Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Burnett was charged with failure to appear for a work-detail program. At Burnett’s arraignment hearing, his behavior was so erratic that the court held Burnett in contempt and sentenced him to jail. A mental health representative advised Sergeant Griffith that Burnett should be placed on suicide watch. While being escorted to a cell, Burnett attempted to break away. Griffith pulled Burnett backward. Burnett continued his efforts. Griffith took him down to the floor with significant force, then knelt over Burnett in an effort to control him. Burnett continued moving. Officer Tessar joined Griffith. Burnett claims that he temporarily lost consciousness. Griffith called for assistance when he noticed that Burnett had a laceration on his head and was bleeding. Other officers and a nurse arrived. Burnett was taken to a hospital, where he received three stitches, then was discharged in good condition. Burnett claims that he suffers from PTSD, migraines, back pain, and personality changes.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The law at the time that Griffith acted did not provide him with fair warning that his actions would violate Burnett’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force; his actions were not so egregious as to obviate the requirement of identifying precedent that places the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. View "Burnett v. Griffith" on Justia Law

In 2019, Miller was arrested at his home for failure to appear. Police woke Miller up in his bedroom and searched his room and his person. They found methamphetamine, marijuana, and a shotgun at the end of his bed. Miller pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government objected to the PSR’s recommended offense level, arguing Miller’s prior convictions for Tennessee drug delivery were “controlled substance offenses” under the U.S.S.G. The district court rejected the government’s argument, citing Sixth Circuit precedent (Havis), which held that “the least culpable conduct” proscribed by Tennessee’s drug delivery statute was “the attempted delivery of a controlled substance” and attempt crimes were not “controlled substance offenses” because they were omitted from the Guidelines’ text.The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that it has repeatedly acknowledged that “the parties’ assumption in Havis was wrong.” The parties in Havis were mistaken about the scope of Tennessee’s drug delivery statute. Evaluating the statute anew, the court concluded it is a controlled substance offense and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In the Automotive Parts Antitrust multi-district litigation, a subset of consumers and businesses (End-Payor Plaintiffs), alleged that automotive-part manufacturers fixed prices in violation of antitrust laws and that they paid elevated prices for defendants’ parts or purchased or leased vehicles containing those parts. After eight years of motions, negotiations, approval hearings, and objections, the district court granted final approval to settlements between End-Payor Plaintiffs and defendants. The settlement agreements, the class notices, and plans of allocation for each settlement agreement defined the classes of plaintiffs to include consumers and businesses that bought or leased certain qualifying vehicles or paid to replace certain qualifying vehicle parts during designated time periods. The class definitions did not include insurers, assignees, or subrogees.FRS, a third-party company that manages and files claims for clients, later submitted claims on behalf of insurers that purchased or leased eligible vehicles for company use (Fleet Vehicles) and claims that are based on its clients’ claimed “subrogation rights” to class members’ claims. The district court denied FRS’s motion to intervene as untimely. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. FRS offers no legitimate excuse for failing to intervene after End-Payor Plaintiffs repeatedly expressed their adverse position; the district court alerted FRS to a deficient filing. End-Payor Plaintiffs would have suffered delay-related prejudice had the district court allowed intervention. View "Automotive Parts Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

In 2012, an anonymous complaint cited dangerous conditions at KenAmerican’s Muhlenberg County, Kentucky underground coal mine. Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspectors arrived for an unannounced inspection and instructed the dispatcher, Holz, not to tell anyone that they were there. When called to the surface, a miner asked Holz, “do we have any company outside?” Holz responded, “yeah, I think there is.” The miner declined to identify himself. Believing that Holz made an illegal attempt to notify the miner about MSHA’s impending inspection, Sparks issued a citation under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 813(a). At a hearing, Sparks testified that he believed that the miner and Holz were using coded language. The ALJ ruled in KenAmerican’s favor; the Commission again reversed, finding that the ALJ abused his discretion in crediting Holz’s testimony over Sparks’s testimony. The ALJ then assessed an $18,742 penalty.The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, first rejecting an argument that the prohibition on advance notice does not apply to mine operators. Section 103(a) prohibits communication that provides advance notice of an MSHA inspection. It does not bar all communication about MSHA, nor prevent discussion of MSHA inspections after they occur. KenAmerican failed to demonstrate that there is a less restrictive rule that would effectively serve the government’s compelling interests, and section 103(a) is narrowly tailored to allow for meaningful inspections. View "KenAmerican Resources, Inc. v. United States Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

In 2001, Presbyterian, a nonprofit, organized a partnership to operate an affordable housing community under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), 26 U.S.C. 42, program. SunAmerica, the limited partner, contributed $8,747,378 in capital for 99.99% of the $11,606,890 LIHTC credit. The partnership agreement gave Presbyterian (for one year following the 15-year LIHTC Compliance Period) a right of first refusal (ROFR) to purchase the property for less than the fair market value and a unilateral option to purchase for fair market value under specific circumstances. Before the end of the Compliance Period, Presbyterian expressed its desire to acquire the Property. After the Compliance Period, the General Partners told SunAmerica that they had received a bona fide offer from Lockwood and that Presbyterian could exercise its ROFR. SunAmerica filed suit.The district court granted SunAmerica summary judgment, reasoning that the Lockwood offer did not constitute a bona fide offer because it was solicited for the purpose of triggering the ROFR. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. The ROFR provision must be interpreted in light of the LIHTC’s goals, including making it easier for nonprofits to regain ownership of the property and continue the availability of low-income housing. The district court erred in concluding that the evidence “overwhelming[ly]” showed that the General Partners did not intend to sell. View "SunAmerica Housing Fund 1050 v. Pathway of Pontiac, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2016, voters elected Kent to the Ohio House of Representatives; she became a member of the House Democratic Caucus. In 2018, she distributed a press release that accused the Columbus Chief of Police of wrongdoing; another press release accused the Department of failing to take child-abuse reports seriously. She attached a letter from the Ohio Legislative Black Caucus to the mayor. Kent submitted the documents to the Caucus for public distribution. Strahorn, then the Minority Leader, prohibited the communications team from posting the press release online and blocked any publication of the release because the attached letter included unauthorized signatures. Strahorn publicly stated that he would not “tolerate a member of the caucus using staff and tax-payer funded resources to fake, forge or fabricate any claim, request or document to further their own political interest or personal vendetta.” The Caucus voted to remove Kent, who lost access to policy aides, communications professionals, lawyers, and administrative staff. Kent was reelected. In 2019, Kent was blocked from attending a Democratic Caucus meeting. Kent did not run for reelection in 2020.Kent filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, alleging that she suffered retaliation for speech protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her suit, citing legislative immunity. The Caucus is inextricably bound up in the legislative process. “Whatever the lawmakers’ motives, principles of immunity fence [courts] out of the legislative sphere.” View "Kent v. Ohio House of Representatives" on Justia Law

Sunless sells tanning booths and spray tan solution under the “Mystic Tan” mark. Sunless claims that applying Mystic Tan solution in a Mystic Tan booth results in a “Mystic Tan Experience.” Palm Beach owns and franchises tanning salons. It owns several Mystic Tan-branded booths, and previously bought Mystic Tan-branded tanning solution to use in them; the booths were designed to accept only Mystic Tan solution. Palm Beach jury-rigged the booths so that they will operate with its own distinctly branded spray tan solution, unapproved by Sunless.Sunless sought a preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1125, arguing that the jury-rigging is likely to confuse consumers into believing they are getting a genuine “Mystic Tan Experience” when they are not. The district court denied the motion, finding that Sunless had failed to show, at this stage of the litigation, that Palm Beach’s salon customers would be confused. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Palm Beach never conceded that it sells a “Mystic Tan Experience” as an indivisible whole. Palm Beach argued there are two products: booths and solutions, each displaying its own distinct mark. Palm Beach continues to use the Mystic Tan-branded booths (which it owns outright), but neither uses nor claims to use Mystic Tan solutions. View "Sunless, Inc. v. Palm Beach Tan, Inc." on Justia Law

Groom tried to refill a prescription for a drug that treats opioid addiction. A technician informed Groom that he could not use a coupon. Groom grabbed the prescription and left without paying. The pharmacist followed him out, offering a lower-cost drug. Groom kept walking. The dispatcher alerted police officers that a man carrying a large knife had robbed the pharmacy and that the suspect, Groom, ran toward another store. Captain Russ and Officer Lee responded. Russ was familiar with Groom, having heard that Groom suffered from mental illness and had attempted suicide. They spotted Groom in a parking lot and exited their vehicles. Russ announced himself. Groompulled a large knife out of a sheath, saying: “Not today David.” Both officers drew their firearms. Groom ignored several commands to drop the knife and walked toward Russ, waving his knife, stopping 30 feet from Russ. He repeatedly told Russ to shoot him. Lee testified that, although Groom at first was “being very belligerent,” he stopped walking and eventually stopped waving the knife. After 20 seconds, Groom took another step. Russ shot Groom. He died from the wound.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the trial court granted Russ summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing “[p]recedent involving similar facts” putting this case “beyond the otherwise hazy border between excessive and acceptable force" to "provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.” View "Lee v. Russ" on Justia Law

In 2012, Rife moved from Kentucky to Cambodia, took a position as an elementary school teacher, began a relationship with a Cambodian woman, and adopted a young Cambodian girl. For six years, Rife lived and worked exclusively in Cambodia, obtaining annual “Extension of Stay” temporary visas through his U.S. passport. Rife did not visit the U.S. during that period but maintained a bank account and property in Kentucky. In 2018, Cambodian authorities investigated allegations that Rife had sexually assaulted his young female students. Rife’s school terminated his employment. He returned to Kentucky, where federal agents interviewed him. Rife eventually confessed to abusing two female students.Rife was charged with two counts of illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place, 18 U.S.C. 2423(c). The government did not allege that Rife offered anything of value in connection with his abuse of the girls; his “illicit sexual conduct” was non-commercial in nature. Rife argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to punish him for non-commercial acts of sexual abuse that occurred in a foreign country years after he had traveled there. The district court denied Rife’s motion to dismiss, passing over the foreign commerce issue but upholding section 2423(c) as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to implement the Optional Protocol. The court sentenced Rife to 252 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent; section 2423(c) as applied here was within Congress’s power to enact legislation implementing treaties. View "United States v. Rife" on Justia Law

Dorsa joined Miraca, which offers pathology services for healthcare providers. His employment agreement contained a binding arbitration clause. Dorsa claims that, during his employment, he observed Miraca giving monetary donations and free services to healthcare providers to induce pathology referrals, in violation of the AntiKickback Statute, the Stark Law, and the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1). Dorsa lodged internal complaints. Dorsa claims that Miraca fabricated a sexual harassment complaint against him. Dorsa filed a qui tam action against Miraca in September 2013. Days later, Miraca fired Dorsa, citing workplace harassment. Dorsa added an FCA retaliation claim.The government investigated the FCA claims and, in 2018, intervened for purposes of settlement, under which Miraca agreed to pay $63.5 million to resolve FCA claims. Miraca moved to dismiss the remaining retaliation claim, citing the arbitration clause, Dorsa argued that the clause did not apply because his claim was independent from the employment agreement. Miraca then asserted that the court did not have the authority to decide a threshold question of arbitrability. The district court ruled in favor of Dorsa. Miraca later moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of that motion. Miraca forfeited and waived its arguments about the district court’s authority to decide threshold questions of arbitrability and its ruling on the merits. Filing the motion to dismiss was inconsistent with Miraca’s later attempts to rely on the arbitration agreement. View "Dorsa v. Miraca Life Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law