Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Washington was convicted of three carjackings that occurred during three days in 2010. Washington and his accomplice were apprehended with loaded weapons soon afterwards. The trial court denied a motion to suppress a victim’s identification as unduly suggestive and rejected a claim of insufficient evidence to prove that he had an “intent to cause death or serious bodily harm,” 18 U.S.C. 2119. The district court imposed sentences for the three carjackings under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) in the order in which they occurred. Because the defendant discharged his firearm during the first carjacking, he received 10 years for his first offense pursuant and two consecutive 25 year sentences for the second and third carjackings for a total mandatory minimum sentence of 60 years. If the district court had used its discretion to treat one of the brandishing counts as the first conviction, he would have received only seven years for his first offense, and his total mandatory minimum sentence would have been 57 years. The government later conceded that chronological ordering of offenses for sentencing purposes was erroneous, and requested limited remand, which was granted by the Sixth Circuit. The court otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 2012 Public Act 53 provides: “A public school employer’s use of public school resources to assist a labor organization in collecting dues or service fees from wages of public school employees is a prohibited contribution to the administration of a labor organization,” so that unions must collect their own membership dues from public-school employees, rather than have the schools collect those dues via payroll deductions. The Act does not bar public employers other than schools from collecting membership dues for unions who represent their employees. Unions and union members challenged the Act under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, quoting the Supreme Court: “The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of speech’; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.” The court further reasoned that there is a legitimate interest in support of the Act’s classification; the legislature could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers. View "Bailey v. Callaghan" on Justia Law

The Kepleys owned 30% of ATA’s outstanding capital stock. Lanz bought one share of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock in the corporation and a right to purchase common stock. At that time, Lanz, ATA, and its shareholders entered into an agreement, prohibiting sale of restricted shares (including Lanz’s share) to ATA’s competitors. In 2010, the Kepleys learned that Lanz sought to sell his share and purchase option to Crimson, an ATA competitor, for $2,799,000. The Kepleys sued, contending that Crimson’s president told them that they could not afford the Lanz shares or litigation and that Crimson would “shut it down or squeeze them out.” The Kepleys sold their shares to Crimson. Lanz did not complete the sale of his stock and remained a shareholder in ATA, 30 percent of which Crimson then owned. The Kepleys sought the difference between the sale price and the fair market value of the shares. The district court dismissed, finding that the Kepleys lacked standing because their alleged injury amounted to diminution in stock value, suffered by the corporation, and only derivatively shared by the Kepleys. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Kepleys, who are no longer shareholders and cannot pursue derivative claims, have standing for a direct suit. View "Kepley v. Lanz" on Justia Law

Defendant had his girlfriend’s six-year-old sister pose nude in photographs and videos and touched the child’s genitalia. The girl’s parents alerted the police. Defendant confessed; police found sexually explicit pictures and videos of the girl on his cell phone and computer. Defense counsel sought (18 U.S.C. 4241) a government-paid examination regarding competency and cognitive function, asking that the results be provided only to him. Section 4241 allows either party to request a competency hearing, but requires the results to be filed with the court with copies provided to counsel. The district court granted an examination, but denied his request that only he receive the results. Staff informed defendant that the results would not be confidential. He conferred with his lawyer and went forward with the examination. The psychiatrist found him competent to stand trial but diagnosed him with pedophilia. Defendant pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e). He objected to inclusion of the psychiatric examination in his pre-sentence report, particularly the pedophilia diagnosis and that he fantasized about having sex with children. The guidelines range was 360 months to life. The district court sentenced him to 360 months, denying a requested downward variance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Graham-Wright" on Justia Law

In 2006, Thompson pleaded guilty to three counts of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).The government dismissed two remaining counts and agreed not to oppose Thompson’s request for a downward departure or variance to result in a sentence of not less than 120 months.” Thompson would have had a base offense level of 24 under the crack guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2D1; because he was a career offender, Thompson’s actual base offense level was 32 under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The judge granted a downward departure to 29 to reflect acceptance of responsibility. The court found that the guidelines range was 151-188 months based on Thompson’s criminal history. After considering the18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the judge sentenced Thompson to 120 months of imprisonment. In 2012, Thompson moved for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) based on Sentencing Guidelines Amendments. On remand, the district court again denied the motion, reasoning that a defendant may be eligible for a sentence reduction when the crack cocaine guidelines were part of the framework used when determining the original sentence, but that those guidelines were not relevant to Thompson’s sentence calculation, which was based on his status as a career offender. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Johnson began communicating online with an FBI agent he believed to be a 14-year-old girl. Johnson sent images of child pornography and arranged a meeting for sexual activity. Following his arrest, Johnson pled guilty to transmitting child pornography and using a facility in interstate commerce to attempt to persuade a minor to engage in sexual activity. After completing his 63-month prison term and supervised release, Johnson began communicating online with another undercover agent he believed to be a 13-year-old girl and sent pornographic images featuring children. Johnson’s computer contained 500 images of child pornography. Johnson pled guilty to transporting child pornography in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1); using a communication facility to transfer obscene material to a minor under age 16, 18 U.S.C. 1470; and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5). Because of the prior conviction for transporting child pornography, he faced statutory sentences of 15 to 40 years on count one, up to 10 years on count two, and 10 to 20 years on count three. The presentence report recommended a term of 360 months to life. The district court sentenced Johnson to 320 months. On remand, the court applied the five-level increase, USSG 2G2.2(b)(5). Johnson was resentenced to 360 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Dotson died in August 1998. An administrative law judge determined that his wife was entitled to survivor’s benefits under the 2010 Black Lung Amendments, Pub. Law 111-148, 1556(a)–(c). The Sixth Circuit denied the company’s petition for review of the Benefits Review Board decision. The company filed a petition for rehearing, arguing that its case involved an additional issue: whether an award of benefits should commence the month the miner died. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition. The regulation says: “Benefits are payable to a survivor who is entitled beginning with the month of the miner’s death, or January 1, 1974, whichever is later.” 20 C.F.R. 725.503(c). This language was clear before Congress enacted the Amendments, and, by its terms, the widow is entitled to benefits beginning with the month of the miner’s death: August 1998. Rejecting an argument concerning retroactive application, the court stated that “imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’ disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor—the operators and the coal consumers.” View "McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Dotson" on Justia Law

In two trials, juries in Livingston County, Kentucky convicted Kraus of first-degree rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse involving two mentally delayed women. He is serving a prison sentence of 70 years with a life enhancement. After exhausting direct appeals and pursuing state court motions for post-conviction relief, Kraus filed two pro se petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petitions. Although the district court declined to issue a certificate of appealability, a Rule 34 panel granted Kraus a COA to review a narrow selection of claimed errors. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Kraus’s petitions “highlight serious concerns about his ability to confront the key witnesses at his trials, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and the competency of his counsel at the sentencing phase.” But, despite court orders, the court was not provided with any records of Kraus’s two trials, precluding meaningful review of Kraus’s claims. View "Kraus v. KY Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

In 1974, songwriter, recording artist, producer, and performer Tilmon, composed the song “You’re Getting a Little Too Smart.” In 1976, Tilmon assigned all of his rights to the song to Bridgeport Music. In 1997, rapper Rashaam A. Smith a/k/a Esham A. Smith released the song “You & Me,” which, according to Bridgeport, unlawfully contained samples of the composition “Smart.” In 2003, plaintiffs, including Bridgeport, sued for copyright infringement. In 2004, plaintiffs obtained default judgments. In 2005, plaintiffs recorded the judgments with the U.S. Copyright Office. In 2011, Tilmon’s widow and a nonparty to the lawsuit, moved, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), to set aside the default judgments because she was the legal owner of the copyright by operation of law at the time the lawsuit was filed. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the motion was untimely because the widow was on constructive notice of the judgment and had not established an inference of fraud on the court. View "Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Manning, a lawyer who served as the executor of Barney’s estate and the trustee of a trust for Mrs. Barney, set up accounts at National City Bank, one for the estate and one for the trust. He then wired funds, totaling about $1,250,000, from the bank accounts into the account of his business in violation of his fiduciary duties. Manning’s business failed and Manning confessed to Mrs. Barney that he had absconded with the money from the two accounts. The estate, trust, and Mrs. Barney sued Manning’s law firm in state court, but the suit was rejected on summary judgment. The Barneys then sued the successor to National City Bank to try to recover the money Manning stole. The district court dismissed, citing the affirmative defense of Ohio’s version of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Barneys failed to plead facts giving rise to an inference that the Bank committed any wrongdoing. View "Estate of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law