Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Freeze was hired by the Decherd Police Department. He became Chief of Police in 2007. Colvin, Freeze’s brother-in-law, was hired as a patrolman in 2007. The Board of Aldermen is responsible for hiring and firing. During a February 2009 meeting, the Aldermen told Freeze that they “might need to just let [him] resign as the Chief and put [him] in as a sergeant at $15 an hour.” Freeze stated that “if it’s going to keep my job, yes, I will take a demotion.” After several confrontations during a March meeting, the Board terminated the employment of Colvin and Freeze. The city did not provide notice that terminations would be considered at the meeting, but claims that it provided oral notice that “general job performance may be discussed.” Neither officer was allowed to present witnesses or evidence. The separation notice regarding Freeze reads: “No reason given.” The city’s 1999 Personnel Resolution designates every city worker as an at-will employee with no property right in employment, but a 2000 Police Resolution states that “discipline shall be for cause and shall follow the basic concepts of due process.” The district court dismissed, finding that the officers possessed no property interest in continued employment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on the unequivocal language of the Police Resolution. View "Freeze v. City of Decherd" on Justia Law

Thomas and Jennifer married and purchased a family home with a first mortgage, then obtained a second mortgage. In a 2003 divorce consent decree, Thomas agreed to relinquish any interest in the home. Jennifer agreed to assume and hold him harmless from the obligation to pay both mortgages. Thomas agreed to pay child support. The couple remarried in 2004, but, in 2007, this marriage also ended in divorce. The 2007 consent decree waived spousal support; Thomas again agreed to give up any interest in the house, which he had never conveyed under the 2003 decree. Jennifer agreed to assume the first mortgage. Thomas's child support obligation was reduced and they agreed to split the second mortgage obligation. Thomas deeded his interest in the house. A $8,082.37 judgment lien was not addressed in the 2007 decree although it attached to the property before the second divorce. Jennifer sold the house in 2008. The first and second mortgage debts were satisfied. Jennifer negotiated release of the judgment lien for $5,000.00 and paid $836.14 to close the transaction. The state court entered an order in the 2007 divorce proceeding, requiring Thomas to reimburse Jennifer $7,500.00 for the second mortgage and $5,000.00 for the judgment lien. Thomas filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief, listing an unsecured priority claim for child support and a $15,000.00 unsecured claim on Schedule F. Jennifer asserted a priority unsecured claim for “[a]limony, maintenance, or support” of $12,500.00 for the second mortgage and judgment lien debts. Thomas objected, arguing that the claim was “satisfied when the real estate was sold,” and not a domestic support obligation. The bankruptcy court applied the Calhoun test and found Jennifer’s claim was in the nature of “alimony, maintenance or support.” The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Thomas" on Justia Law

The Gallia County (Ohio) Public Defender Commission contracted with the non-profit Corporation for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. The Corporation hired Bright, who represented R.G. before Evans, the county’s only trial judge. Bright negotiated a plea agreement, but R.G. hesitated during the plea colloquy. “Mere seconds” later, R.G. informed Bright and Evans that he would take the deal after all. Evans refused. Bright and the prosecutor met with Evans to convince the judge to accept R.G.’s plea. He refused. In pleadings, Bright criticized Evans’s policies as “an abuse of discretion,” “unreasonable,” “arbitrary … unconscionable.” Bright’s language did not include profanity and did not claim ethical impropriety. Evans subsequently contacted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and filed a grievance against Bright and filed a public journal entry stating that Bright’s motion, although not amounting to misconduct or contempt, had created a conflict. He ordered that Bright be removed from the R.G. case. He then filed entries removing Bright from 70 other felony cases. The Corporation terminated Bright’s employment, allegedly without a hearing or other due process. Bright sued Evans, the Board, the Corporation, and the Commission. The district court concluded that Evans was “not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were completely outside of his jurisdiction.” The court held that Bright failed to sufficiently plead that the Board or the Commission retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights or that liability attached under the Monell doctrine, then dismissed claims against the Corporation. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Evans. While Evans’s conduct was worthy of censure, it does not fit within any exception to absolute judicial immunity. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the Board and Corporation; the First Amendment offers no protection to an attorney for his speech in court.View "Bright v. Gallia Cnty." on Justia Law

Williams was convicted on two counts of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute and one count of maintaining a drug-involved premises and was sentenced as a career offender to a total of 360 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that an almost two-year delay between his first indictment and the commencement of his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Williams did not demonstrate that the delay was caused by bad faith or negligence on the part of the government, or that he was prejudiced by it. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing his attorney a continuance, despite the absence of Williams’ signature on the motion. The court also rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was wrongly classified as a career offender, rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hoven, a licensed pharmacist and a former at-will employee of Walgreen, is also the holder of a Michigan license to carry a concealed weapon. He experienced an armed robbery at work in 2007. Walgreen did not comply with his subsequent requests for additional security devices. In May, 2011, gun-wielding robbers entered Walgreen while Hoven was working the overnight shift. After one of the masked individuals pointed a gun at Hoven, Hoven drew his concealed weapon and fired it multiple times. No one was shot or injured during this incident. Eight days later, Hoven was terminated for violation of Walgreen’s non-escalation policy. Hoven brought suit alleging that he was terminated in violation of public policy for exercising his rights of self-defense, defense of others, and to carry a concealed weapon. The district court granted Walgreen’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Hoven failed to identify a public-policy source that supports his claimView "Hoven v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

The flea-and-tick “spot-on products” at issue claim that their active ingredient works by topical application to a pet’s skin rather than through the pet’s bloodstream. According to the manufacturers, after the product is applied to one area, it disperses over the rest of the pet’s body within one day because it collects in the oil glands and natural oils spread the product over the surface of the pet’s skin and “wick” the product over the hair. The plaintiffs alleged false advertising based on statements that the products are self-dispersing and cover the entire surface of the pet’s body when applied in a single spot; that they are effective for one month and require monthly applications to continue to work; that they do not enter the bloodstream; and that they are waterproof and effective after shampooing, swimming, and exposure to rain or sunlight. The district court repeatedly referred to a one-issue case: whether the product covers the pet’s entire body with a single application. The case management order stated that the manufacturers would bear the initial burden to produce studies that substantiated their claims; the plaintiffs would then have to refute the studies, “or these cases will be dismissed.” The manufacturers objected. The plaintiffs argued that the plan would save time, effort, and money. The manufacturers submitted studies. The plaintiffs’ response included information provided by one plaintiff and his adolescent son and an independent examination of whether translocation occurred that detected the product’s active ingredient in a dog’s bloodstream. The district court concluded that the manufacturers’ studies substantiated their claims and denied all of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, except a request for consumer complaints, then granted the manufacturers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The doctrines of waiver and invited error precluded challenges to the case management plan. View "Simms v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Davis pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and two counts of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). The presentence report (PSR) found that defendant had “two or more separate instances of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor” and recommended a five-level enhancement for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor (U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5)). The PSR also concluded that Davis was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years on the distribution count and to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years on the possession counts. The district court concluded that a 1989 sexual battery conviction did not trigger the mandatory minimums, but that the 2002 attempted pandering conviction did. Regarding a 1989 sexual battery conviction, the district court noted that none of the documents it was permitted to examine contained the victim’s age, nor was the court convinced that it was permitted to take judicial notice of the victim’s birth certificate. The court imposed a sentence of 262 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded, agreeing that the district court erred with regard to the statutory mandatory minimums. The court did not err in imposing the pattern-of-activity enhancement.View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

At Harris's state court trial, the court accepted the prosecution’s rationale that Juror 49 was struck “because she had difficulty following questions ... was joking with a neighboring juror who was subsequently struck for cause, and had a grandson who was convicted for his involvement in a shooting.” It was later discovered that a videotape system, reactivated during a trial recess, had recorded a conversation during which a prosecutor commented, “We’ve got ... 49, she’s the old lady, the black lady. The other one is already off.” The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected a direct appeal. Sixth Circuit remanded Harris’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a hearing to determine whether the prosecutors at his state trial had exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The district court held a reconstructed Batson hearing and concluded that the strikes at issue were not motivated by purposeful racial discrimination. Harris appealed with respect to the strike of Juror 49. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in concluding that it could hold a meaningful Batson hearing more than 11 years after his state trial and that the prosecution’s strike of Juror 49 was not improperly motivated by racial considerations. View "Harris v. Haeberlin" on Justia Law

An investigation of the Mansfield, Ohio, drug trade involved the Richland County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO) using a confidential informant it had used once before (Bray) to make controlled buys. In 2005, the U.S. DEA joined the Investigation. Bray was registered as a DEA informant. All targets of the Mansfield controlled buys were selected either by Bray or RCSO. The controlled buys resulted in numerous arrests and indictments. The case agent who testified before the grand jury identified multiple corroborative measures generally used to substantiate Bray’s information and to supervise controlled purchases, including: criminal history and driver’s license checks; searches of Bray’s person and vehicle prior to and after a controlled purchase; tape-recorded phone calls to the suspects; copies of serial numbers of buy money; audio and visual surveillance; and, in certain cases, undercover participation by agents. Corruption pervaded the Investigation. Bray, in jail for an unrelated homicide, disclosed that he had framed innocent individuals, stolen money and drugs, and dealt drugs on side. There was evidence that, as to some arrestees, law enforcement knew of, and participated in, Bray’s misdeeds. The investigation fell apart. Bray pled guilty to perjury and deprivation of civil rights. Agents were also indicted. The district court rejected claims by the Investigation’s targets under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and “Bivens,” citing qualified immunity; held that judicial estoppel barred false arrest claims; and held that because the named individuals had not committed constitutional violations, plaintiffs could not prevail on their Monell claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Spires v. Lucas" on Justia Law

In 1999, Phillips was convicted of a third-degree felony for burglary of a structure. The Florida statute defined burglary in the third degree as burglary in which the offender does not commit assault or battery, does not become armed with a dangerous weapon, and required that the structure be unoccupied. In 2012 Phillips pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court determined that Phillips qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), based in part on the Florida conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that under Florida’s burglary statute attempted burglary is a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA’s residual clause in part because of the potential risk of violent confrontation with passersby. The court reaffirmed that the ACCA’s residual clause is not unconstitutional.View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law