Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Akron held promotional exams for fire department positions of Captain and Lieutenant. The exams were prepared, administered and scored by an outside testing consultant. Each exam contained a 100-question multiple choice section on technical knowledge and two oral assessment exercises. The Lieutenant exam also required a written work-sample; the Captain exam had an additional oral group exercise. Candidates were placed on an eligibility list in an ordered ranking. Plaintiffs alleged disparate-impact age discrimination against 23 firefighters based on age, 29 U.S.C. 621; that the exam for Lieutenant had an adverse impact on three African-American firefighters and that the exam for Captain had an adverse impact on 12 Caucasian firefighters based on race, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and state law violations. The district court concluded that the exam adversely impacted 12 Caucasian Captain candidates and three African-American Lieutenant candidates on the basis of race, and adversely impacted eleven Lieutenant candidates on the basis of their age and ordered promotion of 18 candidates. Each Lieutenant candidate was awarded $9,000 in compensatory damages and $72,000 in front pay. Captain candidate were awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages and $80,000 in front pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howe v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

In 2001 Fitzpatrick killed his girlfriend, her 12-year-old daughter, and a neighbor. There were questions about his mental health. A pretrial hearing was held because of Fitzpatrick’s confession to his cousin that the devil had made him commit the crimes. The court took no action, based on the statement of the lead investigator that officers had no concerns about competence. After opening statements, in a sidebar, defense counsel stated that Fitzpatrick had indicated his desire to plead guilty and that he recommended against such action. The trial court advised Fitzpatrick of its disinclination to accept a guilty plea. Fitzpatrick insisted that he did not want to wait or to “put his family through this.” When the judge disagreed, Fitzpatrick demanded to be taken out of the courtroom and reiterated that he wanted to stop the trial. Following some discussion of competency and inquiries directed to Fitzpatrick, the court accepted the plea. A panel sentenced him to death. Ohio courts affirmed the convictions and sentence, and denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Fitzpatrick’s statements did not give the trial court reason to believe that he did not understand the consequences of waiving a jury trial and pleading guilty. All three attorneys involved consistently represented that they thought that he was knowingly waiving his rights. View "Fitzpatrick v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

The Authority was formed under Ga. Code 46-4-82(a) to provide member municipalities with natural gas. It operates as a non-profit, distributing profits and losses to member municipalities: 64 in Georgia, two in Tennessee, 12 in other states. It pays its own operating expenses and judgments; it is exempt from state laws on financing and investment for state entities and has discretion over accumulation, investment, and management of its funds. It sets its governance rules; members elect leaders from among member municipalities. Smyrna, Tennessee has obtained gas from the Authority since 2000, using a pipeline that does not run through Georgia. The Authority entered a multi-year “hedge” contract for gas acquisition, setting price and volume through 2014, and passed the costs on. The market price of natural gas then fell due to increased hydraulic fracturing (fracking), but Smyrna was still paying the higher price. Smyrna sued for breach of contract, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The district court denied the Authority’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity under Georgia law and the Eleventh Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Authority’s claim that any entity referred to as a state “instrumentality” in a Georgia statute is entitled to state-law sovereign immunity “requires quite a stretch of the imagination.” View "Town of Smyrna, TN v. Mun. Gas Auth. of GA" on Justia Law

The Fund is a multi-employer trust fund under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. 186, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. Blue Cross is a Michigan non-profit corporation; its enabling statute authorizes the State Insurance Commissioner to require it to pay a cost transfer of one percent of its “earned subscription income” to the state for use to pay costs beyond what Medicare covers. In 2002 the Fund converted to a self-funded plan, and entered into an Administrative Services Contract with Blue Cross, which states that Blue Cross is not the Plan Administrator, Plan Sponsor, or fiduciary under ERISA; its obligations are limited to processing and paying claims. In 2004 the Fund sued, claiming that Blue Cross breached ERISA fiduciary duties by imposing and failing to disclose a cost transfer subsidy fee to subsidize coverage for non-group clients. The fee was regularly collected from group clients. Self-insured clients were not always required to pay it. Following a first remand, the district court granted class certification and granted the Fund summary judgment. On a second remand, the court again granted judgment on the fee imposition claim and awarded damages of $284,970.84 plus $106,960.78 in prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI" on Justia Law

In 1990 Plummer, a recognized expert in horse-breeding and the tax consequences of related investments, created the Mare Lease Program to enable investors to participate in his horse-breeding business and take advantage of tax code provision classification of horse-breeding investments as farming expenses, with a five-year net operating loss carryback period instead of the typical two years, 26 U.S.C. 172(b)(1)(G). Plummer’s investors would lease a mare, which would be paired with a stallion, and investors could sell resulting foals, deducting the amount of the initial investment while realizing the gain from owning a thoroughbred foal. If they kept foals for at least two years, the sale qualified for the long-term capital gains tax rate, 26 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A). Between 2001 and 2005, the Program generated more than $600 million. Law and accounting firms hired by defendants purportedly vetted the Program. Plummer and other defendants began funneling Program funds into an oil-and-gas lease scheme. It was later discovered that the Program’s assets were substantially overvalued or nonexistent. Investors sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), also alleging fraud and breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment and awarded $49.4 million with prejudgment interest of $15.6 million. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that there was no genuine dispute over any material facts. View "West Hills Farms, LLC v. ClassicStar Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Eight defendants who held positions with Clay County, Kentucky, were charged with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), based on participation in a vote-buying scheme in three election cycles, 2002 to 2007. Candidates pooled money to pay “vote haulers” to deliver voters for a particular slate of candidates. To ensure that they voted for the correct slate, co-conspiring election officers and poll workers reviewed the ballots. When the proper slate was confirmed, the voter got a token or marking and was paid in a location away from the polls. Conspirators retained lists to avoid double payments and to keep track of whose votes could be bought in future elections and used absentee voting and voter-assistance forms to implement the scheme. When electronic voting machines were introduced, conspiring poll workers misinformed voters that they did not need to click “cast ballot” after selecting candidates; poll workers would enter the voting booth after the voter exited and change the electronic ballot to reflect the slate before casting the ballot. The Clay County Board of Elections was alleged to be the racketeering enterprise in the conspiracy. They were convicted after a seven week trial. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on cumulative errors in evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Advance installs and services signs. It alleges that it entered into a contract to sell Optec’s electronic messaging signs to foodservice customers. Advance claims that Optec agreed not to sell directly to the foodservice companies. Rogers, a franchisee of Sonic Restaurants, was a long-time Advance customer. Advance and Optec undertook a pilot project to install signs at Sonic corporate-owned locations and Rogers’s franchises. Advance claimed that Optec violated the agreement by negotiating with Sonic directly. Advance and Optec entered a second agreement by phone, with Optec to pay Advance 12 percent of net on sales made by Optec to customers introduced by Advance. Advance sent a letter memorializing the terms; Optec made a minor change, unrelated to commission; Advance incorporated the change and returned the letter. Optec refused to sign. Following additional negotiations, Optec signed a two-year agreement with Sonic and installed signs at 1,400 locations, without Advance being involved. A jury found in favor of Advance on breach-of-contract claims and a claim for tortious interference and awarded damages of $3,444,000 for breach of the telephone agreement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that: there was no meeting of the minds for the telephone agreement; Ohio’s Statute of Frauds precluded enforcement; Advance did not prove its tortious interference claim; and that the evidence did not support the damages awards. View "Advance Sign Grp., LLC v. Optec Displays, Inc." on Justia Law

Harkness, a reserve Commander in the Navy Chaplain Corps, was denied a promotion to the rank of Captain by an annual selection board. The Secretary of the Navy denied his request to convene a special selection board (SSB) to review that decision. Harkness filed suit, claiming that promotion policies and procedures for chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by 10 U.S.C. 14502(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-promoted officers must first petition the Secretary to convene an SSB. The Secretary must weigh certain factors, including whether an administrative error caused the original selection board not actually to consider the officer, or whether a material error caused the original board to mistakenly fail to recommend promotion. If the Secretary determines that an SSB is not warranted, the officer can seek review of that denial in federal court. The language of Harkness’s request apparently challenged only the composition of the board and fell short of giving the Secretary a meaningful opportunity to respond to Harkness’s constitutional contention. View "Harkness v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1986, Harrison was charged with second-degree murder and carrying a firearm during commission of a felony, but was convicted of reckless use of a firearm resulting in death (a lesser-included Misdemeanor) and felony-firearm. Harrison received consecutive sentences, although, under Michigan law, the crimes were subject to concurrent sentencing only. Released in 1990, Harrison committed another firearm offense in 1991, was convicted, and returned to prison. On collateral review of the first conviction, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, in 2008, that Harrison had been improperly sentenced and ordered issuance of a corrected judgment. Harrison sued the state and other defendants, seeking damages and reduction of a subsequent, unrelated prison sentence that he was still serving. The district court dismissed, holding that some defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; that claims against the remaining defendants were time-barred; and that a claim concerning the failure to commute his 1991 sentence was noncognizable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding no error in the rulings on sovereign immunity and commutation, but holding that Harrison’s claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not time-barred. View "Harrison v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

Toledo police officers, near a shopping center with few stores and in an area with many complaints of robberies, thefts, drug activity, and loitering, noticed a group of people, not going in or out of stores, but remaining together without any visible purpose. They also noticed a man on a bicycle, who rode across the parking lot. Jeter arrived on a bicycle, but was not a member of the group, nor was he the individual seen traversing the parking lot; he entered a store and purchased a snack and bottled water. Exiting the store, he consumed the snack, placed his water on his bicycle, and then began to leave just as officers arrived to “saturate” the plaza and prevent anyone from leaving. TPD implements this “bum rush” tactic “every couple weeks” in areas of suspected criminal activity, to get “more gun[s] off the street” or “more person[s] with outstanding warrants.” Thinking he was the person they had seen earlier, officers stopped Jeter, who ran. When officers caught Jeter, they found a handgun. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Jeter pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion. His advisory Guidelines range was 30 to 37 months. The district court sentenced Jeter to 45 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jeter" on Justia Law