Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cleveland has had an age-65 mandatory retirement policy for police and fire department personnel since 1960. The policy allowed the chief of police or the fire department to allow a person to continue on active duty on a year to year basis, subject to approval of the Director of Public Safety, following independent medical evaluation. Extensions were routinely granted until 2010, when budget cuts caused lay-offs and the police chief denied all requests. The fire department continued to grant extensions. Former officers, forced into retirement, alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621., Ohio’s age discrimination statute, Ohio Rev. Code 4112, and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal law includes an exception that allows state and local governments to set mandatory retirement ages for firefighters and law enforcement officers; the city established that its retirement plan exists for the efficiency of the police department and is not a subterfuge to evade the Act. View "Sadie v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

The debtor worked Saylor’s nightclub and for another entity owned by Saylor, scouting for commercial properties. Debtor obtained loans ($1,018,350) to purchase four Michigan car washes. The loan closings were conducted by another company controlled by Saylor, acting as agent for the title company, which never released loan proceeds to complete the purchases. After the debtor defaulted, Bayview, assignee of the notes, discovered that he did not hold title to the properties securing the notes. Bayview filed claims under the title commitments. The title company claimed that the loan applications contained false statements and denied the claim for failure to exercise due diligence in approving the loans. Bayview sued and the parties settled; Bayview assigned an interest in the notes to the title company, which obtained a default judgment of $10,172,840 against Saylor. The debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The title company filed an adversary complaint claiming that the Bayview notes were undischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(B). The bankruptcy court rejected the argument, holding that under Michigan law, claims for fraud cannot be assigned and that the title company had the right to pursue Saylor, but not the debtor. The district court reversed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the title company can seek nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2) View "Pazdzierz v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Brigance worked as a coal miner for 20 years, until he stopped working in 1994 because of shortness of breath, which prevented him from obtaining other employment. Brigance obtained Kentucky state black lung benefits, which expired after about eight years. Brigance sought federal benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. An administrative law judge held that the claim was not barred by the Act’s three-year statute of limitations, 30 U.S.C. 932(f). The Benefits Review Board affirmed an award of benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Brigance admitted that he had a medical determination of total disability (pneumoconiosis) seven years before filing his claim. View "Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

Janosek owns a business that makes welded ring products. The business uses water to cool hydraulics used in the process. In or before 1999 Janosek installed closed loop water chillers that he hoped would recapture the water and significantly decrease water consumption. Instead of seeing a decrease in his water bills, Janosek continued to pay in excess of $150,000 a year until 2002, when the bills dropped to between $10,000 and $25,000 a year. Janosek suspected that he had been over-charged based on the Cleveland Water Department practice of estimating water consumption. Cleveland’s Moral Claims Commission, established to consider monetary claims that Cleveland is not legally obligated to pay, held a hearing, without notifying Janosek, and denied the claim. The district court dismissed Janosek’s case, finding that claims of unjust enrichment, taking without just compensation, and negligence were barred by the statute of limitations, and that a due process claim concerning the lack of notice failed because Janosek had not identified a valid property interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Any legitimate property interest that Janosek had in the overpayments lapsed with the running of the limitations period. View "Janosek v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Federal agents tracked Rivas from Texas to Memphis, suspecting he might be trafficking drugs. Rivas later met defendants and the three drove around Memphis in multiple vehicles before arriving at a warehouse. One of the vehicles was a tractor-trailer. The tractor was registered to Rivas. When agents moved in to investigate, defendants complied, but Rivas fled. While a search for Rivas was ongoing, a narcotics dog alerted the officers to the presence of controlled substances in the trailer. The agents later recovered, among other things, one ton of marijuana under the floor of the trailer. In the prosecution that followed, the district court ruled that defendants were unlawfully detained and, as a remedy, suppressed the marijuana evidence as to them, but not as to Rivas, whom it found was lawfully seized. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the recovered evidence was not the product of defendants’ detention, so, lawful or not, suppression was not warranted. Given the officers’ reasonable suspicion that Rivas was using the tractor-trailer to traffic drugs and their knowledge that Rivas owned the tractor, they had authority to detain the vehicle at least briefly. View "United States v. Figuerdo-Diaz" on Justia Law

In June 2007, Louzon, a Ford product engineer, took an approved leave of absence to visit family in Gaza. While he was there, security issues in the region caused Israel to close its borders, making it impossible for Louzon to return to the U.S. before the end of his leave. Ford initially extended his leave, but by the time the State Department was able to evacuate Louzon in August 2007, the extension had expired. Ford terminated his employment. In 2009, Louzon filed suit, alleging age and national-origin discrimination, moved to exclude Louzon’s evidence of comparable employees on the basis that none were similarly situated as a matter of law. The district court granted Ford’s motion and then granted summary judgment to Ford. The Sixth Circuit reversed on the motion in limine, holding that the district court improperly considered nonevidentiary issues in-limine, and vacated the summary judgment. View "Louzon v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Suazo is a Honduran immigrant. He entered the U.S. without inspection in 1998. He has been in the U.S. continuously since that time. In 1999, Suazo was granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) due to his Honduran citizenship. His TPS designation has been continuously renewed due to his continued good moral character, but could potentially be discontinued anytime without notice. In 2010, Suazo married Stacey, who filed an Immediate Relative I-130 Petition on behalf of her husband. Suazo filed an accompanying I-485 Application for Adjustment of Status form, seeking to become a Lawful Permanent Resident (8 U.S.C. 1255). The Suazos had an interview with immigration officials. Stacey’s petition was approved, providing an independent basis to become an LPR. Suazo’s LPR Application, however, was denied because he entered without inspection. The district court dismissed their petition, deferring to the government’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101–1537. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that it was “disturbed by the Government’s incessant and injudicious opposition in cases like this, where the only purpose seems to be a general policy of opposition for the sake of opposition.” View "Flores v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs." on Justia Law

While awaiting a hearing, Zabawa made threats and behaved in an agitated way. Officer Murphy decided to handcuff Zabawa to prevent him from disarming an officer. Before he could do so, Zabawa lunged at Murphy and started punching him. Murphy blocked the attack, and got Zabawa onto the floor by elbowing, kneeing, and headbutting him. After a struggle, Murphy handcuffed Zabawa with the help of other officers. During the fight, Murphy suffered a cut over his eye that required stitches. Murphy testified that he did not know whether the cut happened when he headbutted Zabawa or when Zabawa punched him. A grand jury indicted Zabawa for assaulting and “inflicting bodily injury” on a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b). Zabawa’s trial did not take place for more than five and a half years. After Zabawa was found competent to stand trial, the court denied a motion to dismiss based on the delay. Zabawa was convicted and sentenced to 222 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that “inflict” is a narrower term than “cause” and that Murphy admitted that the injury might have resulted from his application of force to Zabawa, rather than from force Zabawa applied to him. View "United States v. Zabawa" on Justia Law

Davis sued Cintas, individually and on behalf of a class of female job applicants denied employment as entry-level sales representatives, alleging that Cintas’s hiring practices led to gender discrimination, in violation of Title VII, and caused Cintas to reject her application for employment twice. The district court denied Davis’s motion for class certification and granted summary judgment for Cintas. The Sixth Circuit affirmed both denial of class certification and the entry of summary judgment on her individual disparate-treatment claim arising in 2004 and her disparate-impact claim. The court reversed with respect to a disparate-treatment claim arising in 2003, noting that she was at least as qualified as the male candidates at that time. View "Davis v. Cintas Corp." on Justia Law

In 2008, Washburn was seriously injured when the door of an airplane hangar, T-hangar 12, blew off and hit her in the face and torso during a storm at an airpark owned by Lawrence County and operated by Attitude Aviation. Watson had leased T-hangar 12 for more than 20 years at the time of the accident; his lease made him responsible for the condition of the hangar. Attitude was never included in any of the hangar lease negotiations or lease renewals. Rejecting Washburn’s suit on summary judgment, the district court held that the County and Attitude owed no duty of care to Washburn because they had no control over the hangar. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Washburn v. Lawrence Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law