Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three-month-old Jiyen was killed when 11 shots were fired into his home in a drive-by shooting. Prosecution witnesses testified to overhearing Drummond, discussing a retribution for the death of a fellow gang member, seeing Drummond with an assault rifle 15 minutes before the fatal shots were fired, and to hearing Drummond say that “he didn’t meant [sic] to kill the baby. A search of Drummond’s house yielded ammunition consistent with the shooting and a variety of items tying him to the gang. During the trial, the court twice closed the courtroom, once stating that witnesses felt threatened by some of the spectators. A jury found Drummond guilty on all counts; the trial court sentenced Drummond to death. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State courts denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court granted habeas corpus in part, holding that the state trial court violated Drummond’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Drummond’s family was removed from the courtroom after objection without any explanation regarding the scope of the closure and without considering any alternative options. View "Drummond v. Houk" on Justia Law

An officer pulled over a car with expired tags. Booker was a passenger. The officer smelled marijuana. The driver told the officer that he could search the vehicle. The officer had previously arrested Booker and recovered 13 bags of marijuana concealed in his crotch. A drug-sniffing dog alerted near Booker. During a pat-down, the officer noticed that Booker clenched his buttocks, but found no drugs. Booker’s pockets contained large amounts of currency. A search of the front passenger seat revealed plastic bags: one contained .06 grams of marijuana, the others had residue. The officer arrested Booker for felony possession, despite not recovering enough marijuana to justify such an arrest under Tennessee law. At the police station, Booker fidgeted and tried to barricade himself in the room. During a strip search, officers observed a string protruding from Booker’s anus. Booker’s efforts to conceal the item led to an altercation. Booker was shackled and covered in a blanket for transport to the hospital. Although Booker denied having anything in his rectum, had normal vital signs, and refused to submit to a digital rectal examination, the doctor, who claimed to believe that Booker’s life was in danger, sedated him to perform an examination and removed a rock of crack cocaine, greater than five grams, from Booker’s rectum. The Sixth Circuit reversed Booker’s conviction. The unconsented procedure while Booker was under police control must be attributed to the state for Fourth Amendment purposes and “shocks the conscience.” View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law

National contracted to produce “Kids Fun Day” events before 2010 Cleveland Indians games, including a collapsible inflatable slide. National purchased a required comprehensive liability insurance policy naming the Indians as additional insureds, from NHIC through an independent broker, CSI. On the application a box was checked, indicating use of a “bounce houses or inflatables.” A “Certificate of Liability Insurance” issued six weeks before the slide collapsed, causing a death. Neither National nor the Indians had received the full policy at the time of the accident. After the accident, National learned that, despite its specific application request, CSI had failed to procure a policy that expressly covered inflatables. In an email exchange, an employee of CSI stated, “Oh, ok. Sorry, I guess I missed it.” Later CSI stated: “inflatable’s [sic] are excluded on the policy you purchase[d] from us. Whoever own the inflatable’s [sic] are [sic] to carry insurance on them and name you … I don’t believe I’ve ever seen you indicate on your applications that inflatable’s [sic] are at your events, but please note, the exclusion is listed on the quotes we sent over to you.” The district court found NHIC not liable to the Indians and that CSI could not be liable in negligence. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to CSI and remanded the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. View "Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. v. NH Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Broz started a cellular telephone business by organizing a wholly owned S corporation, RFB, in 1991 and purchasing an FCC license to operate a cellular network in Northern Michigan. Broz expanded by organizing additional entities. Alpine and limited liability companies that are taxed as partnerships, were formed to hold and lease FCC licenses. Alpine never operated on-air networks. For the years at issue, Broz deducted: flow-through losses of Alpine on his personal income taxes, on the grounds that he had debt basis in, and was “at risk” with respect to, Alpine; interest, depreciation, startup costs, and other business expenses of the Alpine entities; and the amortization cost of the FCC licenses held by the Alpine entities. The IRS Commissioner determined a deficiency of $18 million in Broz’s income tax filings for the tax years at issue, finding that Broz had insufficient debt basis in Alpine o claim flow-through losses, that Broz was not at risk with respect to investments in the Alpine entities, that the Alpine entities were not entitled to interest, depreciation, startup expense, and other business-related deductions because they were not engaged in an active trade or business. The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Broz v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Tragas bought information that is encoded in the magnetic strip on the back of credit and debit cards from overseas suppliers and re-sold the information to the Hunter brothers, who created “clone” gift and credit cards with which they purchased goods and bona fide gift cards. Tragas and the Hunters communicated online. Police discovered records of their conversations on the Hunters’ computer. Transcripts of the conversations were read at trial. Although the parties did not use names, a picture of Tragas appeared on the account and Tragas made purchases with card information exchanged during the conversations. Tragas purchased a house in Florida after a conversation about buying a house in Florida. As a result of the scheme, credit and debit card users and their financial institutions lost $2.18 million. Tragas was convicted of conspiracy to commit access device fraud offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1029(b); aiding and abetting unlawful activity under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a); bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting claims that the prosecutor improperly read evidence aloud, that the court should have given the jury a specific unanimity instruction, that the Travel Act convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and that her Vienna Convention rights were violated. The court remanded the sentence; the court used an incorrect version of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Tragas" on Justia Law

Officers on patrol in a high-crime, high-drug area observed a vehicle, occupied by Hinojosa, parked next door to a house that had been the site of past drug activity. After Hinojosa walked up and down the driveway, went into the house, and left after less than one minute, officers followed him. There had been reports of drug manufacturing in an apartment in the building where he stopped. An officer exited the unmarked police car; the other parked the car so that it would not have blocked Hinojosa if he had tried to leave. The officer approached Hinojosa, indicating that he wanted to talk, with his hand on his weapon. Hinojosa, with his window rolled up, asked why he wanted to talk. The officer responded that they had suspicions about his odd behavior in the other driveway. After Hinojosa provided a driver’s license, a dispatcher stated that the license was suspended and that Hinojosa was on parole. Hinojosa was arrested. Hinojosa stated that he was carrying a pistol, which the officer removed from Hinojosa’s waistband. After denial of his motion to suppress, Hinojosa pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed: the questioning leading up to Hinojosa’s arrest and search occurred during a consensual encounter. A reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter. Hinojosa was not seized. View "United States v. Hinojosa" on Justia Law

In 2008, the FBI issued its Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) to implement newly revised Department of Justice guidelines, addressing use of race and ethnicity in investigations. Under this guidance, the FBI may identify and map “locations of concentrated ethnic communities” to “reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities … assist domain awareness,” and collect “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU submitted a Freedom of Information Act request, seeking release of documents concerning policy on collecting such information, and records containing information actually collected. The FBI initially released 298 pages (48 partially redacted) of training material, previously released for a similar request by the ACLU’s Atlanta affiliate. The ACLU filed suit. With additional releases, the FBI identified 1,553 pages of potentially responsive records: training materials, “domain intelligence notes,” “program assessments,” “electronic communications,” and maps. The district court held that the FBI appropriately withheld records under a FOIA exemption for law enforcement information whose release could “interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed; release of publicly available information selectively used in investigations may reveal law-enforcement priorities and methodologies and interfere with enforcement. The ACLU’s proposed procedure for resolving the dispute was inadequately protective of sensitive information; in camera review was appropriate. View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Scozzari was fatally shot by two police officers. Plaintiff, as representative of decedent’s estate, brought a civil rights action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to a known medical need. After the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was denied, a jury found in favor of the officers. The district court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was required to prove that deliberate indifference proximately caused decedent’s death. The district court later granted plaintiff a new trial on the deliberate indifference claim because our circuit has held that “in delay-of-treatment cases, it is not necessary to show that the delay in providing medical care proximately caused the injury” when it would be obvious to a layperson that there was a risk of serious harm without immediate medical attention. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for interlocutory appeal. Defendants cannot satisfy the requirement that “a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists regarding the correctness of the decision.” View "Miedzianowski v. City of Clare" on Justia Law

Watson’s companies, Cyberco and Teleservices, defrauded lending institutions and other businesses that provided funding for Cyberco to purchase computer equipment from Teleservices. Cyberco never actually received any equipment, but the lending institutions forwarded funds to Teleservices based on phony invoices Watson arranged. Watson packed Cyberco’s computer room with fake servers and swapped serial numbers among those servers to deceive the victims when they attempted to audit their collateral. Teleservices “funneled” the funds back to Cyberco, which used them to make payments to allow the fraud to continue and to pay Watson and others substantial salaries. The payments were made through Huntington Bank, which also facilitated payments through its cash management services, but Cyberco owed Huntington more than $16 million. Teleservices, which had no banking relationship with Huntington, made payments so that Huntington could reduce its exposure to about $600,000 in a few months, just weeks before the FBI raided Cyberco. After that raid, creditors commenced an involuntary Chapter 7 proceeding against Cyberco. A state-appointed receiver filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition for Teleservices. The bankruptcy court dismissed Huntington’s motions for substantive consolidation of the Chapter 7 petitions. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel determined that the denials were not final appealable orders. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "In re: Cyberco Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007 Joiner pled guilty to crimes involving 129.77 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B). At the time, offenses involving more than 50 grams and a defendant who had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense had a minimum penalty of 20 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The district judge granted a reduction for substantial assistance, enabling Joiner to be sentenced below the statutory minimum. Rather than using the statutory minimum as the starting point, the district judge increased Joiner’s base level to 33, the lowest level that, coupled with Joiner’s criminal history, would correspond to a guideline range containing 240 months, then reduced Joiner’s base offense level by three for acceptance of responsibility and by five for substantial assistance, and imposed a sentence of 107 months of imprisonment. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger the 20-year statutory minimum to 280 grams. The 2011 crack-cocaine-guideline amendments lowered the section 5A guideline range to which Joiner would have been subject absent a statutory minimum. The district court denied Joiner a sentence reduction, holding that when a defendant was subject to a statutory minimum at his original sentencing but received a downward departure for substantial assistance, a Guidelines amendment that lowered the sentencing range under Section 2D1.1 did not lower an “applicable” guideline range as required by U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Joiner" on Justia Law