Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) under an agreement specifying that his offense involved 109 grams of cocaine base. At sentencing, the district court was bound by a statutory minimum sentence of 240 months of imprisonment. The government moved for a downward departure in return for Defendant’s substantial assistance and the court granted further reductions for Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and timely indication of intent to plead guilty. Ultimately, the district court sentenced Defendant to 130 months of imprisonment, the low end of the advisory range. Four years later the Fair Sentencing Act amended the cocaine base sentencing statute so that an offense must involve at least 280 grams of cocaine base to trigger a 10-year statutory minimum sentence. Following the district court’s original sentencing formula, but using the new statutory minimums and amended Guidelines, Defendant would now be subject to a sentence of 70 months. In 2012, Defendant sought sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Defendant was ineligible for sentence reduction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating an intent to give “effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent that the amended Guidelines achieve consistency.” View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Officers observed a Chrysler with heavily tinted windows playing loud music and initiated a traffic stop. After the officers knocked on the car’s windows several times, Evans, the car’s driver and owner, and Walker, the front seat passenger, rolled down the windows and began speaking. The officers smelled marijuana and noticed that Walker was agitated. After Evans exited the vehicle and was under supervision, officers asked Walker to step out and keep his hands in sight. As he released the seatbelt, officers believed that Walker was reaching between the passenger seat and the door in an unnatural movement. Walker ignored warnings until he was restrained. An officer found a gun on the floor between the passenger’s seat and the door, near the floor mounting for the front passenger’s seat belt; it was loaded, had a round in the chamber, and was positioned to be grabbed from the front passenger’s seat. Walker was convicted as a felon in possession of ammunition transported in foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the firearm containing this ammunition; that the government constructively amended or prejudicially varied from the indictment with respect to evidence showing that the ammunition traveled in foreign commerce; and to sentencing himGibb to an additional 24 months because he violated the terms of supervised release. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Greco worked at MetroHealth, a county-owned health-care provider in Cleveland, from 1997 until 2009, supervising independent contractors who worked on MetroHealth construction projects, selecting contractors for small-scale no-bid maintenance projects, and authorizing payment for their work. Greco used his authority to facilitate a bribery scheme set up by his boss and Patel, the vice-president of a construction company. The participants became nervous and Greco took action to hide his involvement in the scheme, but Patel contacted the government and confessed; in exchange for a reduced sentence, Patel provided detailed information about the scheme. Greco was convicted of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery involving programs receiving federal funds (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 371), violation of and conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951), making false tax returns (26 U.S.C. 7206(1)), and conspiracy to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349) and was sentenced to 112 months’ imprisonment and required to pay $994,734.84 in restitution to MetroHealth. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court improperly applied a 12-level enhancement based on an erroneous loss calculation; improperly applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice; and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. View "United States v. Greco" on Justia Law

American loaned $429,991 to Saberline to pay an insurance premium; Saberline agreed that, if it defaulted on the loan, American could cancel the policy and obtain return of any unearned premiums. USIG brokered the deal. American would deliver funds to USIG’s account at Cornerstone; USIG would forward the money to the insurer. Instead of placing the money in a trust account for Saberline, USIG told American to deposit the funds in USIG’s general operating account at Cornerstone. USIG was indebted to Cornerstone and had authorized it to sweep the operating account and apply anything over $50,000 to the debt. As a result, when American deposited Saberline’s premiums, Cornerstone reduced USIG’s debt. Saberline defaulted. American canceled the policy and attempted to recover the premium. USIG repaid American with funds drawn from a different bank, but then filed for bankruptcy, turning that transfer into a preference payment. American settled with the bankruptcy trustee, reserving its right to pursue a conversion claim against Cornerstone. A magistrate judge issued a declaratory judgment that American had a superior security interest in the disputed funds and that Cornerstone was liable for conversion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Premium Finance Company Act, Tenn. Code 56-37-101, gave American a senior perfected security interest in the contested funds. View "American Bank, FSB v. Cornerstone Cmty. Bank" on Justia Law

Vandiver filed a pro se civil action against Prison Health Services (PHS) and five medical professionals, alleging that the defendants violated and are continuing to violate his Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to the health care needs associated with his serious chronic conditions, including Hepatitis C and diabetes and that as a result, he has undergone partial amputations of his feet and suffered visual impairment. He claimed that he is at risk of further injury, including additional amputations, coma, and death. He acknowledged having previously filed three complaints that were dismissed as frivolous. The district court denied his application to proceed in forma pauperis, applying the three-strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that alleging a danger of serious physical injury as a result of being presently denied adequate medical treatment for a chronic illness satisfies the imminent-danger exception to the three-strikes rule. Allegations of incremental harm culminating in serious physical injury may present a danger equal to that of an injury that occurs all at once. View "VanDiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Crum, a small company near insolvency, agreed to service Martin’s light-duty vehicles. Martin was a subsidiary of Massey Coal, a publicly-traded corporation. The agreement allowed Crum to enter Martin’s property to pick up vehicles; Martin required Crum to enter into an indemnification agreement and Crum agreed to Martin’s terms. Crum obtained insurance coverage required by the agreement from Universal. Philip, a Crum employee, rode with a Martin employee to pick up a truck from Martin property. A boulder rolled down hill, hit the vehicle, severely injuring Philip. The U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration cited Martin for having loose rock above the roadway. Philip and Crum sued Martin; Martin counterclaimed based on the indemnification. Universal declined to defend on the counterclaim. After mediation, Martin agreed, without admitting liability, to pay $3,650,000. The parties also entered an “agreed judgment” against Crum for $3,650,000, on Martin’s counterclaim. Martin agreed not to pursue Crum for that judgment and sued Universal. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that Universal had no duty to indemnify Martin because there was enough evidence to show that Crum was not actually liable to Martin. The indemnification was unenforceable as against public policy; it was the product of a significant disparity in bargaining power and attempted to shift liability for compliance with at least one mining-safety statute. View "Martin Cnty. Coal Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Ward, a 50-year-old man from the United Kingdom, obtained lawful-permanent-resident status in 1995. Ward left the U.S. in 2003 to take care of his mother, who suffered from dementia. When he returned in 2006, Ward presented an expired green card and was charged as subject to removal under 8 U.S.C.A. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The government asserted that Ward had abandoned permanent resident status.” At a hearing, the government called Ward to testify, but called no other witnesses. Ward testified in his behalf and his brother also testified. Both sides also introduced documentary evidence. The Immigration Judge held that removability had been sustained by the requisite clear and convincing evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Immigration Judge erred in applying the wrong degree of proof and in assigning the burden of proof to the immigrant. View "Ward v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1975, Brumley assigned to his sons, Robert and William, his interests in a copyright to the hit gospel song, “I’ll Fly Away.” In 2006, Brumley’s four other children sought to terminate the assignment. Robert refused to recognize the termination as valid, arguing that Brumley was not the statutory author of the song and that a 1979 assignment of interests by Brumley’s widow prevented the heirs from later exercising termination rights. The district court ruled in favor of the heirs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed admission of a transcript and recording of a 1977 conversation between Brumley and one of the plaintiffs, but reversed and remanded because of the court’s exclusion of two articles discussing Brumley’s employment status at the time that he composed the song. View "Brumley v. Albert Brumley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Kindred, a nursing home and rehabilitation center in Mobile, has beds for about 170 residents and eight departments into which employees are classified: nursing, nutrition services, resident activity, maintenance, administration, medical records, central supply, and social services. The nursing department has 53 Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) not including the Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs) and Registered Nurses (RNs). The LPNs supervise the CNAs; RNs supervise the LPNs and report to the nursing director. The union petitioned to represent the CNAs. , Kindred argued that the bargaining unit should be expanded to include an additional 86 non-supervisory, non-professional service and maintenance employees. The NLRB regional director certified the CNAs as an appropriate bargaining unit and the union won a representation election. Kindred refused to bargain. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for enforcement, applying the “community of interest” approach. View "Kindred Nursing Cts. E. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Mendel was employed by the City of Gibraltar as a police department dispatcher. After his employment was terminated, he sued under the Family Medical Leave Act. At that time, the city employed 41 employees, excluding 25-30 “volunteer” firefighters, who are not required to respond to any emergency call, but are paid $15 per hour for time they do spend responding to a call or maintaining equipment. They have no consistent schedule and receive a Form–1099 MISC to report their income. They do not receive health insurance, sick or vacation time, or social security benefits, but may be promoted or discharged. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city, finding that Mendel was not an “eligible employee” under FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2611(4), because the city did not have more than 50 employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The substantial wages paid to the firefighters constitutes compensation, not nominal fees, so that they are employees, not volunteers, for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and FMLA. View "Mendel v. City of Gibraltar" on Justia Law