Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Omstott told Lexington police that her boyfriend, Kinison, was involved in criminal sexual activity with children and that Kinison had been sending text messages concerning his desire to get involved with a Savannah group that allegedly adopts children and allows people in the group to engage in sex with those children. Agents downloaded 1,646 pages of text messages with her consent; the messages corroborated Omstott’s claims. In one message Kinison suggested that they could babysit a child under two-years-old that would not be able to talk so that they could, perform sexual acts on the child, and take photos to send to the group. Omstott claimed Kinison was viewing pornographic videos on his home computer. After obtaining warrants, agents seized a computer and a cell phone from Kinison’s house and the phone from his car. He was indicted for receiving and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and 2252(a)(4)(B). Kinison admitted in a post-Miranda statement that he authored and sent the text messages. The district court granted Kinison’s motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that there was “no culpable police conduct to deter here.” View "United States v. Kinison" on Justia Law

Tennessee participates in Medicaid through “TennCare,” Tenn. Code 71-5-102. The Medicaid Act requires that TennCare administer an Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program for all enrollees under age 21, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(43), 1396d(r) and must provide outreach to educate its enrollees about these services. In 1998 plaintiffs filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that TennCare had failed to fulfill these obligations. The district court entered a consent decree that explained in detail the requirements that TennCare had to meet to “achieve and maintain compliance” with the Medicaid Act, based on the assumption that the Act created rights enforceable under section 1983. Eight years later, the Sixth Circuit held that one part of the Medicaid Act was unenforceable under section 1983. Following a remand, the district court vacated paragraphs of the decree that were based on parts of the Act that are not privately enforceable. After a thorough review of TennCare’s efforts, the court then vacated the entire decree, finding that TennCare had fulfilled the terms of the decree’s sunset clause by reaching a screening percentage greater than 80% and by achieving current, substantial compliance with the rest of the decree. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "John B. v.Emkes" on Justia Law

Williams, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, was convicted in 1999 in New York for a firearms charge and deported. Williams re-entered illegally and in 2002 was arrested for kidnapping, robbery, assault, and marijuana possession; he failed to appear for any court proceedings. Williams relocated to Nashville, where he obtained a driver’s license in the name of Arnold Fordham. The DEA began investigating Williams for distributing oxycodone, but believed that he was Fordham. The DEA executed a warrant on Williams’s home and found more than 1,000 oxycodone pills and 190 oxymorphone pills. Williams stated that his name was Fordham and admitted that he had been selling the pills and that he had a gun in the house. Two months after his initial appearance, Williams told the court his real name. He pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The government argued that Williams had obstructed justice when he lied about his identity and requested a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G 3C1.1. The court applied the enhancement and sentenced Williams to 87 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that misrepresentation of identity was not material to any matter decided by the district court. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Fulgenzi was prescribed the generic drug metoclopramide (FDA approved in 1980), sold originally under the brand name Reglan, a drug approved for short-term treatment of patients suffering from gastroesophageal reflux disease. In her suit, claiming failure to adequately warn of risks, she alleged that taking the drug caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia, an often-irreversible neurological disorder that causes involuntary movements, especially of the lower face. In 2009, the Supreme Court held that with respect to branded drug manufacturers, state failure-to-warn suits were not preempted by the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act , 21 U.S.C. 301. In 2011 the Court held that such suits could not go forward against generic drug manufacturers, as it is impossible to comply simultaneously with their state duty to adequately warn and their federal duty of sameness (federal law requires generic drug labels to be the same as their branded counterpart). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that after the branded-drug manufacturer of metoclopramide strengthened warnings on its label, the generic manufacturer failed to update its label as required by federal law, rendering compliance with both federal and state duties no longer impossible. View "Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Howell, then 17, and five friends left Kentucky, taking guns and a rickety car. At a rest stop in Tennessee, Lillelid, approached the group, sharing his religious views. Risner displayed a gun, directed the Lillelid family to their van even though Lillelid offered his keys and wallet. Risner, still armed, Howell, and others rode with the Lillelids to a secluded road where the Lillelids and their children were shot. Only two-year-old Peter survived, but lost an eye. When they were caught in Arizona, the group had the Lillelids’ possessions. All pled guilty in adult court in exchange for withdrawal of death-penalty requests and for certainty about other punishments. Howell received three life sentences without the possibility of parole and 25 years for attempted murder, each to be served consecutively, plus 25 years for especially aggravated kidnapping, 12 years for aggravated kidnapping and four years for theft, to run concurrently. State courts rejected Howell’s post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on her attorney’s failure to insist that she undertake a psychological evaluation The Tennessee Supreme Court held that, although the attorney had performed deficiently, Howell could not show prejudice. The federal district court rejected her habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howell v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Gayheart applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits in 2005 due to manifestations of anxiety, panic disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression. After an initial denial and three separate hearings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the limitations caused by Gayheart’s impairments did not preclude him from performing a significant number of jobs available in the national economy and denied Gayheart’s application. Gayheart’s request for an administrative appeal was denied. The Report and Recommendation issued by the federal court’s assigned magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that Gayheart should be awarded benefits. But the district court sustained the Commissioner’s objections and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ failed to weigh the medical opinions according to 20 C.F.R. 404.1527. View "Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Between 1982 and 1997, Alfes took out student loans funded by FFELP. Alfes consolidated his student-loan debt; SunTrust was the lender and obligee on the consolidated note and the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency was the guarantor. Alfes sought relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court entered a general discharge in 2005. Subsequently, Alfes sought a declaration that the debt under the consolidated note had been discharged, arguing that the consolidated note no longer constituted an “educational loan” under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)(A) and had been discharged with his ordinary debt. The bankruptcy court initially entered a default judgment against the defendants. Following a series of transfers, reopening, and various motions, the bankruptcy court ultimately held that a holder of consolidated student loans is an educational lender and that the consolidated loan was, therefore, not dischargeable absent a showing of undue hardship. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Alfes v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

In October 2008, Deputy Kuhn, a black man, stopped Joseph, a white woman for a traffic violation. Joseph falsely reported that Kuhn had raped her during the stop. An internal investigation into the allegation was not closed until January 2009. Several months after the investigation closed, Kuhn requested medical leave based on stress. Kuhn eventually took approximately seven months of paid and unpaid leave that did not end until he was terminated in January 2010. He filed suit against the county, and his superior. Against the county only, Kuhn asserted claims for termination without due process of law, violation of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 15.361, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Kuhn asserted a claim against his superior only for tortious interference with business expectancy. Against both, Kuhn asserted racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII, and racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2101. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kuhn v. County of Washtenaw" on Justia Law

While working at a Ford Motor plant, Rudisill was hit in the face by a piece of equipment, was knocked against a wall, fell to the floor, and rolled forward through the floor opening into the hot pit below. He lay there unconscious, being burned, until coworkers pulled him out of the pit. Rudisill had gained consciousness by this time and was screaming in pain. Rudisill sustained a head injury that required several staples to close. He was also burned on his arms and legs, abdomen, and left hand. Rudisill continues to experience pain, dizzy spells, ringing in the ears, and memory problems. He has had numerous surgeries and has undergone physical and occupational therapy. After a safety review immediately following the incident, Ford decided to modify the process so that employees slide metal grates over the pit before removing the guard rails. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, Rudisill sued Ford, alleging intentional tort; his wife asserted a derivative claim of loss of consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for Ford. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding insufficient evidence that Ford acted with deliberate intent to injure Rudisill, as required by Ohio statute. View "Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, created Amtrak, 84 Stat. 1327, and allowed railroads to be excused from providing intercity passenger service by entering into a contract with Amtrak. In1971, after filing for bankruptcy, APU’s predecessor contracted to pay Amtrak $52 million and provide Amtrak use of its tracks, facilities and services; Amtrak was to relieve it of responsibility for intercity rail passenger service and issue it about 5.2 million stock shares. A 1978 Settlement Agreement released existing claims between APU’s predecessor and Amtrak. In 1997, Congress enacted the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, 111 Stat. 2570, requiring that Amtrak, before redeem all common stock for the fair market value. More than 10 years later, Amtrak has not redeemed APU’s stock. In 2000 APU rejected Amtrak’s offer of $0.03 per share. In 2008 APU filed suit. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding that Amtrak qualified as an agency for purposes of constitutional violations, that federal agencies cannot be sued for damages for constitutional violations, and that the statute did not create a private right of action for redemption. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to a claim that Amtrak’s valuation of APU’s shares denied APU due process, but otherwise affirmed. View "Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp." on Justia Law