is not capable of being defamatory. The court rejected a motion to amend to add claims of trade libel-injurious falsehood and tortious interference with prospective business relationships to the claims of false light-invasion of privacy and of defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that amendment of the complaint would be futile. View "Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); the plea agreement stated that his offense involved 109 grams of cocaine base and that, “The parties agree to recommend that the Court impose a sentence within the range determined pursuant to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the computations and stipulations set forth in this agreement.” The district court accepted the plea. Defendant was subject to a statutory minimum sentence of 240 months of imprisonment because the prosecution moved for a downward departure for Defendant’s substantial assistance to its investigation. The district court granted further reductions for acceptance of responsibility and timely indication of intent to plead guilty, yielding an advisory range of 130 to 162 months. The court imposed a sentence of 130 months. Four years later, Fair Sentencing Act amended the cocaine base sentencing statute (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). The district court found Defendant ineligible to have his sentence reconsidered. The Sixth Circuit vacated, to “give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency.” Plugging the new statutory minimums and amended Guidelines into Defendant’s original sentencing formula would yield a sentence of 70 months. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Droganes is a Kentucky fireworks dealer. In 2007, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) agents raided his business on suspicions that he was illegally selling “display” fireworks and seized more than 800,000 pounds of merchandise, only part of which proved to be contraband. Display fireworks are more powerful than consumer fireworks and are subject to greater regulation. Droganes pleaded guilty to distributing explosives without a license (18 U.S.C. 842(a)(1)) and agreed to forfeit the seized items determined by ATF to be display fireworks.” The government tendered a proposed forfeiture order encompassing all such fireworks, which the district court accepted. Droganes objected to the breadth of the order and the classification standard the government used to classify the fireworks and sought monetary sanctions for alleged failure to return the legal fireworks in a timely manner or to reimburse him. The district court rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court’s determination of forfeiture was consistent with Droganes’s plea agreement. The court acknowledged the “seemingly interminable delays in testing the seized fireworks, many of which the government knew not to be display fireworks.” View "United States v. Droganes" on Justia Law

Greektown, the owner of a Detroit casino, and affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan and named a trustee. Before the plan became effective, the bankruptcy court authorized unsecured creditors to file a fraudulent transfer action under 11 U.S.C. 544 and 550 and the Michigan Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, alleging that Greektown incurred $185 million dollars of debt and simultaneously transferred approximately $177 million to several transferees, including the Tribe. The complaint alleged that the Tribe directly received $6 million and that $145 million transferred to others indirectly benefitted the Tribe because the Michigan Gaming Control Board had required the Tribe to pay this amount to those others if Greektown failed to do so. The Trustee and the Tribe later agreed to a settlement, under which the Tribe would pay $2.75 million and relinquish approximately $2.58 million in claims it had filed, conditioned upon the bankruptcy court’s entering a bar on further claims “arising out of or reasonably flowing from” either the fraudulent transfer proceeding or the allegedly fraudulent transfers themselves. The district court approved the settlement and entered the bar order over objections. Finding the order overly broad, the Sixth Circuit remanded for the court to consider whether the outcome of the actions covered by the bar order would affect the bankruptcy estate. View "Papas v. Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law

After a physical altercation in 1993, his wife (Carol) told O’Neal and his sons to leave the house. She filed a domestic complaint and planned to change the locks. O’Neal later returned to the house, broke through the front door and fired three shots Carol, one of which fatally wounded her. Carol’s son alleged that O’Neal also attempted to shoot him but that the gun jammed. A police canine unit later found him hiding in a nearby house where he surrendered. He confessed to the shooting. A forensic examination linked the bullet removed from Carol’s body to the pistol in O’Neal’s possession at the time of his surrender. Convicted of aggravated murder, O’Neal was sentenced to death. Ohio courts affirmed and denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that three sub-70 IQ scores were insufficient on their own to prove O’Neal had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The court rejected claims, aimed at the aggravated burglary specification, that O’Neal received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present the actual lease to support his assertion of contractual privilege to enter the house, and of spousal privilege. View "O'Neal v. Bagley" on Justia Law