Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tompkins was injured when she slipped in a pool of water on the floor and fell at McNamara Terminal in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport (DTW). She sued Northwest Airlines, which she alleged had possession and control of McNamara at the time; Wayne County Airport Authority (WCAA), which owns DTW; and Kimco, which provided janitorial services. Contractors involved in the installation and repair of an allegedly leaky roof were brought into the suit as third party defendants. Her claims against WCAA were for liability under the public building exception to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 691.1406; claims against Northwest and Kimco were based on theories of failure to inspect and maintain the premises. The district court granted the contractors, WCAA, and Kimco summary judgment, but denied Northwest’s motion on procedural grounds. A jury awarded $3,198.80 in damages, of which only $1,439.46 was attributable to Northwest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Northwest had constructive notice of the condition. View "Tompkins v. Crown Corr, Inc." on Justia Law

Like many Michigan municipalities, Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties, especially since 2008. Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager. Acting under Michigan’s then-existing emergency manager law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of Pontiac’s retired employees and modified severance benefits, including pension benefits, that Pontiac had given retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. The retired employees claim that Schimmel and Pontiac violated their rights under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied the retirees an injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters have since rejected Public Act 4 by referendum, which may have rendered Schimmel’s actions void.The court also questioned whether two-thirds of both houses of the Michigan Legislature voted to make Public Act 4 immediately effective. The court noted that similar issues face many Michigan municipalities. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

Findlay sought relief from a withdrawal liability payment it allegedly owed the pension fund under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461. Findlay had ceased making contributions to a pension plan administered by the fund as the result of a labor dispute. About three months after the strike began, the fund demanded Findlay pay withdrawal liability of more than $10 million. Findlay contended that withdrawal liability was improper because withdrawal occurred as the result of a labor dispute; that despite the Act’s arbitration requirement, it should not be forced to arbitrate the dispute because the withdrawal was “union-mandated;” and that despite the Act’s interim payment requirement, it should not be forced to make interim payments because doing so would cause it to suffer irreparable harm. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act required the dispute be arbitrated, and enjoined the fund from collecting withdrawal liability payments pending arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but reversed the injunction, stating that creating an exception to interim payments for employers that would suffer irreparable harm would contradict the congressional purpose of protecting funds from undercapitalized or financially precarious employers. View "Findlay Truck Line, Inc. v. Cen. States SE & SW Areas Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Aker’s Louisville team consisted of the project manager, Hudson; electrical and instrumentation (E&I) designers Ash, Kirkpatrick, Sharp, and Whitaker; three piping designers; an estimator/scheduler; and a drafter who was being groomed to become an E&I designer. Sharp began as a contract worker in 2003 and became an employee in 2005. In 2008-2009, several Aker employees, including Sharp, were laid off because customers had canceled or postponed projects. Sharp, then 52 years old, claimed that he was fired because of his age, citing Hudson’s decision to train Kirkpatrick, and not Sharp, as E&I design lead and noting Hudson’s alleged comments about the advancing age of the group and the need to bring in younger people. Aker asserted that Hudson and Ash considered Kirkpatrick a superior employee to Sharp. The trial court entered summary judgment for Aker in Sharp’s age-discrimination claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding adequate evidence that Hudson played a determinative role in the layoff decision to attribute his motivation to the company, that Hudson’s remarks were direct evidence of age discrimination, and that Hudson’s expression of age as a factor in his decision was not merely a proxy for a legitimate business concern. View "Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Riley pled guilty to possession, with intent to distribute, of 53.17 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and, after unsuccessfully challenging his designation as a “career offender,” was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. At the time, life imprisonment was the statutory maximum penalty. Based on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and corresponding crack-cocaine guideline amendments implemented by U.S.S.G. Amendment 750, Riley unsuccessfully moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Riley’s sentence was not “based on” the then-applicable crack cocaine guidelines and that he is not eligible for a sentence reduction. . View "United States v. Riley" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hamilton Township imposed impact fees of about $2,100 per lot on developers of residential property. Salt Run, a residential developer, sought to avoid the fees by annexation to the Village of Maineville. Unable to stop the annexation in court, Hamilton Township imposed a lien on the property. Salt Run ultimately defaulted on its loan as a result of funding an escrow so that it could sell the property, despite the lien. Salt Run sued the Township, alleging a takings claim. While the case was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Hamilton Township had no authority to impose the fee. The district court granted judgment in favor of Salt Run on some claims but denied its claim that the lien amounted to an unconstitutional taking. Salt Run appealed that ruling and sought attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Salt Run was not a prevailing party and characterizing the suit as, at most, asserting an improper “collection mechanism.” View "Vill. of Maineville, OH v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

In 2006 White began working at a job that required him to lift parts weighing between 20 and 75 pounds. White was considered a good worker, but had consistent attendance problems. Between January 26, 2009, and September 24, 2009, White called in 19 absences for reasons, including emergency vacation leave, vacation leave, unpaid leave, and Family Medical Leave Act leave. White took FMLA leave in 2009 due to gout and unrelated back and foot pain. In September 2009, White began suffering complications related to abdominal surgeries following a 1995 car accident. On September 25, White’s surgeon scheduled his surgery for October 7. According to the employer, White did not use the word hernia and only indicated that he might be having surgery soon. White and his employer dispute whether he submitted paperwork concerning a restriction on lifting. White missed several more days and failed to call in, in violation of company policy, and was terminated. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The FMLA expressly permits an employer to enforce its “usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave,” 29 C.F.R. 825.302(d). View "Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC" on Justia Law

Officers responded to an anonymous 911 call reporting that a black man wearing a blue shirt, with a “poofy” afro, riding a bicycle, had a pistol. Officer Meredith arrived and began talking with Nelson, who precisely matched this description. Officer Massey then arrived and Nelson began to ride away on his bicycle. Meredith shouted at Nelson to stop, but Nelson kept riding away. Massey, in his squad car, followed Nelson at a distance of 10 to 25 feet, and saw Nelson reach into his waistband and throw a large, heavy object into bushes. Massey continued following Nelson to a parking lot, where Nelson was stopped. After Nelson was under arrest, officers recovered bullets from his pocket. Officers found a loaded gun at the location where Massey had seen Nelson throw an object. Nelson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and moved to exclude testimony regarding the 911 caller’s description of the suspect. The district court denied the motion. A jury convicted Nelson, who was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence, but finding admission of the hearsay evidence prejudicial, notwithstanding the prosecution’s contention that it was admitted only as background information. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Boaz began working for FedEx in 1997, under an agreement that stated: “To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against Federal Express Corporation, I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires first.” She began took on additional responsibilities, previously handled by a male employee, without corresponding compensation, 2004-2008. Boaz sued FedEx in 2009, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court held that, although the claims were timely under the statutes, they were barred by the agreement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on Supreme Court precedent prohibiting an employee from waiving rights under those laws. View "Boaz v. FedEx Cust. Info. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Yancy pleaded guilty to felon-in-possession, carjacking, and use-of-firearm charges, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), 2119, and 924(c), and received a 156-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s application of the use-of-a-minor enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3B1.4; and fact-finding pertaining to uncharged conduct that increased the statutory minimum sentence. Crediting parts of the minor’s testimony, the district court found that Yancy directed the minor to take a phone, to stand in front of the store, and to initiate contact with the first person who came up. Yancy voluntarily admitted facts establishing brandishing during his plea, with full knowledge of their potential effect on his sentence, and he suffered no prejudice from the indictment’s failure to specify brandishing. View "United States v. Yancy" on Justia Law