Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Skilken, the owner of Max Rack, Inc., invented a piece of gym equipment that he named the “Max Rack.” For years, his company sold Max Racks through a licensing agreement with Core. When Max Rack’s last patent expired, Core decided to sell an identical machine under a new name, “Freedom Rack.” Max Rack alleged that Core continued to sell “Max Racks” without authorization, and attempted to sell Freedom Racks by free-riding off the “Max Rack” name, Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1), 1117(a), 1125(a)(1)(A). A jury awarded Max Rack $1 million in damages and $250,000 in Core’s profits. The district court doubled the profits award to $500,000, and granted Max Rack attorney’s fees but overturned Max Rack’s damages award.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the $250,000 profits award as supported by sufficient evidence and the court’s rejection of the $1 million damages award, reversing the court’s decision to double the profits award and its decision to grant Max Rack attorney’s fees. This case does not qualify as “exceptional” and Core did not litigate in an “unreasonable manner.” Core’s unauthorized sales ended before trial. View "Max Rack, Inc. v. Core Health & Fitness, LLC" on Justia Law

In a suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(B), concerning the duty of prudence as applied to the investment options that a company offers to its employees for their 401(k) and other defined-contribution plans, plaintiffs (employees) argued: (1) that the employer, TriHealth, should not have offered its employees the option of investing their retirement money in actively managed funds, (2) that the performance of several funds was deficient at certain points, (3) that the overall fees charged for the investment options were too high, and (4) that even if a prudent investor might make available a wide range of valid investment decisions in a given year, only an imprudent financier would offer a more expensive share when he could offer a functionally identical share for less.The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of the suit, rejecting the first three claims as foreclosed by recent precedent. However, the plaintiffs’ claim that TriHealth offered them more expensive mutual fund shares when shares with the same investment strategy, the same management team, and the same investments were available to their retirement plan at lower costs stated a plausible claim that TriHealth acted imprudently. View "Forman v. TriHealth, Inc." on Justia Law

Capital, a New York LLC with its principal place of business in New York, sued Peters, an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Indiana, for breach of contract and received a judgment by confession in New York state court. Peter then brought suit in the Southern District of Ohio, alleging that Capital and its Operations Manager, a resident of Florida. engaged in a scheme that violated RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, adopting the “forum state approach.” Service over out-of-district defendants is governed by 18 U.S.C. 1965(b), which provides that if “other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district.” Section 1965 in its entirety “does not provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction over every defendant in every civil RICO case, no matter where the defendant is found.” Section 1965(a) grants personal jurisdiction over an initial defendant to the district court for the district in which that person resides, has an agent, or transacts his affairs; nationwide jurisdiction hinges on whether at least one defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state. Peters did not assert sufficient facts to establish that the court had personal jurisdiction over either defendant and did not specifically allege how the claims arose from conduct within Ohio. View "Peters Broadcast Engineering, Inc. v. 24 Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

In its 2014 “Mitchell” decision, the Sixth Circuit held that robbery, as defined under Tennessee law, is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). Based on that holding, the district court sentenced Belcher to a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence under ACCA after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The Sixth Circuit rejected Belcher’s arguments that the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Elonis” and 2021 “Borden” decisions undermine Mitchell. Those decisions clarified that ACCA’s definition of violent felony excludes offenses where the defendant’s use or threatened use of force can be reckless or negligent (as opposed to intentional). Tennessee defines robbery as “the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” The court rejected Belcher’s argument that Tennessee precedent leaves room for cases where the defendant did not intend to cause fear, but where the victim actually did experience (or reasonably could have experienced) fear nonetheless; no Tennessee court has construed the fear element that way. The court also rejected Belcher’s argument that a jury, rather than the court, must determine whether a defendant’s prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of ACCA. Three of his prior offenses each came at least six years apart. View "United States v. Belcher" on Justia Law

To dispute a property tax assessment under Detroit ordinances and Michigan state law, taxpayers “make complaint on or before February 15th" before the Board of Assessors. Any person who has complained to the Board of Assessors may appeal to the Board of Review. For the Michigan Tax Tribunal to have jurisdiction over an assessment dispute, “the assessment must be protested before the board of review.” On February 14, 2017, Detroit mailed tax assessment notices to Detroit homeowners, including an “EXTENDED ASSESSORS REVIEW SCHEDULE” that would conclude on February 18, just four days later. At a City Council meeting on February 14, the city announced: “The Assessors Review process will end this year February the 28th.” News outlets reported the extension and that Detroit had waived the requirement of appearance before the Board of Assessors so residents could appeal directly to the Board of Review. Detroit did not distribute individualized mailings to so inform homeowners.Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violations of their due process rights; asserting that Michigan’s State Tax Commission assumed control of Detroit’s flawed property tax assessment process from 2014-2017 so that its officials were equally responsible for the violations; and claiming that Wayne County is “complicit” and has been unjustly enriched. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Tax Injunction Act and the principle of comity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that a state remedy is uncertain. View "Howard v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Inman was part of the majority of the Michigan House of Representatives who, along with a majority of the Senate, voted to repeal the prevailing-wage law. Inman was charged with soliciting bribes for his prevailing-wage vote: attempted extortion under color of official right, 18 U.S.C. 1951; soliciting a bribe, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B); and making a false statement to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) (Count III). A jury acquitted Inman on Count III but hung on Counts I and II. The district court dismissed those counts, concluding that the acquittal precluded a retrial on the other counts.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The acquittal on the false-statement charge did not decide any fact that necessarily precludes a verdict against Inman on the extortion and bribery-solicitation charges, so issue preclusion does not apply. To show the underlying corrupt agreement, the prosecution did not need to produce evidence that Inman lied to the FBI. It needed to produce evidence that Inman extorted or attempted to solicit an agreement where Inman would vote on the prevailing-wage law in exchange for payment. At retrial, a jury must decide whether Inman actually extorted or attempted to solicit such an agreement—a question not answered by the acquittal on Count III. View "United States v. Larry Inman" on Justia Law

Akron Police received an anonymous call that men were smoking marijuana in Whitney Park, "a high-crime area." Several officers, including Detective Elam, went to investigate. They arrived at the park in the early evening and saw a group of 10-15 men, including McCallister; they detected the odor of marijuana and began stopping people. Four men, including McCallister, tried to walk away. An officer instructed them to stop moving and place their hands on their heads. McCallister did so. Elam saw a “little bump out on his shirt,” which the detective concluded was a gun, and saw McCallister “turn[] his body in towards the huddle so no one would see.” Elam asked McCallister if he was carrying any weapons; McCallister did not respond. As McCallister raised his hands, his shirt lifted, and Elam saw a firearm magazine tucked into McCallister’s waistband. Elam retrieved the weapon.McCallister was indicted for illegal possession of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), and possessing an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The officers had reasonable suspicion that all of the men were smoking marijuana, justifying the detention, and reasonable suspicion that McCallister was armed and dangerous, justifying the search. View "United States v. McCallister" on Justia Law

While working at Dura-Bond’s Duquesne, Pennsylvania plant, Marshall stepped out of his truck, while others were loading metal pipes onto it. A worker accidentally ran a forklift into the pipes, causing one to roll off the truck and crash into Marshall. Doctors had to amputate both of Marshall’s legs, leaving him totally disabled.Russell Trucking had contracted with Express to use its license. Express would ensure that drivers met federal requirements, but Russell could otherwise retain the drivers they wanted. Marshall had completed an Express application, passed a background check, and completed training with Russell. Marshall leased a truck from Russell and drove it under Express’s license. Although he signed a contract stating that he was an independent contractor, Marshall believed that he was an employee of both Express and Russell.Marshall filed a workers’ compensation claim. Russell, Express, and Dura-Bond all disclaimed an employment relationship with Marshall. Marshall conceded that he had agreed to obtain his own workers’ compensation insurance and had failed to do so. An ALJ found that Russell was Marshall’s “immediate employer” and that Express and Dura-Bond were Marshall’s “statutory employers” under Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation statute. Neither Express nor Russell had insurance for Marshall. The judge ordered Dura-Bond (which had insurance) to pay Marshall’s benefits and allowed it to seek indemnity. Express reimbursed Dura-Bond for the benefits.Marshall subsequently brought tort claims against Express and Russell. RLI, which had issued Express a commercial general liability policy, refused to reimburse for a $2.4 million settlement, citing policy exclusions for “[a]ny obligation” “under a workers’ compensation” “law” and for injuries to an “employee.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury finding that Marshall was a “temporary worker,” leaving the tort-suit settlement covered by the policy. View "P.I. & I. Motor Express, Inc. v. RLI Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Delek uses third-party specialty inspectors to ensure that Delek’s projects comply with industry and regulatory requirements. Cypress employs and assigns these specialty inspectors to companies like Delek. Becker worked as an electrical inspector for Cypress, which set Becker’s compensation as a day rate and issued his paychecks. Cypress deemed Becker an administrative employee and considered him overtime-exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 (FLSA). Becker signed an employment agreement, acknowledging that he “underst[ood] that [his] employment is based on a specific project to be performed for a designated customer” and that any dispute related to this employment relationship would be arbitrated. Becker was assigned by Cypress to work at a Delek location.Becker filed an FLSA complaint against Delek, arguing that “Delek’s day-rate system violates the FLSA because [he] and those similarly situated workers did not receive any overtime pay for hours worked over 40 hours each week.” Becker claimed Delek was his employer because he worked 12-15 hours a day for six-seven days a week at Delek's location, reported to Delek, performed work essential to Delek’s core business, and had his pay and schedule directed by Delek. Cypress was allowed to intervene and moved to compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of the motion. Becker’s challenge is not “specific” to the arbitration agreement’s delegation provision, leaving the question of whether Delek can enforce the arbitration agreement for an arbitrator to decide. View "Becker v. Delek US Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Williams pled guilty to possession of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on four previous Kentucky robbery convictions, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). When Williams was 16, he pled guilty to robbery in the first degree, Ky. Rev. Stat. 515.020, and three counts of robbery in the second degree, section 515.030. The four robberies, committed on separate days by the same individuals, were charged in the same indictment. Williams argued that the second-degree robbery convictions were not ACCA predicate offenses because they were not violent and not separate offenses. The district court overruled the objection, calculated a guidelines range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment, considered 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s factors, and sentenced Williams to 200 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Looking at Kentucky law as a whole, robbery occurs when the defendant steals using force sufficient to overcome the victim’s will and does not encompass taking without the victim’s awareness or without physical force; second-degree robbery in Kentucky requires a sufficient level of force to satisfy ACCA’s elements clause. It is not a crime that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law