Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant hacked the email account of then-Alaska governor and Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin. After forensic examinations revealed that he took action to remove information from his computer relating to the incident, he was indicted on several counts, including identity theft, but only convicted of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519. Section 1519, part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, prohibits knowing destruction or alteration of any record with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence investigation of any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal department or agency or in relation to or in contemplation of any such matter or case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant's posts indicated "contemplation" of a federal investigation.

Checking accounts were opened in the name of Diallo by a man with a passport bearing that name. The IRS deposited $3,787 into the account. Diallo withdrew $2,500 before the bank discovered that the money was a tax refund belonging to another. The account was blocked and the bank notified the IRS. The IRS made additional deposits for tax refunds. Diallo attempted to make a withdrawal, but the transaction was blocked. Later that day, at the airport, defendant was flagged for additional screening. The search revealed envelopes containing large amounts of cash and unsealed envelopes containing passports bearing defendant's picture but different names, including the name Diallo. He was indicted for possession of a false passport, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344 and 1028A(a)(1). The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the government failed to establish that the search was constitutional, and barred admission of the bank records. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although actual documentation seized during the search must be suppressed, evidence obtained legally and independently of the search is not suppressible, even if the government cannot show that it would have discovered its significance without the illegal search. The minimal deterrent effect of suppression is outweighed by the burden on the truth-seeking function of the courts.

Taxpayer took business and individual tax deductions for the cost of "Loss of Income" insurance policies. The policies were back-dated, had a high premium to coverage ratio, were described as tax-savings products, and allowed taxpayer access to and control over the funds. A significant part of the premium was invested for later distribution to the policy holder. He was convicted of: subscribing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1); attempting to evade taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7201; and conspiracy to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 371. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government presented sufficient evidence of the crimes. The court rejected a challenge to prior bad acts evidence and an argument that the government was required by the nature of the charges to forgo charging him under the general crime of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. The district court properly ordered payment of restitution for the personal income taxes of his co-conspirator.

Defendant was convicted of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), based a scheme to acquire a house for $1.4 million, intending to resell for a profit. The purchase involved recruiting a third-party with good financial credit to act as nominal purchaser. Defendant and her now-deceased husband provided the straw buyer with $30,000 that she deposited in her bank account, and falsified documents so that she appeared as president of defendants' sales group since 2003, earning a salary of $30,000-to-$40,000 per month. Within months of the purchase, the loan went into default. The lien holder foreclosed and resold the house, resulting in a net loss of $376,070.16. The straw buyer was not prosecuted, but testified without a nonprosecution agreement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion for a new trial. The prosecution's failure to disclose that the straw buyer was testifying without an agreement was not material, for purposes of a "Brady" violation or a claim of ineffective assistance.

Defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and conspiracy and sentenced to 120 months in prison and payment of fines and assessments. In a separate trial he was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering and sentenced to 360 months, to run concurrently. in a consolidated appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly denied an entrapment instruction; there was never any meeting of defendant and the government agents and, hence, no inducement. Wiretap evidence was properly admitted. There was no evidence that the warrant contained intentional or reckless falsehoods and there was probable cause. Evidence concerning the amount of loss was properly admitted with respect to both cases and sentencing was reasonable, regardless of the defense theories about other possible causes of the loss.

Doctors filed suit, alleging violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3279 and the Michigan Medicaid False Claim Act, as qui tam relators on behalf of the United States/ The claimed that the business defrauded the government by submitting Medicare and Medicaid billings for defective radiology studies, and that the billings were also fraudulent because the business was an invalid corporation. The federal government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed. Sixth Circuit affirmed. The doctors failed to identify any specific fraudulent claim submitted to the government, as is required to plead an FCA violation with the particularity mandated by the FRCP. A relator cannot merely allege that a defendant violated a standard (in this case, with respect to radiology studies), but must allege that compliance with the standard was required to obtain payment. The doctors had no personal knowledge that claims for nondiagnostic tests were presented to the government, nor do they allege facts that strongly support an inference that such billings were submitted.

Defendant, convicted of obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and conspiracy, in connection with offering a bribe for favorable testimony in a business fraud case, was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in refusing to give an entrapment jury instruction, in defining the corrupt intent required to convict as "characterized by improper conduct." Defendant acted for profit, was not reluctant to commit the offense, made the initial suggestion of the offense, and had little to no inducement from the government. The definition amounted to "invited error" and was not manifestly unjust. The sentence was reasonable; defendant knew the size and scope of the underlying crime at the outset.

In 1991, Carpenter pled guilty to aggravated theft and bank fraud. He served jail time and was disbarred. Between 1998 and 2000, he ran a Ponzi scheme, selling investments in sham companies, promising a guaranteed return. A class action resulted in a judgment of $15,644,384 against Carpenter. Plaintiffs then sued drawee banks, alleging that they violated the UCC "properly payable rule" by paying checks plaintiffs wrote to sham corporations, and depositary banks, alleging that they violated the UCC and committed fraud by depositing checks into accounts for fraudulent companies. The district court dismissed some claims as time-barred and some for failure to state a claim. After denying class certification, the court granted defendant summary judgment on the conspiracy claim, based on release of Carpenter in earlier litigation; a jury ruled in favor of defendant on aiding and abetting. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Claims by makers of the checks are time-barred; the "discovery" rule does not apply and would not save the claims. Ohio "Blue Sky" laws provide the limitations period for fraud claims, but those claims would also be barred by the common law limitations period. The district court retained subject matter jurisdiction to rule on other claims, following denial of class certification under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d).

Defendant, convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 of conspiracy to defraud the United States while serving as in-house general counsel to the company involving the company's filing of false tax returns with the IRS. He was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution to the IRS. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The jury instructions adequately addressed the elements of conspiracy. There was no need for mention of the attorney-client privilege or of an attorney's potential obligation to report illegal activity. The government’s theory of liability was not dependent on whether defendant had an affirmative duty to inform, yet failed to do so; conviction did not turn on whether defendant's actions were governed by the attorney-client privilege. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

The defendant, convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, was sentenced to one day of incarceration and three years of supervised release. Supervised release was revoked when he was convicted in state court of aggravated robbery and voluntary manslaughter; he admitted to possessing and discharging a firearm during the commission of the robbery. Upon revocation of supervised release, the district court sentenced the defendant to 36 months imprisonment, a 15-month upward departure from the Guidelines range, to run consecutively to his 12-year sentence for his state convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court intentionally imposed a sentence that was an upward departure; it considered all of the mitigating circumstances, stated specific reasons for the upward departure, and did not misunderstand the guidelines. The sentence was properly based on violations of supervised release following the original offense.