Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kinds was assaulted and threatened by her live-in boyfriend. She requested time off to find a new place to live, but did not have vacation time available and was not eligible for Family and Medical Leave Act leave because she had worked less than 1,250 hours for her employer during the previous 12 months, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A). The company granted her one week of discretionary leave. She returned to work for about a month, after which she was eligible for FMLA leave. She applied for leave the following day and returned part-time about two months later. Her employer notified the administrator of its short-term disability insurance plan. Three weeks into her leave, a licensed independent social worker diagnosed Kinds as having a severe depression episode. Following approval of disability benefits for part of Kinds’s absence, her employer approved the period after her diagnosis for FMLA leave and asked Kinds to submit medical certification for the period that was not approved. Neither Kinds nor her healthcare providers timely submitted documentation. After an extension, the employer denied FMLA leave, determined that Kinds’s absence during the period at issue was unexcused, and terminated Kinds’s employment. The district court dismissed her FMLA lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Kinds v. OH Bell Tel. Co." on Justia Law

Hogg, charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and possession with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of cocaine, pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment. He sought to withdraw his plea, based on newly-discovered evidence of criminal charges against the prosecution’s lead detective and violation of Fed.R.Crim.P.11(b)(1)(H)-(I) by incorrectly advising him of the penalty range for the offense to which he pled guilty. The court denied both arguments. On appeal, Hogg argued that the government offered him an inducement that was not included in his written plea agreement and that he was entitled to sentencing under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The court had applied provisions in effect at the time he committed his offense. The Sixth Circuit remanded to allow withdrawal of the plea. Neither the court nor counsel correctly anticipated the effect of the new enactment on the statutory penalty range for the offense to which Hogg pled guilty. The court cautioned, “be careful what you wish for,” because in exchange for the deal Hogg wants to reject, he was allowed to plead guilty to an offense involving significantly less crack cocaine than he admitted responsibility for in his agreement. View "United States v. Hogg" on Justia Law

Capozzi, a federal prisoner, rolled out of a transport van and fled. Personnel pursued him, firing shots. Two days later agents discovered Capozzi hiding in a wooded area. He was indicted for escaping from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a) and sought to present a defense of necessity, arguing that he faced an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury due to post-traumatic arteriovenous fistula originating from a chest stabbing. Capozzi claims that he believed that escape at that moment was his only chance at saving his life. The district court denied the motion and refused to instruct the jury on the defense. During deliberations, the jury submitted a note stating that without a transcript it could not make a decision. The court gave a supplemental instruction designed for deadlock, to which neither party objected. After additional deliberation, the court concluded that the jury was deadlocked, polled the jurors, and over Capozzi’s objection, declared a mistrial. A retrial was scheduled, but Capozzi pled guilty. The government objected to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court found that because the government did not move for a reduction, Capozzi was entitled only to a two-level reduction and sentenced Capozzi to 51 months, the top of his Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Capozzi" on Justia Law

Nichols, a Tennessee state prisoner awaiting execution, had an “oppressive and forlorn childhood, due to his father’s abuse, his mother’s illness, their poverty, and the church-dominated society into which he was born” in 1960. Nichols graduated high school; he enlisted in the Army in 1981. He was discharged two years early. In 1984, he pled guilty to burglary and assault with attempt to rape. A psychological report found nothing remarkable. He married and had a stable relationship. In 1987 Nichols returned to jail for a prowling conviction and parole violation. He was released and returned to his wife and job. He began disappearing at night. Following rapes or attempted rapes of 12 women (Pulley died as a result) in 1988-1989, police received an anonymous tip identifying Nichols. Police showed photo-arrays to four victims, each of whom identified Nichols immediately. Nichols waived counsel and Miranda rights and videotaped a confession to four rapes. After being allowed to sleep, Nichols confessed to other rapes. Additional victims identified Nichols. Nichols directed a detective to recover the board used to murder Pulley. Nichols’s wife stated that Nichols had confessed to her. A Ph.D. and an M.D. found Nichols competent to stand trial. State courts rejected his appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief. In 2005 DNA testing confirmed Nichols as the source of sperm on Pulley’s clothing. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance and multiple procedural arguments. View "Nichols v. Heidle" on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

Shweika applied for naturalization in 2004. Three years passed without review. Shweika obtained a writ, compelling USCIS to complete review by May 30, 2008. On May 29, 2008, USCIS denied the application because Shweika failed to provide certified copies of expungement documents to meet his burden to establish good moral character. Shweika sought a hearing. Although regulations require that USCIS schedule a hearing within 180 days of a timely request, 10 months passed. Shweika returned to the district court, which found that mandamus was unnecessary, but did not dismiss. The immigration officer conducted a de novo review, contrary to Shweika’s expectations, asking about a conviction from 1992, and allegations by Shweika’s ex-wife suggesting domestic violence. Shweika’s attorney asked to stop the hearing because the inquiry exceeded the scope of appeal; the officer refused. On advice of counsel, Shwika left. USCIS denied Shweika’s application on the record before it. Although noting that USCIS equivocated over whether denial was on the merits or for failure to prosecute, the district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reasoning that that the 8 U.S.C. 1421(c) hearing requirement is nonjurisdictional, but that Shweika was not free to disregard the requirement, if he did so. View "Shweika v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Tennessee resident Lombard acquired a 1997 Lincoln Town Car in 2004. The car was partially manufactured, and its final assembly completed, in 1996 at Ford’s Wixom, Michigan plant. In March 2007, the Lincoln, which was licensed, registered, and insured in Tennessee, allegedly caught fire in Lombard’s driveway, causing damage to the car, Lombard’s residence, and personal property. Lombard’s insurers reimbursed Lombard for his losses and, as subrogees, sued Ford, asserting products liability, breach of warranty and negligence claims, alleging that the fire was due to a defective cruise control system. The district court dismissed, finding that Tennessee law governed and that Tennessee’s statute of repose for products liability actions bars the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, after examining Michigan choice of law rules. The conclusion that Michigan’s interests do not “mandate” that Michigan law be applied despite Tennessee’s interests was not erroneous. View "Std. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The plant’s union and TRW negotiated collective bargaining agreements, which included provisions for healthcare benefits for retirees. The last CBA became effective in 1993 and was scheduled to expire in 1996. The plant closed in 1997. TRW and the union entered into a termination agreement that provided that any beneficiary, who is receiving or entitled to receive any payment and/or benefit under the CBA, “shall continue to receive or be entitled to receive such payment and/or benefit as though the CBA and Pension Plan had remained in effect.” In 2011, TRW terminated prescription drug coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees, replacing it with an annual contribution to a health reimbursement account. Plaintiffs claimed that this change modified their benefits in violation of TRW’s contractual obligation and filed a purported class action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and a claim for benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court granted TRW’s motion to compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the two named Plaintiffs, declining to address the rights of hypothetical plaintiffs. View "VanPamel v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, the district court sentenced Defendant to incarceration, followed by two years of supervised release, for the sale of counterfeit obligations. Supervised release began in November, 2010. In 2012, the district court transferred jurisdiction of Defendant’s supervised release. Before the transfer, Defendant left the district without permission on four occasions and was arrested twice for promoting prostitution. Defendant entered a guilty plea and waived his right to appeal. The district court sentenced Defendant to 13 months of incarceration, as recommended. Defendant appealed, arguing that his plea was invalid because the violations upon which it was based occurred before transfer of jurisdiction of his supervised release and that he was then unaware of potential issues with the court’s jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to revoke release and that Defendant’s guilty plea was valid under 18 U.S.C. 3605, which authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of supervised release for violations committed prior to transfer and gives transferee courts equal power to terminate or reduce the conditions of supervised release. The court noted the need to avoid creating a “twilight zone” whereby supervisees would obtain immunity for violations committed, but not discovered, before transfer. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Romo was sleeping in the driver’s seat of a parked car, intoxicated, when he was approached by Officer Largen, who arrested Romo for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, based on Largen’s observation of Romo’s having driven the car minutes earlier. Romo claimed that he had not been driving and filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claiming that Largen violated his constitutional rights and committed several intentional torts. The district court denied Largen’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified-immunity, finding that a jury could disbelieve Largen’s claim that he had seen a very similar car being driven in violation of traffic laws. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that it was bound by the district court’s finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed. View "Romo v. Largen" on Justia Law