Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Clean Air Act New Source Review program forbids construction of new pollution sources without a permit, 42 U.S.C. 7475. Operators of major pollutant-emitting sources who plan construction must make a preconstruction projection of the increase in emissions following construction, to determine whether the project constitutes a “major modification,” requiring a permit. DTE planned on replacing 2,000 square feet of tubing, the economizer, and large sections of reheater piping; installing a new nine-ton device that provides voltage that creates the electromagnetic field needed for the rotor to produce electricity; and refurbishing boiler feedwater pumps at its power plant. The project required 83 days and $65 million. DTE performed required calculations and projected an emissions increase of 3,701 tons per year of sulfur dioxide and 4,096 tons per year of nitrogen oxides. Under the regulations, an increase of 40 tons per year of either substance is significant. DTE determined that the increase fell under the demand growth exclusion. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality took no action and construction began. The U.S. EPA filed notice of violation. The district court granted DTE summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While the regulations allow operators to undertake projects without having EPA second-guess their projections, EPA is not categorically prevented from challenging blatant violations until after modifications are made. View "United States v. DTE Energy Co." on Justia Law

Former employees of AK Steel filed a class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), including claims for a “whipsaw” calculation of their benefits from a pension plan in which they participated before terminating their employment. The employees were originally involved in a related class action that included identical claims against the same defendants, but were excluded from that litigation due to their execution of a severance agreement and release that each of them signed during the that litigation. The district court ruled in favor of the employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed an award of prejudgment interest for failure to consider case-specific factors, but otherwise affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss; class certification; and partial summary judgment on liability. The employees’s future pension claims were not released as a matter of law because the whipsaw claims had not accrued at the time of the execution of the severance agreements and because the scope of the contracts did not relate to future ERISA claims. View "Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp." on Justia Law

After the child complained of burning during urination, school nurse Sliwowski conducted a visual examination of the six-year-old female student’s genital area for medical purposes. The student’s mother alleges that this medical examination violated the child’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The district court denied summary judgment and denied Sliwowski qualified immunity, finding that the visual examination, conducted without consent and in the absence of a medical emergency, was an unreasonable search. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the law was not clearly established regarding whether a medically motivated examination by a school nurse exposing a student’s body constitutes a search subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment and that Sliwowski is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Hearring v. Sliwowski" on Justia Law

In 2004 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services promulgated 42 C.F.R. § 412.106(b), concerning the amount that certain hospitals are entitled to receive as enhancements to their regular reimbursement payments from the Medicare program. In connection with the Medicare program, Congress created a statutory formula to identify hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of low-income patients and to calculate the increased payments due such hospitals. Metropolitan Hospital challenged the way that the Secretary of HHS interprets this statutory formula to exclude certain patients who are simultaneously eligible for benefits under both Medicare and Medicaid, claiming that exclusion of dual-eligible patients cost it more than $2.1 million in 2005. The district court ruled that the challenged HHS regulation was invalid as violating the statute that it purported to implement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, upholding HHS’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1395. View "Metro. Hosp. v. U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 1992, Hodges pled guilty to first-degree murder in Tennessee and a jury sentenced him to death. The trial court refused to allow his attorneys to ask prospective jurors whether they could consider a life sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction for murder. The evidence indicated that Hodges planned the killing of a stranger to obtain money to move to Florida. Hodges presented mitigation evidence, claiming he had been raped at age 12, had drug abuse issues, and was raised in an unstable household. State courts upheld the conviction and sentence on appeal and denied Hodges’s petition for post-conviction relief. Hodges petitioned for federal habeas relief, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that state courts reasonably applied federal law in determining that restrictions imposed on voir dire did not interfere with Hodges’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial and in determining that Hodges’s trial counsel were not ineffective for advising Hodges to plead guilty to murder and aggravated robbery. The district court properly denied Hodges’s requests for discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and habeas relief on a claim of juror misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Hodges v. Bell" on Justia Law

Judge, who worked as an airline baggage handler and ramp agent for 20 years, underwent surgery to repair an aortic valve and a dilated ascending aorta. He applied for disability benefits under a group insurance policy issued by MetLife. MetLife denied benefits, finding that Judge was not totally and permanently disabled under the terms of the Plan. After exhausting internal administrative procedures, Judge sued to recover benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The district court granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of MetLife. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that MetLife applied the wrong definition of “total disability,” erred in failing to obtain vocational evidence before concluding that Judge was not totally and permanently disabled, erred in conducting a file review by a nurse in lieu of having Judge undergo independent medical examination, and that there was a conflict of interest because MetLife both evaluates claims and pays benefits under the plan. View "Judge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Debtors, five single-asset limited partnerships holding apartment complexes developed under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program, 26 U.S.C. 42, filed for relief under Chapter 11 in 2010. The properties were put into service in 2005 and 2006, and their tax credit recapture periods expire in 2019 and 2020. The bankruptcy court conducted a valuation hearing and concluded that, for purposes of determining the value of the secured portion of the (mortgage holder) Bank’s claims under 11 U.S.C. 506(a), a determination of the fair market value of the properties included consideration of the remaining federal low-income housing tax credits. The Bankruptcy Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s Valuation Order. The Debtors failed to amend their plan or disclosure statement to reflect the values set by the bankruptcy court until ordered to do so in 2012. The court ultimately dismissed the petitions, based on continuing loss to or diminution of the estate, coupled with absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation; the Debtors’ inability to effectuate a plan; and bad faith under 11 U.S.C. 1112(b). The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Creekside Senior Apts." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 91 current and former special investigators (SIs) employed by Nationwide Mutual Insurance claimed that Nationwide improperly classified SIs as administrative employees exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207 and 213(a)(1)) and analogous provisions of New York and California law. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Nationwide, then ruled in the company’s favor following trial on other issues. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reference to investigators, 29 C.F.R. 541.3(b)(1), read in context, pertains to law enforcement and public safety personnel and not to the Sis employed by Nationwide. Plaintiffs perform work “directly related” to Nationwide’s “general business operations.” The district court properly found that their investigations, with the purpose of resolving the indicators of fraud and the legitimacy of the suspicious claims, are unlike the narrower more formulaic background investigations into facts and records that have been found to not involve the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. View "Foster v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co" on Justia Law

In 1979, Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, on behalf of present and future recipients, alleging that Tennessee’s Medicaid program violated federal requirements, 42 U.S.C. 1396, and the Due Process Clause. The decades that followed involved intervenors, consent orders, revisions, and creation of a subclass. In 1994, Tennessee converted to a managed care program, TennCare. In 1995, five class members filed motions alleging that TennCare was being administered inconsistent with a 1992 decree and federal law. In 2009, the district court awarded plaintiffs more than$2.57 million for fees and expenses leading up to a 2005 Revised Consent Decree. Plaintiffs had originally requested a lodestar amount of $3,313,458.00, but the court reduced the award by 20 percent on account of plaintiffs’ “limited” success relative to the breadth of defendants’ requests and the scope of the litigation. The court noted that there was “no dispute that Plaintiffs in this case are the prevailing party, and thus entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988.” The Sixth Circuit vacated parts of the award, noting that section 1988 “is not for the purpose of aiding lawyers and that the original petition for fees included requests for dry cleaning bills, mini blinds, and health insurance. View "Binta B. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Geraldine Fuhr successfully sued to be instated as varsity boys basketball coach at Hazel Park High School, where she had been employed as varsity girls basketball coach. For five years she coached both teams. In 2006, she was removed from her position coaching varsity girls basketball. She claims that her dismissal as the varsity girls basketball coach and other acts of harassment were a result of her 1999 suit. The district court granted the district summary judgment, rejecting claims of retaliation (42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)), gender discrimination, and hostile work environment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting a substantial time gap between the suit and the complained-of actions and the district’s complained-of actions were not discriminatory. View "Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law