Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For more than 20 years, Kurlemann built and sold luxury homes in Ohio. In 2005-2006 he borrowed $2.4 million to build houses in Mason. When neither sold, he enlisted realtor Duke, who found two straw buyers, willing to lie about their income and assets on loan applications that Duke submitted to Washington Mutual. Both buyers defaulted. Duke pled guilty to seven counts, including loan fraud and making false statements to a lending institution, and agreed to testify at Kurlemann’s trial. A jury convicted Kurlemann of six counts, including making false statements to a lending institution, 18 U.S.C. 1014; and bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. The district court sentenced Kurlemann to concurrent 24-month sentences and ordered him to pay $1.1 million in restitution. The district court sentenced Duke to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy fraud conviction, based on Kurlemann’s concealment of his interest in property, but reversed and remanded his false statements conviction, finding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that concealment was sufficient to support conviction. The court also reversed Duke’s sentence, finding that the court failed to explain the sentence it imposed. View "United States v. Kurlemann" on Justia Law

Coley was convicted in Ohio of aggravated murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery and firearm specifications, based on events that occurred in 1996. He was sentenced to death on the aggravated murder charges. His petition for state post-conviction relief was rejected at all levels. The federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the indictment; ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to request that the trial judge recuse herself; prosecutorial misconduct for using inconsistent theories to convict; ineffective assistance of counsel during mitigation; ineffective assistance of counsel during mitigation for failing to request that trial judge recuse herself; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; failure to consider mitigating evidence; and of error in the trial court’s decisions to not provide Coley with grand jury transcripts and to not sever certain counts. View "Coley v. Bagley" on Justia Law

D.W., age 13, alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that state defendants violated his procedural due process rights by listing him on the Tennessee child abuse registry. After an interview with a case manager, D.W. requested review and submitted information regarding the alleged victim’s inconsistent statements, but never was told the evidence against him. Children’s Services upheld the classification. Children’s Services then denied administrative review because the classification did not affect his employment. D.W. claimed that being listed deprived affected his liberty interest in pursuing common occupations, because Tennessee law prohibits his employment with child-care agencies and programs and adult-daycare centers and that the listing prohibits contact with children during the course of state agency employment. The district court held that D.W. did not present a justiciable controversy because the alleged deprivation was the possibility of future harm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. D.W. has standing to seek additional procedures because those procedures, if granted, could result in relief that is sufficiently concrete and particularized. The classification is complete and will not be expunged from state records; this is not a generalized grievance or an injury to a third party. No further facts are needed to determine whether the boy was afforded adequate process. View "Wright v. O'Day" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana and of aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and sentenced to 320 months of incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after testimony of a prosecution witness that purportedly revealed a Brady violation and constituted a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The evidence at issue was neither exculpatory nor material. The court remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to identify particular statements that amounted to perjury, to justify enhancement for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Macias-Faria" on Justia Law

Johnson was a heroin dealer. After a 17-year-old customer died of acute heroin toxicity, Johnson and customers who had been with the decedent during the fatal overdose were charged in state court. Johnson and one customer were subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for distribution of heroin resulting in death; distribution of heroin to a minor resulting in death; and possession with intent to distribute heroin. Johnson agreed to plead guilty. The probation office determined a base offense level of 43 (USSG 2D1.1(a)(1)) because he was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), the offense resulted in death, and Johnson had a prior conviction for a “similar offense,” a 2009 conviction for based on 3.5 grams of heroin found in Johnson’s possession. Johnson received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. His total offense level was 40. He had a criminal history category of IV. The court rejected an argument that his prior conviction was not a “similar offense,” but departed downward by five levels for an advisory guidelines range of 235 to 293 months and an effective range of 240 to 293 months because of a mandatory minimum. The district court imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Lumbard was arrested by Michigan authorities on warrants charging breaking and entering, destruction of a building, and larceny. He was released on a $100,000 bond. Other outstanding warrants charged aggravated battery, obstruction of justice, receiving stolen property, and more. Eluding capture on the other warrants, Lumbard paid Cheesebrew $500 for his birth date, social security number, and information about his place of birth and his parents. Lumbard used the information to obtain a driver’s license, a copy of Cheesebrew’s birth certificate, and a passport. He traveled to Tokyo, Thailand, and Burma after attempting to stage a “suicide.” Lumbard was eventually located and, during transport, attempted to stab a Burmese officer in order to be charged in Burma, which would have prevented extradition. He entered a conditional guilty plea to falsely representing information in an application for a passport and knowingly providing false identifying documents, 18 U.S.C. 1542 and using the name, social security number, date of birth, and driver’s license of another person to obtain a passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and (c)(7), (aggravated identity theft). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that a purchase of identification can constitute aggravated identity theft. View "United States v. Lumbard" on Justia Law

Glassman is a car dealer in Southfield, Michigan and an authorized Kia dealer, under an Agreement that states that Glassman’s rights are not exclusive. Glassman agreed to assume certain responsibilities in its Area of Primary Responsibility, an area undefined in the Agreement, but agreed “that it has no right or interest in any [Area of Primary Responsibility] that [Kia] may designate” and that “[a]s permitted by applicable law, [Kia] may add new dealers to … the [Area of Primary Responsibility].” Michigan’s Motor Dealers Act grants car dealers certain limited territorial rights, even when the dealer has a nonexclusive franchise, and requires manufacturers to provide notice to an existing dealer before establishing a new dealer within a certain distance of the existing dealer’s location. Receipt of notice gives the existing dealer a cause of action to challenge the proposed new dealer. Kia and Glassman entered into their Agreement in 1998, when the distance for notice was 6 miles. A 2010 amendment increased the distance to 9 miles. The district court found that the parties did not agree to comply with the 2010 Amendment and that the 2010 Amendment is not retroactive. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 6-mile distance applies. View "Kia Motors Am., Inc. v. Glassman Oldsmobile Saab Hyundai, Inc." on Justia Law

Columbia Gas disagrees with the Singhs over the scope of an existing pipeline right-of-way. Columbia suit in federal court to enjoin the Singhs and their tenant from engaging in activity that Columbia believed could lead to violations of Columbia’s duties under federal laws regulating natural gas service and pipeline safety. Although the cause of action appeared to be an Ohio interference-with-easement claim, Columbia’s complaint referred to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717–717w, as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Without explicitly addressing jurisdiction, the district court held a status conference at which the parties reached a settlement. When the Singhs refused to comply with Columbia’s understanding of the settlement, the district court granted Columbia’s motion to enforce the settlement. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this property dispute between nondiverse parties. Columbia’s complaint neither asserted a federal cause of action nor showed that a substantial federal interest was implicated by its state-law claim. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Singh" on Justia Law

Deen was convicted of distributing five grams or more of cocaine base and sentenced to prison for 66 months, followed by four years of supervised release. Deen began his supervised release in 2011. Months later, at a revocation hearing, Deen pleaded guilty to violations stemming from domestic violence incidents, alcohol use, and failure to report and to attend behavioral therapy. The government pushed for “a significant term of imprisonment where [Deen] hopefully can get some treatment for alcohol abuse, and perhaps counseling in terms of anger management.” The court sentenced Deen to 24 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24 months of supervised release. The judge explained her decision in terms of the goal of rehabilitation. In 2012, Deen and the government jointly requested that this court vacate Deen’s sentence and remand for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court decision, Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), that hat the Sentencing Reform Act does not permit a court to “impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the bar on sentencing decisions based on rehabilitative needs applies equally to supervised-release sentences. View "United States v. Deen" on Justia Law

In 2004 Stout pleaded guilty to second-degree escape (KY Rev. Stats. 520.030) from the prison where he was incarcerated. Stout admitted to scaling the wall and escaping through a hole in the fence, but denied cutting the hole in the fence. The government proffered no evidence indicating that Stout cut the hole in the fence. In 2009 Stout pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing body armor after having been previously convicted of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 931(a)(2), after unsuccessfully arguing that the prior conviction for escape did not constitute a “crime of violence,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court reasoned that Stout’s actions were “purposeful and aggressive” and “created a serious risk of the use of physical force against guards and members of the general public.” There is substantial risk that offenders who choose to escape from secured settings will engage in physical violence during the course of the escape. View "United States v. Stout" on Justia Law