Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal authorities investigated a man in Michigan after receiving a tip that he was distributing methamphetamine sourced from Las Vegas. Over several months, law enforcement gathered evidence, including intercepting a package containing nearly seven pounds of methamphetamine sent to his uncle’s home. Upon executing search warrants, officers seized drugs, cash, and firearms from both the uncle’s residence and the defendant’s home. The defendant admitted his involvement during a post-arrest interview. After serving a short state sentence for probation violations, he moved to Atlanta, where he was employed and had no further criminal incidents for about a year. In 2023, a federal grand jury indicted him for drug and firearm offenses. He was arrested in Michigan several months later, and while out on bond, he violated conditions and was re-arrested. While in jail, he attempted to smuggle synthetic drugs and was caught with contraband.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied the defendant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, citing his continued drug-related conduct and false denials during the presentence investigation. The court also denied his request for a downward variance based on his period of lawful behavior in Atlanta, but did grant a downward variance due to his lack of youthful guidance, sentencing him to 300 months, below the guideline range. Defense counsel did not object to the court’s handling of non-frivolous arguments at sentencing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction for clear error and affirmed, holding that post-offense drug activity and false denials were relevant to assessing acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The appellate court also declined to review the procedural reasonableness of the sentence, finding that the defendant had either waived or invited any error by affirming that all arguments had been addressed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Jett" on Justia Law

Diego Pavia, a college football player, sought to play for Vanderbilt University during the 2025 season. After a successful 2024 season, Pavia faced ineligibility under National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules, which limit athletes to four seasons of intercollegiate competition, including seasons played at junior colleges. Pavia’s path included time at a junior college, New Mexico State University, and Vanderbilt. The NCAA counted his 2021 junior college season toward his eligibility, effectively barring him from playing in 2025. Pavia argued that this rule violated the Sherman Act and sought injunctive relief to allow him to play in the 2025 and 2026 seasons.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted Pavia a preliminary injunction, preventing the NCAA from enforcing the rule against him for the 2025 season and from applying its restitution rule to Vanderbilt or Pavia based on his participation. The NCAA appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the NCAA issued a waiver allowing all similarly situated athletes, including Pavia, to play in the 2025 season. The NCAA confirmed that this waiver would remain in effect regardless of the outcome of the appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that, because Pavia had already received the relief he sought at the preliminary injunction stage, the appeal was moot. The court held that it could not grant any further effectual relief and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court also declined to vacate the preliminary injunction, finding that the NCAA’s own actions had caused the case to become moot. View "Pavia v. NCAA" on Justia Law

Daniel Jackson was stopped by sheriff’s deputies in Kentucky after they observed his truck with an obscured license plate and learned he was driving without a valid license or registration. After arresting Jackson, deputies searched his truck and found methamphetamine, marijuana, syringes, and digital scales. A subsequent search of the police cruiser’s back seat, where Jackson had been placed, revealed a bag containing fentanyl. Jackson was charged with possession of fentanyl and methamphetamine with intent to distribute.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky presided over Jackson’s trial. At trial, Jackson testified that he had been framed by a deputy who allegedly planted the drugs in both his truck and the police cruiser. The jury rejected Jackson’s account and convicted him. At sentencing, the district court found that Jackson’s testimony constituted perjury and applied a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court also imposed a five-year term of supervised release, including a condition permitting searches of Jackson’s electronic devices by the probation office. Jackson did not object to this condition at sentencing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Jackson’s challenges to both the obstruction-of-justice enhancement and the supervised-release search condition. The court held that the district court’s findings of perjury—falsity, willfulness, and materiality—were not clearly erroneous and that the enhancement was mandatory under the Guidelines. The appellate court also found no plain error in the imposition or explanation of the electronic-device search condition, given the district court’s stated concerns about officer safety and recidivism. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A prisoner at a Michigan correctional facility was involved in a physical altercation with another inmate, after which he was subdued and handcuffed by corrections officers. Two officers then escorted him through a hallway and into a prison yard. Upon entering the yard, the officers performed a takedown maneuver, throwing the prisoner to the ground and fracturing his foot. The prisoner claimed he did not resist or act aggressively before the takedown, while the officers asserted that he had lunged away, prompting their response. Surveillance footage captured much of the incident, but some key moments were obscured or unclear. The prisoner suffered significant injury as a result of the takedown.Following the incident, a prison misconduct hearing was held, and the hearing officer found the prisoner guilty of assaulting staff, relying heavily on the video evidence, which the prisoner was not permitted to view. The prisoner did not seek judicial review of this administrative finding. He then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, holding they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court reasoned that the hearing officer’s factual findings should have preclusive effect and that the video evidence clearly contradicted the prisoner’s account.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer’s findings should not have preclusive effect because the prisoner lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the facts, particularly due to his inability to access crucial evidence. The court also found that the video evidence did not so clearly contradict the prisoner’s version as to warrant summary judgment. The court concluded that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the officers used excessive force, and that the officers had forfeited the “clearly established” prong of their qualified immunity defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Nash v. Bryce" on Justia Law

A sixth-grade student with behavioral disabilities, X.M., attended Mount Pleasant Public Schools under an Individualized Education Plan that allowed him to use a breakroom to manage stress. In the fall of 2021, after a student reported that X.M. had brought a gun to school, school officials, including special-education teacher Jason Russell, searched X.M.’s locker and questioned him, but found nothing. The next day, after X.M. made a comment about not having his gun at school, officials again searched his belongings. According to X.M., Russell then ordered him to pull down his trousers and lift his shirt in a search for a gun. Days later, after X.M. was suspended for violence, he claimed Russell locked him in the breakroom for over 20 minutes.Cheyenne Johnson, X.M.’s mother, sued Russell, the school district, and other officials, alleging violations of X.M.’s constitutional rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to all defendants except Russell, denying him qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims. The district court found that disputed facts—specifically, whether Russell conducted a strip search and locked X.M. in the breakroom—required a jury’s determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that, even accepting X.M.’s version of events, Russell did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that Russell’s search was justified at its inception and not clearly excessive in scope given the suspicion of a gun. It also concluded that it was not clearly established that locking a student in a breakroom for 20 minutes under these circumstances constituted an unreasonable seizure. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims against Russell. View "Johnson v. Mount Pleasant Public Schools" on Justia Law

A married couple, both employees of UT-Battelle, objected to their employer’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate on religious grounds, specifically because of their belief that the vaccines’ development involved the use of fetal cell lines from abortions, which conflicted with their Christian faith. UT-Battelle required employees seeking religious exemptions to undergo a panel interview and read a “fact sheet” presenting religious leaders’ support for vaccination. Employees granted religious accommodations were placed on unpaid leave, while those with medical accommodations were not. Mrs. Bilyeu ultimately received a medical exemption before the policy took effect and did not lose pay or work time. Mr. Bilyeu, however, was placed on unpaid leave after exhausting his vacation days, returning to work only after the policy was rescinded.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to UT-Battelle on all claims except Mrs. Bilyeu’s retaliation claim, which was later settled. The court found that Mrs. Bilyeu lacked standing and that Mr. Bilyeu had not suffered a materially adverse employment action under Title VII.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to Mrs. Bilyeu, holding she lacked Article III standing because she suffered no cognizable injury after receiving her medical accommodation. For Mr. Bilyeu, the Sixth Circuit vacated the summary judgment on his disparate treatment and failure-to-accommodate claims, instructing the district court to reconsider them in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, which eliminated the “materially adverse” requirement for adverse employment actions under Title VII. The court reversed the summary judgment on Mr. Bilyeu’s retaliation claim, finding sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the interview process could dissuade a reasonable worker from seeking a religious accommodation, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC" on Justia Law

After being released from federal prison, an individual began a term of supervised release that required him to comply with several conditions, including avoiding new criminal conduct, truthfully answering his probation officer’s questions, and participating in mental health and substance abuse treatment programs. Within two months, the probation office alleged that he violated four conditions: failing to enroll in required treatment, lying to his probation officer about receiving services, missing a scheduled drug test, and committing a new state misdemeanor offense involving assault and stalking.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held a revocation hearing. The individual admitted to three of the violations—lying to his probation officer, failing to enroll in treatment, and missing the drug test—and contested only the allegation that he committed a new state crime. After hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that he had committed the misdemeanor, in addition to the three admitted violations. The court revoked his supervised release and imposed a 14-month prison sentence, at the top of the applicable guidelines range. The individual appealed, challenging only the finding that he committed the new state offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error. The appellate court concluded that even if the district court erred in finding the new state offense, any such error was harmless because the three uncontested violations independently justified revocation and the sentence imposed. The court held that a single violation is sufficient to support revocation, and the guidelines range and sentence would have been the same regardless of the contested finding. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Kidd" on Justia Law

Two African American truck drivers employed by a large transportation company in Nashville alleged that their supervisors subjected them to a racially hostile work environment. The plaintiffs claimed they were assigned longer routes and more hours than their non-African American colleagues for the same pay, denied certain benefits, and given older or more damaged trucks. They also testified that their supervisors, one of whom was also African American, repeatedly called them “monkey” and “monkey ass,” used demeaning language, and threatened or criticized them in ways not directed at white coworkers. The plaintiffs reported this conduct to company liaisons and managers, but the alleged harassment continued. One plaintiff resigned due to the conditions, while the other was terminated for alleged performance issues, which he disputed.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to the employer, finding that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence of race-based harassment to support a hostile work environment claim. The court reasoned that the terms used by the supervisors were not inherently racist, that the plaintiffs had not shown the terms were used only against African Americans, and that the plaintiffs’ comparative evidence was insufficient because it did not establish the race of the relevant comparators with the required specificity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’ testimony regarding the use of “monkey” and “monkey ass” by supervisors constituted evidence of race-based harassment, given the well-established history of those terms as racial slurs against African Americans. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ comparative and other evidence was admissible and sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment and the employer’s liability. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Smith v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Christopher C. Brown, through his company Tattooed Millionaire Entertainment (TME), owned a Memphis music studio and insured both the studio and its equipment with Hanover American Insurance Company. John Falls, a musician, leased Studio B and its equipment from Brown and also obtained insurance from Hanover for the equipment and lost business income. In 2015, the studio was damaged by arson, and both Brown and Falls submitted insurance claims. Hanover discovered Brown had forged receipts for equipment purchases and sued to recover advance payments and for a declaratory judgment of no further liability. Brown, Falls, and another lessee counter-sued for breach of contract. After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Falls was awarded $2.5 million for equipment loss and $250,000 for business income, while Brown was found to have committed insurance fraud.Hanover moved to set aside the verdict under Rule 50(b), which the district court granted. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Hanover had forfeited its Rule 50(b) motion by failing to make a Rule 50(a) motion as to Falls, and ordered reinstatement of the jury verdict. Subsequent proceedings included a federal interpleader action and a parallel state court action between Falls and TME. The district court enjoined the state action, but the Sixth Circuit reversed the injunction.In the present appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s allocation of the insurance payout, holding that Hanover was precluded by res judicata from challenging Falls’s recovery on grounds that could have been raised earlier. The court found the district court’s error in interpreting the wrong lease was harmless and upheld the allocation of funds based on the value of Falls’s leasehold interest. The court also held that Tennessee public policy barred Brown from recovering his allocated share due to his insurance fraud. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Hanover American Insurance Co. v. Tattooed Millionaire Entertainment" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was found in possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted of multiple felonies, including several burglaries. When law enforcement approached his girlfriend’s home, he cooperated and led them to a pistol hidden in the woods, which bore his fingerprints. He was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence report listed twenty-two prior felony convictions, eleven of which were for burglary, with the offenses occurring over several years and involving different victims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee accepted the defendant’s guilty plea. At sentencing, the court determined, based on the presentence report, that the defendant qualified as an Armed Career Criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum sentence for those with three prior violent felony convictions committed on different occasions. The court imposed a 180-month sentence. The defendant did not object to the factual accuracy of the presentence report but later challenged the application of the ACCA enhancement, arguing that the determination of whether his prior offenses were committed on different occasions should have been made by a jury, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Erlinger v. United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the failure to submit the “different occasions” question to a jury was not structural error and that, under harmless error review, no reasonable jury could have found that the defendant’s predicate burglaries occurred on the same occasion, given the significant gaps in time and different victims. The court also rejected the defendant’s double jeopardy argument, finding no plain error. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the enhanced sentence under the ACCA. View "United States v. Ballinger" on Justia Law