Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Delek uses third-party specialty inspectors to ensure that Delek’s projects comply with industry and regulatory requirements. Cypress employs and assigns these specialty inspectors to companies like Delek. Becker worked as an electrical inspector for Cypress, which set Becker’s compensation as a day rate and issued his paychecks. Cypress deemed Becker an administrative employee and considered him overtime-exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 (FLSA). Becker signed an employment agreement, acknowledging that he “underst[ood] that [his] employment is based on a specific project to be performed for a designated customer” and that any dispute related to this employment relationship would be arbitrated. Becker was assigned by Cypress to work at a Delek location.Becker filed an FLSA complaint against Delek, arguing that “Delek’s day-rate system violates the FLSA because [he] and those similarly situated workers did not receive any overtime pay for hours worked over 40 hours each week.” Becker claimed Delek was his employer because he worked 12-15 hours a day for six-seven days a week at Delek's location, reported to Delek, performed work essential to Delek’s core business, and had his pay and schedule directed by Delek. Cypress was allowed to intervene and moved to compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of the motion. Becker’s challenge is not “specific” to the arbitration agreement’s delegation provision, leaving the question of whether Delek can enforce the arbitration agreement for an arbitrator to decide. View "Becker v. Delek US Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Williams pled guilty to possession of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on four previous Kentucky robbery convictions, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). When Williams was 16, he pled guilty to robbery in the first degree, Ky. Rev. Stat. 515.020, and three counts of robbery in the second degree, section 515.030. The four robberies, committed on separate days by the same individuals, were charged in the same indictment. Williams argued that the second-degree robbery convictions were not ACCA predicate offenses because they were not violent and not separate offenses. The district court overruled the objection, calculated a guidelines range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment, considered 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s factors, and sentenced Williams to 200 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Looking at Kentucky law as a whole, robbery occurs when the defendant steals using force sufficient to overcome the victim’s will and does not encompass taking without the victim’s awareness or without physical force; second-degree robbery in Kentucky requires a sufficient level of force to satisfy ACCA’s elements clause. It is not a crime that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Homeland Security’s 2021 Guidance notes that the Department lacks the resources to apprehend and remove all of the more than 11 million removable noncitizens in the country and prioritizes apprehension and removal of noncitizens who are threats to “national security, public safety, and border security.” Whether a noncitizen poses a threat to public safety "requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.” The Guidance lists aggravating and mitigating factors that immigration officers should consider and does not “compel an action to be taken or not taken,” and “may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit.” In a suit by Arizona, Montana, and Ohio, the district court issued a “nationwide preliminary injunction,” blocking the Department from relying on the Guidance priorities and policies in making detention, arrest, and removal decisions. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal and subsequently reversed the order. The court noted “many dubious justiciability questions” with respect to standing. The Guidance leaves considerable implementation discretion and does not create any legal rights for noncitizens, suggesting it is not reviewable. Even if the states cleared the justiciability hurdles, they are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Guidance violates the Administrative Procedure Act, whether on the grounds that it is contrary to law, it is arbitrary or capricious, or it lacks a required notice and comment, 5 U.S.C. 706(2), 553. View "Arizona v. Biden" on Justia Law

Lawyers brought claims against schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400. After the claims failed, the schools sought their attorney’s fees from the lawyers under the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision. The School Districts alleged that, during the administrative process, the attorneys presented sloppy pleadings, asserted factually inaccurate or legally irrelevant allegations, and needlessly prolonged the proceedings. The lawyers asked their insurer, Wesco, to pay the fees. Wesco refused on the ground that the requested attorney’s fees fell within the insurance policy’s exclusion for “sanctions.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wesco. The IDEA makes attorney misconduct a prerequisite to a fee award against a party’s lawyer, so the policy exclusion applied. The court noted that the legal community routinely describes an attorney’s fees award as a “sanction” when a court grants it because of abusive litigation tactics. View "Wesco Insurance Co. v. Roderick Linton Belfance, LLP" on Justia Law

VanDemark owns the Used Car Supermarket, which sells cars from two lots in Amelia, Ohio. In 2013-2014, VanDemark funneled away his customers’ down payments and left them off his tax returns. He used this stashed-away cash to finance the mortgage on his mansion.The Sixth Circuit affirmed VanDemark’s convictions for helping prepare false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2), structuring payments, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3), and making false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The down payments were taxable upon receipt, not, as VanDemark argued, when customers purchased the cars after leasing them. With respect to his missing 2013 personal return, the court stated that a defendant is guilty even if he helps prepare, without presenting, the fraudulent return. View "United States v. VanDemark" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed an appeal by Antonio, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, from an order denying his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay of removal pending a decision on the merits of his petition, 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(3)(B). "Everyone agrees" that Antonio will likely be tortured if he is removed. The record indicates that Antonio, who was involved with serious drug trafficking gangs that might have control over the Dominican Republic police forces, will not be protected by the government from the torture to which he will be subject upon his return. Antonio has made a substantial showing that one of his torturers in the past was a police officer. In light of his strong showing of irreparable harm, Antonio’s arguments present a sufficient likelihood of success to weigh in favor of granting a stay pending an appeal on the merits. A stay pending a merits decision is necessary to preserve any value in hearing his case on the merits. View "Antonio v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ziesel entered a bank wearing a mask and a hooded sweatshirt, approached the tellers, and said “give me all the money.” At some point, Ziesel told the tellers that “no one was going to get hurt.” Before leaving with the money, Ziesel told the tellers to get on the floor. Ziesel did not have a weapon, nor did he imply he had a weapon. Ziesel pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for “physical restraint” under USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), resulting in an imprisonment range of 46-57 months. Without that enhancement, the range would have been 37-46 months.The judge noted that application of the enhancement was “a close question” but overruled Ziesel’s objection, stating: the simple communication “This is a bank robbery” connotes a certain degree of potential harm, whether a weapon is shown or not, and certainly, control is exercised by the robber ... when you are standing upright, and then to be told to go into prone position by somebody who appears able to exercise substantial force over you …. They believed that you posed a clear and present danger. The Sixth Circuit reversed Ziesel’s 46-month sentence. Neither the plain language of the Guidelines nor precedent supports application of the enhancement under thesed facts. View "United States v. Ziesel" on Justia Law

Brown’s company, TME, owned the House of Blues recording studio in Memphis and leased a studio to Falls. Hanover issued separate insurance policies to TME and Falls. Intruders vandalized and burgled the studio, and committed arson. Hanover made advance payments to TME and Falls, then discovered that Brown had submitted false receipts and had been the target of several similar arson incidents. Hanover sued Brown, TME, and Falls, seeking recovery of the prepaid funds and a declaratory judgment. A jury returned a verdict against Brown but found that Falls was entitled to recover the full insurance coverage. Hanover unsuccessfully moved to overturn that verdict because TME was named as an additional insured on Falls’s policy and his policy voided coverage if “you or any other insured” misrepresented a material fact. Meanwhile, Falls sought monetary damages and declaratory relief against Brown and TME in Tennessee state court.Hanover filed an interpleader complaint against Brown, TME, and Falls in federal court, requesting that the court find the insurance award void under Tennessee public policy or, alternatively, determine to whom Hanover should pay the award. The district court enjoined Falls’s state court action, citing the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Act allows an injunction only for necessity, not simply for efficiency. Because the district court proceedings were not in rem, an injunction was not “necessary” to aid the district court’s jurisdiction. View "Hanover American Insurance Co. v. Tattooed Millionaire Entertainment, LLC" on Justia Law

Freed created a Facebook profile, limited to his “friends.” Eventually, he exceeded Facebook’s 5,000-friend limit on profiles and converted his profile to a “page,” which has unlimited “followers.” His page was public, anyone could “follow” it; for the page category, Freed chose “public figure.” Freed was appointed Port Huron’s city manager. He updated his Facebook page to reflect that title. In the “About” section, he described himself as “Daddy ... Husband ... and City Manager, Chief Administrative Officer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.” Freed listed the Port Huron website as his page’s website, the city’s general email as his page’s contact information, and the City Hall address as his page’s address. Freed shared photos of family events, visits to local community events, and posts about administrative directives he issued as city manager. When the Covid-19 pandemic hit, he posted policies he initiated for Port Huron and news articles on public-health measures and statistics. Lindke responded with criticism. Freed deleted those comments and eventually “blocked” Lindke from the page.Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C 1983, arguing that Freed violated his First Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Freed. Freed’s Facebook activity was not state action. The page neither derives from the duties of his office nor depends on his state authority. View "Lindke v. Freed" on Justia Law

Bell was charged with distribution of a controlled substance that resulted in death, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl, section 841(a)(1). Bell pled guilty to a lesser included, but not indicted, offense--distribution of a controlled substance. The district court accepted the guilty plea but ultimately rejected the plea agreement. The court then sentenced Bell to 30 months’ imprisonment—a sentence approximately 82 percent lower than that contemplated under the plea agreement. The government appealed, alleging a right to withdraw its consent to a plea to a lesser included, but not indicted, offense when a district court rejects a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government’s arguments. Rule 11 contemplates that the rejection of a plea agreement allows the defendant, not the prosecutor, to withdraw or persist in the plea. Where, as here, the defendant pleads to all charges against him and chooses not to withdraw his pleas, there are no remaining charges for which the government may proceed to trial, and a subsequent re-indictment for the greater included offense implicates double jeopardy concerns under the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law