Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wyko sold parts to tire manufacturers, but in the U.S., provided parts for steel tire-assembly machines only for Goodyear. Wyko contracted with HaoHua, owned by the Chinese government, to supply parts unlike any it had previously built. Goodyear used machines like those Wyko needed. Goodyear asked Wyko to repair tire-assembly machines. Wyko sent engineers. Before their visit, both signed agreements that they might have access to trade secrets or other confidential information and that they would not disclose that information. A security guard reminded them that no cameras were allowed inside the factory. Unescorted for a few minutes, one engineer used his cell-phone camera to take photos that were forwarded to the design team. Wyko’s IT manager forwarded the e-mail to Goodyear. Goodyear notified the FBI. Convicted of theft of trade secrets (18 U.S.C. 1832(a)) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349), the engineers were sentenced to four months of home confinement, community service, and probation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting an argument that the photographs did not meet the statutory definition because Goodyear did not take “reasonable measures” to protect secrecy. The court reversed the sentences because the court had not adequately explained its calculation of loss. View "United States v. Howley" on Justia Law

The Memphis nightclub is located in a zoning district where adult entertainment has been prohibited since 1993. Although already allowed to present most forms of adult entertainment under a grandfather clause, the club desires to present adult entertainment in the form of compensated nude dancers and claims that an ordinance requiring a permit to present nude dancers is unconstitutional as an improper prior restraint and as vague. The club claims that a city official’s actions violated its procedural due process rights. Following a remand, the district court rejected its suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the club had forfeited its prior restraint argument, had not established vagueness, and had not established that it was deprived of a protected property or liberty interest when its dance permit was revoked and not reissued. View "600 Marshall Entm't Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

USCA is a non-profit national civic league with approximately 27,000 members that devotes itself to conservative values and opposes efforts of the federal government to interfere with market processes. Some of USCA’s uninsured members object to the purchase of private health insurance because they do not believe in the effectiveness of traditional medicine, prefer alternative and integrative medicine, or prefer to focus on preventative care that is not covered by traditional health insurance policies. Two individual plaintiffs do not have, nor do they wish to acquire, health insurance, but they are not exempt from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, 26 U.S.C. 5000A. They challenged the mandate as violating the Commerce Clause, rights to freedom of expressive and intimate association, rights to liberty, and rights to privacy. The district court dismissed in part, without substantive analysis, holding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “plausibility standard” and entered summary judgment on the Commerce Clause challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius controls the outcome on the Commerce Clause count and the remaining constitutional claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim. View "U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Stoudemire, then age 23, entered the Michigan Department of Corrections system in 2002, suffering from systemic lupus erythematosus, a chronic, painful autoimmune disease; hypercoagulapathy, a related disorder involving tendency to develop blood clots; and depression. Stoudemire bore a significant risk of experiencing kidney and liver damage, heart attacks, amputations, and chronic pain. Stoudemire’s health quickly deteriorated. She experienced a heart attack, liver failure, and life-threatening embolisms. She underwent three amputations, losing both legs below the knee. At her 2007 parole, she suffered from chronic depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and conditions related to medications. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132; and Michigan law, Stoudemire, alleged that she was placed in a segregation unit following her amputation that lacked accommodations for disabled persons, and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate purpose. The district court denied motions by the warden and an officer, seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit vacated with respect to the warden, stating that the court did not adequately analyze deliberate indifference, but affirmed with respect to the officer, stating that the excessively invasive nature of the search outweighed any need to conduct it. View "Stoudemire v. MI Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Since enacting a program for black-lung benefits in 1969, known as the Black Lung Benefits Act,83 Stat. 742, Congress has repeatedly amended the claim-filing process, sometimes making it harder for miners and survivors to obtain benefits, sometimes making it easier. The most recent adjustment, part of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, reinstated a presumption that deceased workers who had worked for at least 15 years in underground coal mines and had developed a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment were presumed to be totally disabled by pneumoconiosis and to have died from it. The presumption is rebuttable. The Act also reinstated automatic benefits to any survivor of a miner who had been awarded benefits on a claim filed during his lifetime, 124 Stat. at 260. Groves, a miner for 29 years, filed a claim for benefits in 2006 and died four months later. An ALJ denied his widow benefits. The law changed while her appeal was pending. The Benefits Review Board concluded that the new law covered this claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Vision Processing, LLC v. Groves" on Justia Law

Having secured extensions, the Stockers filed their 2003 tax return in October 2004. In March 2007, the IRS settled an audit of an entity in which the Stockers had lost money. Flintoff, their tax preparer, determined that the Stockers had overpaid 2003 taxes by $64,058 and prepared an amended return, required to be filed within three years of October 15, 2004, 26 U.S.C. 6511(a). Stocker claims that he mailed it at the post office on October 15, but was unable to get date-stamped receipts, because of Flintoff’s failure to give him customer copies of certified mail receipts. Although simultaneous mailings were timely received, the IRS claims that it received the return on October 25; its records reflect that the envelope was postmarked October 19, but it did not retain the envelope. The return-receipt card, to be completed by the certified mail recipient, was left blank and returned to Flintoff, who unsuccessfully requested reconsideration of the refund claim. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Stockers could not establish the jurisdictional prerequisite of a timely-filed return under any method recognized in the Internal Revenue Code or precedent for determining the date of delivery of a federal tax return. View "Stocker v. United States" on Justia Law

Luedtke, a pro se federal prisoner, sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that prison officials violated his Thirteenth Amendment rights by refusing to pay him the wages he earned in his prison job, failed to require all inmates to work, discriminated against white inmates in favor of black inmates and “illegal aliens from Mexico,” and improperly placed him on refusal status for the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. The district court dismissed under its screening authority, 28 U.S.C. 2243. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, stating that section 2241 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement. Luedtke’s fourth claim is cognizable under 2241 as a challenge to the execution of a portion of his sentence and the district court erred in dismissing it as unexhausted at the screening stage. Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, generally and in the context of prisoner lawsuits. Even under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, an inmate’s section 1983 claim “may not be dismissed at the screening stage for failure to plead or attach exhibits with proof of exhaustion.” The court denied Luedtke’s motion for appointment of counsel View "Luedtke v. Berkebile" on Justia Law

Petitioners are citizens of Mali who remained in the U.S. longer than authorized under their visitors’ visas. In 2006, Camara sought asylum and withholding of removal based on past persecution she suffered in the form of female genital mutilation (“FGM”); she listed her husband as a derivative applicant. She testified that she was unable to submit her asylum application by the one-year filing deadline because she and her husband had experienced medical problems. The IJ denied Petitioners’ applications, finding that Camara’s FGM constituted past persecution; however, he found that even if Camara’s illness was an “extraordinary circumstance” sufficient to excuse the filing deadline, Camara had failed to show she filed within a reasonable period. On remand, the IJ again rejected the applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding Kalle removable because: Camara’s lead asylum application was denied; Kalle never applied for individual relief; and withholding of removal is not available derivatively. The Sixth Circuit denied review, rejecting arguments that Kalle was denied due process when the Board failed to consider evidence of his intent to apply for individual withholding of removal and that withholding of removal ought to be available derivatively.View "Camara v. Holder" on Justia Law

Eleven plaintiffs who obtained home loans from Countrywide Bank, sought to challenge alleged racial disparities dating back to 2002 and resulting from Countrywide’s loan-pricing policy for home mortgages. The district court denied class certification, finding that the proposed class failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)’s commonality requirement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs challenged policies that grant broad discretion to local agents; they do not claim that a uniform policy or practice guides how local actors exercise their discretion, such that the corporate guidance caused or contributed to the alleged disparate impacts. To justify certification, class members must unite acts of discretion under a single policy or practice, or through a single mode of exercising discretion; the mere presence of a range within which acts of discretion take place will not suffice to establish commonality. View "Miller v. Countrywide Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

Catchings pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft; he had fraudulently opened personal credit-card accounts using his former clients’ personal information without their knowledge. When calculating the amount of loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), district courts include losses stemming from relevant conduct under section 1B1.3. In Catching’s case, the district court included losses stemming from credit cards that were in the name of U.S. Investments & Construction, a business that Catchings started with a friend. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. Relevant conduct under United States Sentencing Guidelines 1B1.3 must be criminal conduct to be relevant for the purpose of calculating a defendant’s guidelines range. The conduct involved in opening the U.S. Investments cards involved taking advantage of a trusting friend, but was not criminal. View "Unted States v. Catching" on Justia Law