Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For many years, Warren, Michigan, has put up a winter holiday display in the atrium of its civic center, with a range of secular and religious symbols, including a lighted tree, reindeer, snowmen, a nativity, and a “Winter Welcome” sign. After the city refused to remove the nativity in 2010, the Foundation asked the city to add a sign: “At this season of THE WINTER SOLSTICE may reason prevail. There are no gods, no devils, no angels, No heaven or hell. There is only our natural world, Religion is but Myth and superstition That hardens hearts And enslaves minds…. KEEP THEM SEPARATE”. The city refused. The district court rejected the Foundation’s constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The nativity scene, when accompanied by a collection of secular and seasonal symbols, does not amount to an establishment of religion or an impermissible endorsement of it. View "Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Warren" on Justia Law

The Nimers own land, zoned for residential use, where they operate a business that produces meat snacks. They began constructing buildings to expand the business to include butchering. They did not get zoning certificates. A state court enjoined the Nimers from putting the buildings to any use other than keeping and feeding animals, without the necessary zoning certificates. Several days after appealing the state court decision, the Nimers sued Litchfield Township in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court decided to abstain and dismissed without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to stay the case. While Younger abstention applies to section 1983 damages claims, a district court lacks the power to decide whether to dismiss such a damages claim. Where plaintiffs seek only legal relief (in the form of damages), relief that does not involve the district court’s equitable or discretionary powers, then the district court may not exercise its discretion to decide whether to dismiss the case; instead, the district court must stay the damages claim pending the outcome of the state court proceedings. View "Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs" on Justia Law

Quigley was 23 years old, with no known life-threatening physical conditions when he was transferred from one Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facility to an MDOC guidance center, where he was under the care of CMS, a service provider with which MDOC contracted. CMS employees Dr. Thai and physician’s assistant Garver treated Quigley for moderate depression and prescribed medications. After about a month, Quigley was found dead in his cell. The medication chart confirmed that Quigley had been administered both Amitriptyline and Trazodone the previous three days. The autopsy report concluded that Quigley died of an epileptic seizure disorder. Quigley’s estate obtained affidavits from a forensic pathologist, who concluded that Quigley likely died from a fatal drug interaction between the tricyclic Amitriptyline and tetracyclic Trazodone and from a psychiatrist, who similarly concluded that the fatal drug interaction likely killed Quigley. Thai provided three medical-expert affidavits, all concluding that the best explanation for Quigley’s death is epileptic seizure. Quigley’s estate sued Thai, Garver, and CMS under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied a motion asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that there were unresolved material questions of fact concerning the cause of death. View "Quigley v. Thai" on Justia Law

KDMC operates a regional medical center. SEIU is a labor union that represents health care and social service workers and has a collective bargaining agreement with KDMC. In 2010, concerned about the cost of health care for KDMC employees, SEIU launched a two-day robo-call campaign, targeting KDMC, to protest proposals that would shift a larger cost to employees. Residents within KDMC’s service area received calls from an automated system that played a prerecorded voice message criticizing KDMC’s plans in dramatic terms. The message did not disclose that the SEIU was responsible for the call. Call recipients who opted to press “1” during the call were patched through to the direct extension for KDMC CEO Jackson. KDMC alleges that Jackson’s extension received 536 live calls over the two-day period and that the high volume of calls overwhelmed its main trunk lines. KDMC filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act does not extend to purposeful calls made by individuals seeking to express an opinion, noting that the calls required a real person to “exercise independent judgment” in order to connect to Jackson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union" on Justia Law

Officers tried to serve an arrest warrant on Brown at 3171 Hendricks Avenue in Memphis. On Hendricks Avenue, they could not find a house with a 3171 address, but found two houses on opposite sides of the street with a 3170 address. Noticing that one of the two houses was occupied, they knocked, a woman answered, and she promptly shut the door. While one officer went to the back of the house, the other knocked again. After several minutes, the occupant opened the door. Instead of asking the woman what the address of the house was, whether Brown lived there or whether this was the odd-numbered side of the street, the officer represented to the woman that he had a warrant “for this address.” The woman let the officers into the house, owned by Shaw, where they performed a protective sweep and found a lot of cocaine. They arrested Shaw. The district court denied Shaw’s motion to suppress and pled guilty to distributing cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the officers had no right to enter the house based on a falsity and that their actions were not reasonable. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Officer Parks stopped the car driven by Johnson based on a seat-belt violation. Approaching the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and noticed a license plate on the seat. A passenger admitted she had smoked marijuana in the car and initially provided her sister’s identification information. Johnson stated that he knew he would be arrested because a condition of release for a prior conviction required him to stay away from the passenger and that he was a convicted felon and had a loaded gun underneath the seat. Once the database (NCIC) confirmed that Johnson had been ordered to stay away from LuShanda Giles, Parks handcuffed Johnson; located the passenger’s identifying information, confirming that she was LuShanda; and recovered the weapon. The district court denied a motion to suppress the firearm. Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924. The court held that a Tennessee conviction of facilitation to commit aggravated robbery was not a violent felony, but that a conviction of first-degree stalking did qualify and sentenced Johnson to 180 months, the minimum mandatory under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both the denial of suppression and the sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Fund, a multi-employer pension plan under ERISA, has a Plan, providing for administration by a Board with authority to make benefit determinations and amend the Plan, including retroactively. No amendment may result in reduced benefits for any participant whose rights have vested, except in specified circumstances. Price began receiving Plan disability benefits under the “Total and Permanent Disability Benefit” category in 1990, after work-related injuries left him unable to work. In 2001, the Fund notified Price that he no longer qualified for benefits under this category, but that he could continue receiving benefits under provisions for “Occupational Disability Benefit.” His benefits were discontinued after 2006, according to an Amendment. Price became eligible for early retirement in 2012. The Board rejected an appeal. The district court granted Price judgment in his suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). On remand from the Sixth Circuit, for review determination of vesting under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the judge again ruled in favor of Price. The Sixth Circuit again reversed; the court failed to look to the terms of the plan but instead found that because the Board’s decision letter did not discuss whether the benefits vested, the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "Price v. Bd. of Trs. of IN Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Peppel, former President, CEO, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of MCSi, a publicly-traded communications-technology company, conspired with CFO Stanley to falsify MCSi accounting records and financial statements in order to conceal the actual earnings from shareholders, while laundering proceeds from the sale of his own shares in a public stock offering. Peppel pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities, mail, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1371 and 1349; willful false certification of a financial report by a corporate officer,18 U.S.C. 1350; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The parties stipulated to use of the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual The district court heard testimony and received reports on five competing amount-of-loss theories and, based almost solely on its estimation of Peppel as “a remarkably good man,” varied downward drastically from this advisory range, imposing a custodial sentence of only seven days—a 99.9975% reduction. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonably low sentence, but did not err in calculating the amount of loss or number of victims. View "United States v. Peppel" on Justia Law

Yeremin, a Russian citizen, lawfully entered the U.S. in 1999; in 2004, he pled guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in fraudulent identification documents in violation based on “unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and … possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification. Yeremin was sentenced to five months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. n 2005, DHS initiated removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which allows removal of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission to the U.S., if the crime is punishable by at least one year in prison, and second under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ rejected an argument that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude, because he did not plead guilty to an offense which necessarily involved fraudulent or deceptive conduct. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review, applying the “categorical approach” because the conduct prohibited by the statute he was convicted under inherently involves deceit. View "Yeremin v. Holder" on Justia Law

Governor Strickland appointed Terry to fill a vacancy on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Terry sought reelection to retain the seat and enlisted the help of County Auditor Russo, a presence in Cleveland politics. The FBI was investigating Russo and had tapped his phones. Russo had a phone conversation with an attorney about foreclosure cases on Terry’s docket and promised to make sure Terry did what he was “supposed to do.” Later, by phone, Russo told Terry to deny motions for summary judgment. Terry said he would and did so. Russo ultimately pled guilty to 21political corruption counts and received a 262-month prison sentence. Terry was convicted of conspiring with Russo to commit mail fraud and honest services fraud; and honest services fraud by accepting things of value from Russo and others in exchange for favorable official action, 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2).. The district court sentenced him to 63 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, quoting once-Speaker of the California General Assembly, Jesse Unruh, “If you can’t eat [lobbyists’] food, drink their booze, . . . take their money and then vote against them, you’ve got no business being [in politics],” View "United States v. Terry" on Justia Law