Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

American Satellite, a third party retailer of Dish Network satellite television services, received a call from a potential customer. A woman, who identified herself as “Dickley,” provided what she claimed to be her social security number. In actuality, the number belonged to a man named Bickley. Dickley was an identity thief. The agent entered Dickley’s name and social security number into an interface that connects to credit reporting agencies. Unable to verify the information, American Satellite informed Dickley that her attempt to open an account was declined. Bickley later received a credit report indicating that Dish had made an inquiry on his name. Dish informed him that someone had attempted to open an account in his name, providing a recording of the conversation between the agent and the identity thief. A year later, despite knowing that the inquiry had prevented the theft of his identity, Bickley filed suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681b, alleging request and use of his credit report without a “permissible purpose” and sought emotional distress damages. The district court entered summary judgment for Dish, including a counterclaim for abuse of process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, referring to the conspicuous underdevelopment of key factual detail in Bickley’s complaint and in briefs as “bordering on deceitful” and to the adage that no good deed goes unpunished. View "Bickley v. Dish Network LLC" on Justia Law

Ice House manufactures ice-vending machines. Cardin’s machines generated about $264,000 in income in 2012. In 2004, Cardin also agreed to be the exclusive distributor of Ice House’s machines in Tennessee. Four years later Ice House sued for breach, obtaining judgments totaling $1,301,900, without interest. Cardin filed for bankruptcy as an individual debtor under Chapter 11. A Chapter 11 plan of reorganization must identify any claims it will “impair,” 11 U.S.C. 1123(a)(3). The bankruptcy court generally cannot confirm a plan if any impaired creditor votes to reject it. Section 1129(b) permits confirmation of nonconsensual plans (cramdown plan) if the plan is fair and equitable with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired and has not accepted the plan. To be “fair and equitable” a plan must satisfy the absolute-priority rule, which provides that every unsecured creditor must be paid in full before the debtor can retain “any property.” The rule was not satisfied with respect to Cardin. Cardin’s plan allowed him to retain several assets after paying off loans they secured, to make a single payment of $124,000 towards Ice House’s unsecured claim of $1.545 million, and to “remit” to Ice House any disposable income that he earns during the five years following confirmation. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, construing the 2005 Bankruptcy Code amendments to eliminate the absolute-priority rule for individual debtors. The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with other circuits that the absolute priority rule continues to apply to pre-petition property of individual debtors in Chapter 11 cases. View "Ice House Am., LLC v. Cardin" on Justia Law

On January 13, 2009, Jackson was in a car accident with an agent of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Jackson suffered damage to her head and spinal cord. Jackson retained the services of Shaffer, an attorney with the firm “Michigan Autolaw.” On March 5, 2009, Shaffer erroneously submitted Jackson’s administrative claim for Damage, Injury, or Death, to DHS, which forwarded Jackson’s claim to ICE. On June 17, ICE received Jackson’s claim. The cover letter listed Shaffer’s address in Southfield, Michigan. The claim form included Jackson’s mailing address. On July 7, ICE confirmed receipt of Jackson’s claim in correspondence, sent to the Southfield address, stating that ICE would process Jackson’s claim pursuant to the Federal Tort Claim Act, which allows an agency “up to six months to adjudicate a damage claim, beginning from the date the agency receives the claim.” On March 8, 2011, ICE sent to the Southfield address a “final determination” denying Jackson’s claim, stating that Jackson could file suit no later than six months after the date of mailing. On March 23, the Postal Service returned the denial as “Not Deliverable…Unable to Forward.” Autolaw had changed locations in May, 2010. Jackson contends that Autolaw had a one-year forwarding order for its mail. The parties also disagree whether the information about changing locations was conveyed to ICE. Despite receiving the undelivered mail, ICE took no further action. On January 11, 2012, Jackson filed suit. The district court dismissed, finding that the mailing of the denial letter triggered the six-month limitation and declining to apply equitable tolling. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Jackson v. United States" on Justia Law

Minnesota-based Everest breeds and races thoroughbreds. Crestwood is a thoroughbred farm in Kentucky. The businesses began working together in 1993. The parties entered a more definite arrangement in 2008, for sale of Everest’s horses. Everest would transfer ownership of more than 100 horses to Crestwood, which would pay the horses’ day-to-day costs and would sell the horses at a public auction or a private sale. The agreement prohibited Crestwood from setting a “reserve” on any horse, a price floor below which the sale would not go. Crestwood was to keep 25-50 percent of the proceeds from each sale. The agreement provided that Island Fashion and its unnamed filly would be sold at auction, but remained Everest’s property. Crestwood tried to sell several horses, including the Island Fashion filly. There were bids of $850,000 and $875,000 for the filly. Everest had planted a separate agent at the auction without Crestwood’s knowledge, who tried to drive the selling price higher by placing a $900,000 bid. The sale failed. After learning what Everest had done, Crestwood kept $219,513.89, 25 from selling other horses based on the failed high bid for the filly (plus auction fees). Everest sued and Crestwood counterclaimed. The district court granted summary judgment to Crestwood and awarded $272,486.30 in attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Nielsen v. McLean" on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [the Act],” 29 U.S.C. 1140. Sexton made a one-time unsolicited internal complaint to his employer about alleged violations of the ERISA, with respect to seating employees on the company’s board of directors. About six months later, the company fired Sexton from his job as a general manager. Sexton sued in Michigan state court for violating the state Whistleblower Protection Act and for breaching his employment contract. The company invoked complete preemption under ERISA and removed the case to federal court. Sexton did not challenge the company’s removal of the case or its use of complete preemption. The district court granted the company summary judgment on the ERISA claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over Sexton’s breach-of-contract claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Sexton’s complaint did not amount to “giv[ing] information ... in any inquiry” under ERISA. View "Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Jackson pleaded guilty to possessing, with the intent to distribute, more than five grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The offense then carried a maximum penalty of 40 years of imprisonment. Because Jackson had two prior felony controlled-substance convictions, he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a). Because Jackson’s offense level for a career offender from the table (34) was greater than the offense level otherwise applicable (29), the career-offender offense-level applied. His criminal-history category was VI. Jackson received a reduction of three levels for acceptance of responsibility, so his final offense level was 31, resulting in a range of 188 to 235 months. In 2010, the district court, citing the “crack versus powder cocaine disparity issue,” exercised its discretion to depart downward and imposed a sentence of 150 months. Later that year, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, and the Sentencing Commission amended the crack-cocaine guidelines. Following a remand by the Sixth Circuit, the district court used the amended guidelines, noted that, were Jackson not a career offender, his new sentencing range would be 84 to 105 months, applied the offense level from the career-offender table, but reduced Jackson’s sentence below the bottom end of his amended guideline range. The Sixth Circuit vacated with instructions to reinstate the sentence of 150 months. U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b)(2) prohibits courts from reducing a defendant’s term of imprisonment to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties. In 2011 Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager under then-existing law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of retired city employees and severance benefits, including pension benefits, for retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Retired employees sued under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied an injunction. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters later rejected Public Act 4 by referendum. Following rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for consideration of whether, under section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Public Act 4 prescribed a method of composition of indebtedness that binds the retirees without their consent and, if so, whether principles of state sovereignty preclude application of section 903(1) in this case; whether the emergency manager’s orders were legislative acts under the Contract Clause; whether the reductions and eliminations of health care benefits were “necessary and reasonable” under the Contract Clause; whether the retirees’ procedural due process claim is viable; and, assuming the Due Process Clause’s procedural protections apply, whether the collective bargaining agreements, considered in their entireties, establish protected property rights. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

After losing her job as an appraiser for St. Joseph County, Trayling filed a grievance with her union and a discrimination charge with the Michigan Civil Rights Department. The union refused to pursue the grievance because the collective bargaining agreement’s election-of-remedies clause prohibits use of the internal grievance process and an external process simultaneously. Trayling sued the county for age and disability discrimination, and sued the union and the county for implementing an allegedly unlawful election-of-remedies rule. The district court held that the election-of-remedies rule violated federal law. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s order granting partial summary judgment did not amount to a final decision; it did not even fully resolve the election-of-remedies claim (damages remain undecided), much less the whole case. An exception to the finality requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1292(a), does not apply because the order did not involve an injunction. View "Trayling v. St. Joseph Cnty. Emp'rs Chapter" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party of Ohio (LPO) sought to enjoin Ohio Secretary of State Husted from enforcing Ohio Rev. Code 3501.38(E)(1) and to restore its candidates to the May 2014 primary ballot. The Code requires that, to appear on the primary ballot and qualify for the general election, candidates must file petitions with (for statewide office) signatures of at least 500 qualified electors who are members of the same political party as the candidate. A petition consists of separate papers, each with signatures of electors of only one county; only one circulator can circulate each paper. Signatures must be in ink and include the location of the signer’s residence, as it appears on registration records. The circulator must note the number of signatures on each paper, and sign a statement that the circulator witnessed every signature and that, to the best of the circulator’s knowledge, each signature was that of a qualified voter and of the person whose signature it purports to be. The circulator must also identify the circulator’s name, address of permanent residence, and the name and address of the person employing the circulator to circulate the petition, if any. LPO previously successfully challenged an Ohio residency requirement for circulators. Hatchett collected signatures for LPO candidates and was paid about $2300. Hatchett, an independent contractor, believed it was unnecessary to fill in the employee information box, having circulated about 10,000 petition papers without completing that box. In response to a protest, papers submitted by Hatchett were invalidated. This was the first time enforcement of the employer disclosure requirement resulted in the disqualification of a statewide candidate. Absent a protest, practice had been not to check petitions for that disclosure. Because of the disqualification, LPO will likely lose its recognition as an Ohio political party. The district court rejected due process and First Amendment challenges to the statute. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Libertarian Party of OH v. Husted" on Justia Law

From 1998 to 2010, Dimora was one of three elected Cuyaho County commissioners. From 2005 to 2010, Gabor worked for the county weights-and-measures office, which inspects gas pumps, grocery store scanners, truck scales and the like for accuracy. In 2007, the FBI began investigating public corruption in Cuyahoga County and discovered that Dimora handed out public jobs, influenced Cleveland decision-makers and steered public contracts in return for about 100 bribes worth more than $250,000. Gabor bought his job for $5,000 and spent most of his time on errands for Dimora that were unrelated to the job, including acting as a go-between in arranging kickback schemes on county projects. When Gabor learned that the FBI was investigating him, he warned his co-conspirators about the investigation and tried to convince them to lie. After a 37-day trial, they were convicted of 39 violations of anti-corruption laws. The district court sentenced Dimora to 336 months in prison and Gabor to 121 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a jury instruction for the RICO charge, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d); to the sufficiency of the evidence; and to various evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Dimora" on Justia Law