Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Universal Life Church Monastery permits anyone who feels called to become ordained as a minister—over the Internet, free of charge, in a matter of minutes. Tennessee law permits only those “regular” ministers—ministers whose ordination occurred “by a considered, deliberate, and responsible act”—“to solemnize the rite of matrimony.” Tenn. Code 36-3-301(a)(1)–(2). Since 2019, the law has explicitly clarified that “[p]ersons receiving online ordinations may not solemnize the rite.”Asserting that those restrictions violate the federal and Tennessee constitutions, ULC and its members sued several Tennessee officials, seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment. The officials claimed sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against several defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. No plaintiff has standing to seek relief against Governor Lee, Attorney General Slatery, District Attorney General Helper, or County Clerks Crowell, Anderson, and Knowles. The plaintiffs have standing to sue District Attorneys General Dunaway, Pinkston, and Jones, and County Clerk Nabors. The court noted that county clerks have no discretion to inspect officiants’ credentials or to deny licenses on that basis; state law deems issuance of the licenses a ministerial duty. View "Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Nabors" on Justia Law

After going to Helton’s home to execute a warrant for his arrest, Knox County Deputy Mullins sought a search warrant. His affidavit stated that Mullins had received complaints about Helton selling methamphetamine; that a reliable source advised that a person he was with purchased methamphetamine at the residence; and that when the officers arrived Helton had a clear baggie that appeared to hold residue. Executing the search warrant, deputies found illegal drugs, currency, and multiple firearms. Deputies then obtained a warrant and searched the home of Helton’s mother, recovering money, firearms, and drugs. Helton was charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and being a felon in possession of firearms. The court rejected motions to suppress, upholding both warrants. At trial, Moore testified about a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Helton. Juror 191 told the judge that she recognized Moore as someone that she would watch during her employment at a shopping center “in case she was going to steal,” but that she was not aware of Moore actually shoplifting. Over Helton’s opposition, the district court struck Juror 191 on the basis that she personally knew Moore and had twice responded “I think so” when asked if she could set aside her knowledge of Moore. The Sixth Circuit upheld Helton’s convictions and 264-month sentence. While the search warrant did not satisfy constitutional requirements, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "United States v. Helton" on Justia Law

Rangers, responding to an incident at Mammoth Cave, encountered a female technician who was monitoring a cave restoration project. She explained that Zabel, a contractor, had pinned her against a wall and attempted to kiss her, grabbed her buttocks and breasts, and exposed his penis. The rangers used an elevator to enter the cave and walked 25 minutes through dark, narrow passages until they found Zabel. They recorded the ensuing encounter. The rangers introduced themselves and explained that he was “not under arrest,” was “free to go,” and that he did not have to talk to them. Zabel made several incriminating statements, including that he had grabbed the woman’s butt and showed her his penis, which “may have been a little” erect.Zabel, indicted under 18 U.S.C. 2244(b), unsuccessfully moved to suppress those statements, arguing that the rangers improperly solicited those statements during a custodial interrogation without reciting his Miranda rights. Zabel then pled guilty, The PSR sought an upward variance and an upward departure (U.S.S.G. 5K2.8) for Extreme Conduct because Zabel’s behavior was more egregious than typical abusive sexual contact. The district court recessed so that Zabel and his counsel could review recorded statements by the victim and provided Zabel an opportunity to testify. Zabel declined. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment plus a life term of supervised release. The court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his custodial sentence and term of supervised release. View "United States v. Zabel" on Justia Law

Head Start is a federal program that funds early childhood education for low-income children and provides other resources and education to the children’s families. Michigan Head Start grantees challenged the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers imposed by an interim final rule of the Department of Health and Human Services. The district court denied a preliminary injunction.The Sixth Circuit denied an injunction pending appeal. The plaintiffs have not shown that they will likely prevail on the merits. HHS likely did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act when it promulgated the vaccine requirement through an interim final rule instead of notice-and-comment rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). That rule contains ample discussion of the evidence in support of a vaccine requirement and the justifications for the requirement, 86 Fed. Reg. 68,055-059. HHS likely has the statutory authority to issue a vaccine requirement for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers under 42 U.S.C. 9836a(a)(1)(A), (E). The risk that unvaccinated staff members could transmit a deadly disease to Head Start children—who are ineligible for the COVID-19 vaccine due to their young age—is “a threat to the health” of the children. The court noted HHS’s history of regulating the health of Head Start children and staff. View "Livingston Educational Service Agency v. Becerra" on Justia Law

NOCO manufactures and sells battery chargers and related products. Although it sells these products itself, NOCO also authorizes resellers if they sign an agreement. NOCO discovered that OJC was selling NOCO’s products on Amazon without authorization. NOCO complained to Amazon that OJC was selling NOCO’s products in violation of Amazon’s policy. Around the same time, another company (Emson) also complained to Amazon about OJC. Amazon asked OJC for proof that it was complying with its policy concerning intellectual property rights. OJC did not provide adequate documents. Amazon temporarily deactivated OJC’s account.OJC claimed that NOCO submitted false complaints, and sued for defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, and violation of the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of OJC’s claims. To succeed on those claims, OJC must establish that NOCO was the proximate cause of its injury. It cannot do this because three intervening causes broke the causal chain, relieving NOCO of any liability: Emson’s complaint, Amazon’s independent investigation and decision, and OJC’s opportunity to prevent the harm to itself. View "NOCO Co. v. OJ Commerce, LLC" on Justia Law

Two female students at Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS), were videoed by other students engaging in sexual activity with male students at school. One student told school officials that the incident was forcible rape; afraid to remain at the school, she enrolled in a new school. When the other girl’s mother asked that something be done about the circulation of the video, school officials stated that it was a criminal matter and to contact Metro Police; the girl was called names in the hallway and threatened. She finished the school year at home.In a suit alleging violations of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted MNPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Disciplinary records established that MNPS was aware of issues with sexual harassment in the school system before the two students reported their incidents. Many of these incidents involved photos or videos. To hold MNPS is immune from liability as long as no student is assaulted twice, would defeat Title IX’s purpose. With respect to one girl’s treatment after notifying the school of her harassment, a reasonable jury could conclude that, rather than take steps to remedy the violation, MNPS opted to avoid the problem, resulting in her having to homeschool or endure further misconduct. View "Doe v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Hasanaj, a teacher certified in Michigan, was employed by the Detroit Public Schools as a teacher for 10 years under a series of contracts. After about seven years, the District stopped sending him contract renewal notices. Hasanaj received “ineffective” ratings in the three years that followed. The District dismissed him as required by Mich. Comp. Laws 380.1249(2)(j).Hasanaj sued, alleging procedural due process violations because he and defendants “acted with the understanding that he had tenure,” the evaluation ratings violated Michigan’s statutory evaluation system, and now he cannot use his certificate to teach in Michigan. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit. Hasanaj has not satisfied Michigan’s Teachers’ Tenure Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 38.71-.191, and has no protected property interest in continued employment. Hasanaj has not alleged that he satisfied the statutory probation requirements to acquire tenure. A contract or a tacit understanding cannot override the statutory requirements. It is irrelevant that Hasanaj stopped receiving contract renewal notices, that the three-strikes provision was invoked for firing him, that he was notified that he could appeal to the Tenure Commission, and that the parties stipulated before the Tenure Commission that Hasanaj obtained tenure. Nor was he deprived of his liberty to pursue his profession because he still holds a valid certificate to teach. View "Hasanaj v. Detroit Public Schools Community District" on Justia Law

Whitley was the subject of a traffic stop for failing to come to a standstill before exiting a driveway onto a street. Before the stop, officers had been surveilling Whitley for suspected drug trafficking. During the stop, officers noticed a digital scale sitting on Whitley’s lap. They asked Whitley to exit the vehicle Whitley initially refused but complied after his mother arrived. A drug-detection dog arrived and alerted to the presence of narcotics in Whitley’s vehicle. The officers then conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle. They found a Glock handgun with an extended magazine, ammunition, $7,600 in cash, a digital scale, and a pound and a half of marijuana.Whitley unsuccessfully moved to suppress that evidence, and several post-Miranda statements, as fruits of an unlawful stop and search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers abandoned the permissible traffic stop after seeing the scale but had reasonable suspicion to continue detaining Whitley such that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In addition to the scale and apparent marijuana residue on the dashboard., the officers observed Whitley entering and leaving a suspected drug house, counting a wad of cash, making short stops, and moving a bag from the seat to the trunk. The drug-detection dog was certified, so its positive alert was sufficient to establish probable cause. View "United States v. Whitley" on Justia Law

TVA, wholly owned by the U.S. government, 16 U.S.C. 831, operates Tennessee's Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant. A containment dike that retained coal-ash sludge failed in 2008, causing 5.4 million cubic yards of coal-ash sludge to spill to adjacent property. TVA and the EPA responded under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. TVA, as the lead agency, engaged Jacobs as its “prime contractor providing project planning, management, and oversight,” including evaluating potential hazards to human health and safety. Jacobs submitted a Safety and Health Plan. More than 60 of Jacobs’s former employees sued, claiming that they were exposed to coal ash and particulate “fly ash” during this cleanup. The suits were consolidated.The district court denied Jacobs’s motions seeking derivative discretionary-function immunity, reasoning that Jacobs would be entitled to immunity only if it adhered to its contract and there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Jacobs acted within the scope of its authority. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs but did not designate any particular theory, as listed in the jury instructions, for which Jacobs could be held liable, broadly finding that Jacobs “failed to adhere to the terms of its contract," or the Plan. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Jacobs is immune from suit only if TVA is immune; TVA would not have been immune from suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ claims raise either “inconsistency” or “grave-interference” concerns. View "Greg Adkisson v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc" on Justia Law

USN4U brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Wolf Creek and its employees submitted falsely inflated project estimates to NASA for facilities maintenance, resulting in the negotiation of fraudulently induced, exorbitant contract prices. USN4U alleged that “[t]he Government paid Wolf Creek and its union employees for labor not actually performed,” described specific projects, and alleged that when Wolf Creek performed NASA projects, workgroup leads instructed “participating union employee[s]” to falsely report their labor hours to “justify the inflated [labor] estimate.” USN4U identified several Wolf Creek employees who were allegedly active members of the fraudulent schemeCiting NASA’s subsequent decision to pay the invoices and continue to contract with Wolf Creek, and the government’s decision not to intervene in USN4U’s claim, the district court dismissed the suit.The Sixth Circuit reversed. USN4U adequately alleged fraud. NASA asked Wolf Creek for estimates and always awarded the contracts for the quoted amount, which could indicate that NASA trusted and relied upon the purported accuracy of Wolf Creek’s estimates. NASA plausibly would not have agreed to pay Wolf Creek the quoted amount if NASA knew that it was being grossly overcharged. View "USN4U, LLC v. Wolf Creek Federal Services, Inc." on Justia Law