Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In sight of Nixon and Greene, Ballinger had an argument with Jones, retrieved a rifle and began shooting, then fled. Two men died of gunshot wounds. There was no physical evidence tying Ballinger to the scene; the prosecution presented testimony by Nixon and Greene. Before trial, defense attorney Jackson filed a list of potential alibi witnesses, which included Krisel. After the government objected to the notice, Jackson withdrew it. The jury convicted Ballinger. Before sentencing, Ballinger argued ineffective assistance due to Jackson’s failure to call Cunningham, claiming that Cunningham was Krisel’s married name and Jackson was aware of her possible testimony. The court denied Ballinger’s motions. Michigan courts rejected appeals. On a habeas corpus petition, the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Jackson testified that he did not argue alibi because Ballinger admitted committing the murders. Cunningham testified that she was Krisel and was with Ballinger when the crimes were committed, that Jackson never contacted her, but that she never tried to contact authorities. The district court considered that Jackson was later disbarred on an unrelated matter and granted the petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, given that a state court had issued a decision on the merits with respect to the claim. State courts did not violate clearly established federal law in rejecting Ballinger’s ineffective-assistance claim. View "Ballinger v. Preslesnik" on Justia Law

When her car was stopped, Villega, then pregnant, failed to produce a valid driver’s license. At the jail, an agent of the U.S. through Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 287(g) program, 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), determined that Villega was not lawfully in the U.S. A detainer was imposed, so that federal immigration officials would delay action until resolution of pending state charges. Unable to post bond, she was classified as a medium-security inmate because of the detainer and held for two days, until she informed a guard that she was about to have her baby. For transportation, Villega was placed on a stretcher with her wrists handcuffed in front of her body and her legs restrained together. At the hospital, the handcuffs were removed, but one of Villega’s legs remained shackled to the stretcher before and after the birth. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment on her shackling and denial-of-breast-pump claims; a jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting material factual disputes surrounding whether Villega was shown to be a flight risk, whether officers had any knowledge about a doctor’s no-restraint order, and the conflicting expert testimony about the ill effects of shackling. View "Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Abraitis brought a challenge to the reasonableness of an IRS jeopardy determination, 26 U.S.C. 7429 (b). The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on the statutory requirement that the taxpayer seek administrative review within 30 days of receiving the notice of jeopardy levy. The court rejected his argument that various bad-faith actions by the IRS excuse his neglect and permitted judicial review. The exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but is mandatory. View "Abraitis v. United States" on Justia Law

Sims was set to go to trial on charges that he possessed child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2)), and that he attempted to produce child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e)). Four days before trial he pled guilty to the possession charges. The district court then excluded the plea, expected testimony by the mother of one of the minors, and all evidence of Sims’s possession of child pornography from his attempted-production trial. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The trial court did not distinguish between the different types of evidence, incorrectly reasoning that the excluded evidence was relevant only to an issue that would not be important at trial: Sims’s intent. The intent element of the charged offense requires the government to prove that Sims specifically intended to obtain a lascivious image when he stood outside the minor’s bedroom window with a video camera. The district court erred, therefore, when it discounted the probative value of intent evidence in its balancing under Rule 403. The court’s reasoning did not adequately distinguish between prejudice that is unfair and prejudice that is fair with respect to the different types of evidence. View "United States v. Sims" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher since 1976, was diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes. By 1999, she required insulin injections. Until 2008, plaintiff was never disciplined. In 2008, plaintiff was summoned to address allegations that she had been sleeping during class. Plaintiff claimed that she was not sleeping but rather exhibiting symptoms of diabetes. She was formally reprimanded and requested accommodations: training in recognizing symptoms of diabetes; assistance if she appeared asleep; and breaks for insulin injections. The superintendent allowed her to keep snacks in her classroom, to use the nurse’s office if she first obtained classroom coverage, and to disseminate diabetes information to students and staff. Plaintiff was subsequently suspended for missing classes, sleeping in class, and referring to Playgirl Magazine in class discussion. The Board decided to terminate her contract. Plaintiff was 71 years old. A referee upheld the termination. Instead of appealing, plaintiff filed suit, alleging age discrimination under Ohio law; failure to make reasonable accommodations (ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and state law); retaliation for engaging in protected activity (ADA and state law); and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to age discrimination, but reversed on other claims. View "Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Pagliara, a licensed securities broker for more than 25 years, maintained a spotless record with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) except for this case. Under a 2002 licensing agreement, Pagliara served both Capital Trust and NBC until 2008. During that time, Butler followed Pagliara’s recommendation to invest $100,000 in bank stocks that later lost value. Butler’s attorney threatened to sue NBC and Pagliara. NBC retained JBPR for defense. Unbeknownst to NBC and JBPR, Pagliara offered to settle the claim for $14,900, $100 below FINRA’s mandatory reporting threshold. Butler refused. Pagliara then informed NBC of his intent to defend the claim in FINRA Arbitration and objected to any settlement of the “frivolous claim.” NBC insisted that Pagliara not have any contact with Butler, based on the License Agreement signed by the parties, which stated that: “NBCS, at its sole option and without the prior approval of either [Capital Trust] or the applicable Representative, may settle or compromise any claim at any time.” JBPR finalized a $30,000 settlement without obtaining a release for Pagliara. Pagliara sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and intentional infliction of harm. The district court rejected the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Pagliara v. Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose, LLP" on Justia Law

In 2002 Brandeberry sold his phonebook business, AMTEL, to White, who in turn sold the business to Yellowbook, a national publisher of yellow-pages directories. In 2009, Brandeberry started a rival phonebook under the AMTEL name. Yellowbook brought a trademark-infringement suit. The district court found that when Brandeberry initially purchased the rights to the AMTEL mark the rights were transferred to both him individually and his corporation; since the sale to White did not involve Brandeberry in an individual capacity, Brandeberry retained his individual rights, and White received only a non-exclusive right to use the mark. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the contract transferred exclusive ownership of the mark and, even if it did not, Brandeberry’s rights were abandoned. The initial contract cannot be read to create joint ownership, and trademark law would not permit joint ownership under the facts in this case. View "Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry" on Justia Law

In unrelated child pornography convictions, Gamble and Crawford were ordered by their respective district courts to pay over $1,000,000 in restitution to “Vicky,” the pseudonym of one of the individuals depicted in the images they possessed or received. Restitution was ordered jointly and severally under 18 U.S.C. 2259, which makes restitution mandatory for “the full amount of the victim’s losses” in child exploitation cases. The Sixth Circuit remanded because the district courts did not require a showing of proximate cause between the losses and the defendants’ offenses. Sixth Circuit case law requires such a showing. On remand the district court must reconsider the extent to which the defendants must pay restitution where they share responsibility for Vicky’s injuries with hundreds of other child pornography viewers. View "United States v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Moore was convicted in Ohio state court of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. The district court conditionally granted his habeas petition based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and improper jury instructions. The Sixth Circuit reversed and rejected Moore’s additional claims of ineffective assistance for failure to employ a mitigation specialist, of prosecutorial misconduct in presenting testimony by the victim’s father and in making comments about the defense, and concerning police treatment of the then-19-year-old Moore. View "Moore v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and defendants obtained class certification and settlement approval for a nationwide class action involving three related lawsuits, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p and state law, based on the practice of “robo-signing” affidavits in debt collections. Eight individuals objected. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the disparity in the relief afforded under the settlement to the named plaintiffs (exoneration of debts, $2000, and prospective injunctive relief) and the unnamed class members ($17 and prospective injunctive relief) made the settlement unfair. The class notice was inadequate and, although the class satisfies four of the six certification requirements (numerosity, commonality, typicality and predominance), the representation is not adequate under Rule 23(a) nor is the class action vehicle superior. View "Vassalle v. Midland Funding LLC" on Justia Law