Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, the owners and lessors of royalty rights to natural gas produced in Trumbull and Mahoning Counties in Ohio, filed a putative class-action lawsuit, alleging that three interrelated energy companies that entered into oil and gas leases with plaintiffs deliberately and fraudulently underpaid gas royalties over more than a decade. Plaintiffs asserted breach of contract and five additional tort and quasi-contract claims and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The district court dismissed, holding that the contract claim was time-barred by Ohio’s four-year statute of limitations and that none of the tort and quasi-contract claims were separate and distinct from the underlying contract action because they did not allege any obligations apart from those imposed by the leases. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that the district court failed to consider plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment argument and that allegations regarding due diligence were sufficient to require further analysis. View "Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2009, Epling purchased a manufactured home, borrowing funds from Vanderbilt secured by a security interest in her manufactured home. Epling resided in Magoffin County, Kentucky. Vanderbilt filed an application for first title and an application for a title lien statement in Bell County, Kentucky and later filed the Certificate of Title for the manufactured home, which listed Vanderbilt’s lien, in Bell County. In 2010, Epling filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The trustee initiated a strong-arm proceeding to avoid Vanderbilt’s lien on the manufactured home, under 11 U.S.C. 544, because the lien was not properly perfected under the Kentucky law. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee summary judgment, concluding that Vanderbilt had failed to perfect its lien because it had filed the required title lien statement in its county of residence, rather than in Epling’s county of residence. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Westenhoefer" on Justia Law

In August, 1996, Timmerman arrived at her mother’s home, hysterical and bleeding from a laceration on her nose. She said that a man named Gabrion had raped her. Timmerman was 19 years old and had given birth to a baby six weeks earlier. She told her mother that Gabrion had said that, if she reported the rape, he would kill her and her baby. She reported the rape to the Newaygo County Sheriff. Two days before the trial was set to begin, Gabrion, free on bond, abducted Timmerman, took her to a remote location on federal land in the Manistee National Forest, bound and gagged her and weighed her down with concrete blocks, and threw her, alive, into a shallow lake, where she drowned. Gabrion also abducted and killed Timmerman’s infant daughter. The government presented 58 witnesses; a federal jury convicted Gabrion of murder and recommended that he be sentenced to death. The district court sentenced him accordingly. On rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the fact that Michigan has no death penalty should have been considered a mitigating factor and a challenge to the voir dire. View "United States v. Gabrion" on Justia Law

The Trustee for McKenzie’s bankruptcy estate filed an adversary proceeding against GKH, McKenzie’s law firm (and a creditor), seeking records pertaining to entities in which McKenzie allegedly had an interest (11 U.S.C. 542). The parties entered into an agreed order. The Trustee then filed other actions, arising from the same post-petition transfer of 50 acres from the Cleveland Auto Mall, an entity in which McKenzie had a 50% interest, to a newly formed entity in which McKenzie had no interest. The Trustee alleged violation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(k) and preferential or fraudulent transfer, 11 U.S.C. 547(b) and 544(g)). The Bankruptcy Court dismissed, finding that under Tennessee law and notwithstanding prior dissolution, CAM existed as a separate legal entity such that the land remained its separate property. The Trustee then filed a state court action, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy to commit fraud; GKH allegedly represented McKenzie under a conflict of interest in drafting the transfer documents. Several claims were dismissed as untimely. GKH then sued the Trustee alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed GKH’s adversary proceeding alleging claims, citing quasi-judicial immunity and failure to state a claim, and denied GKH’s motion for leave to file a complaint in state court. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "In re McKenzie" on Justia Law

Exact developed business software. Infocon began distributing Exact’s software in 1998. A conflict arose when Exact allegedly abandoned a scheduled upgrade, leaving distributors like Infocon out to dry, and Infocon allegedly failed to remit fees. Exact sued Infocon in 2003. According to the district court, Exact showed “persistent noncompliance with… ever more stringent” discovery orders. When Infocon moved for a default judgment, Exact fired its lawyer, hired new counsel and entered settlement negotiations. . On the eve of settlement, Infocon fired its lawyer, DeMoisey. DeMoisey placed a charging lien on the settlement proceeds. Exact delivered the $4 million settlement to the district court, which distributed most of it to Infocon and placed the remaining $1.2 million in escrow pending resolution of the fee dispute. Nine months later, Infocon sued DeMoisey in Kentucky state court for malpractice. After a summary judgment ruling in favor of the lawyer, the district court held a bench trial and awarded DeMoisey $1.4 million in quantum meruit relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the amount was too high, that Infocon had a right to a jury trial and, for the first time on appeal, that the district court lacked jurisdiction because DeMoisey and Infocon are both from Kentucky. View "Exact Software N. Am., Inc. v. Infocon Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are investors who purchased Omnicare securities in a 2005 public offering. They sold their securities a few weeks later and sought relief under the Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. 77k, alleging that the registration statement was materially misleading. Omnicare is the nation’s largest provider of pharmaceutical care services for the elderly and other residents of long-term care facilities in the U.S. and Canada. Plaintiffs claimed that Omnicare was engaged in a variety of illegal activities including kickback arrangements with pharmaceutical manufacturers and submission of false claims to Medicare and Medicaid. The Registration Statement stated “that [Omnicare’s] therapeutic interchanges were meant to provide [patients with] . . . more efficacious and/or safer drugs than those presently being prescribed” and that its contracts with drug companies were “legally and economically valid arrangements that bring value to the healthcare system and patients that we serve.” The district court dismissed the suit against Omnicare, its officers, and directors, holding that plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded knowledge of wrongdoing. The Sixth Circuit reversed with regard to claims of material misstatements or omissions of legal compliance, but affirmed with respect to claims that revenue was substantially overstated in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. View "IN State Dist. Counsel v. Omnicare, Inc." on Justia Law

USI sued defendants for five million dollars, claiming misappropriation of funds held in escrow. USI also sought relief under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act of Canada (similar to a reorganization bankruptcy). Ultimately defendants agreed to pay USI $1,242,000 in installments. USI petitioned the CCAA court for clearance to proceed with settlement. Pursuant to that court’s directions, USI posted notice on its website informing creditors of the settlement. Alleging that the posting violated a confidentiality clause, the defendants refused to pay in accordance with the settlement. A magistrate ruled that there was no breach because the posting was “very, very vague,” but enjoined USI from future publication of the information. The district court reversed, holding that magistrates are not authorized to issue injunctions. Defendants then filed a separate suit, claiming that USI breached the confidentiality provision, and that under the “first-breach doctrine,” one who commits the first “substantial breach” of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other party for failure to perform; they obtained a temporary restraining order in state court that prevented USI from collecting on its judgment. After transfer back to the court in which the settlement was approved, the district court dissolved the injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Nat'l Viatical, Inc.,v. Universal Settlement Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs receive subsidies from Michigan’s Child Development and Care Program for providing home childcare services for low-income families. Following creation of the Home Based Child Care Council, a union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. The union and the Council entered into a collective bargaining agreement and the state began deducting union dues and fees from the subsidy payments. Plaintiffs sought to file a class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, collected allegedly in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of plaintiffs’ proposed class (all home childcare providers in Michigan) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for union representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs attempted to cure by proposing a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, finding that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if all members of the proposed subclass did oppose representation, their reasons for opposition were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Corrections agreed to house LaFountain at Lakeland in exchange for dismissal of his lawsuits. LaFountain wanted assignment to Lakeland to enable family visits and avoid further retaliation from Muskegon correctional officers. After the transfer, LaFountain filed new grievances, alleging selective enforcement of housing-unit rules based on race. He was transferred back to Muskegon. When LaFountain arrived at Muskegon, his typewriter was missing. He filed another grievance. At Muskegon, he was assigned to a cell with Riley, a mentally ill prisoner. Riley threatened LaFountain and kept him awake with lights and noise. LaFountain filed a grievance, alleging retaliation. After Riley threatened LaFountain’s life, LaFountain refused to remain in his cell and spent eight days in segregations. Each new shift ordered LaFountain to continue celling with Riley. Every time that he refused, the officers cited LaFountain for major misconduct, causing forfeiture of 770 days of good-time credits. The district court reviewed his civil rights suit under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and dismissed it, 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) & 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of certain of the retaliation claims based on the transfer to Muskegon, the typewriter damage, and the cell assignment. View "LaFountain v. Harry" on Justia Law

The Michigan State Real Estate Transfer Tax, MICH.COMP.LAWS 207.521, and the County Real Estate Transfer Tax, section 207.501, impose a tax when a deed or other instrument of conveyance is recorded during the transfer of real property. The tax is imposed upon “the person who is the seller or grantor.” State and county plaintiffs sought to recover transfer taxes for real property transfers recorded by Fannie Mae, a corporation chartered by Congress to “establish secondary market facilities for residential mortgages,” in order to “provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages,” and “promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation,” 12 U.S.C. 1716; Freddie Mac, also a corporation chartered by Congress for substantially the same purposes; and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, an independent federal agency, created under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. 4617, which placed Fannie and Freddie into conservatorships, 12 U.S.C. 4617(a)(2). When Congress created defendants, it expressly exempted them from “all” state and local taxes except for taxes on real property. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, reasoning that “transfer taxes are excise taxes, not taxes on real property. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Genesee Cty, v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency" on Justia Law