Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lindke and his ex-girlfriend, Moeller, engaged in a child custody dispute. Moeller obtained a domestic personal protection order (PPO) against Lindke, alleging that Lindke beat her repeatedly, threatened her, and sent nude photos of her to her family, friends, and coworkers. Lindke violated that PPO twice. When it expired, Moeller sought a second PPO, claiming that Lindke continued to harass her online. Michigan state court judge Tomlinson granted another PPO. Moeller obtained sole custody, then sued Lindke in state court, alleging that his “continued harassment . . . on social media” violated the 2016 PPO. Judge Tomlinson found that most of Lindke’s online activity was constitutionally protected speech but that his act of “tagging” Moeller in a specific Facebook post violated the PPO.Rather than appeal that decision, Lindke sued Judge Tomlinson and Sheriff King in federal court, claiming that Michigan’s domestic PPO statute violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). Lindke has previously sued a state-court judge in federal court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that no subject-matter jurisdiction existed in the case against Judge Tomlinson and that Lindke failed to state a claim against Sheriff King. View "Lindke v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

As a full-time Wal-Mart associate, Chelf purchased basic life insurance, an optional Prudential life insurance policy, and short-term and long-term disability insurance; premiums were deducted from his paycheck. Chelf obtained a leave of absence; his last workday was October 17, 2014. When his short-term benefits had maxed out, he obtained long-term disability benefits. Chelf was not required to pay premiums for his disability benefits while he was receiving those benefits. Nonetheless, Wal-Mart continued to charge him those premiums. Chelf paid life insurance premium payments during his leave. Chelf died in April 2016.After denial of her claims for benefits, Chelf’s widow filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461 (ERISA). She alleged Wal-Mart incorrectly treated the life insurance coverage as terminated before Chelf’s death and did not inform him that the policy had terminated; assessed certain premiums in error; failed to inform Chelf of that error; failed to remit premiums to Prudential; failed to inform Chelf that his accrued paid time off could cover his premiums; and failed to notify him of his right to convert his term life insurance policy.The district court dismissed, finding that Chelf’s allegations fell “outside the scope of ERISA’s fiduciary requirements or administrative functions.” The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to allegations concerning the mishandling of premiums. The remaining allegations sought to impose liability for failure to disclose information that is not required to be disclosed under ERISA. View "Chelf v. Prudential Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Beginning in 2008-2009, three partners ran Florida medical clinics and hired Hofstetter, who became the office manager. One of the partners admitted that, over time, pain management dominated their business, so that the other practice areas dwindled, and the clinics eventually became “pill mills.” Clemons, Newman, and Womack were employed as nurse practitioners at these clinics. The clinics displayed numerous indicators of illegal opioid prescription practices, so the government investigated all four women. A jury convicted each defendant of maintaining at least one drug-involved premises. Hofstetter was also found guilty of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, distributing controlled substances, and money laundering.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. With respect to the drug-involved-premises convictions, the court rejected an argument that the underlying statute, 21 U.S.C. 856(a), was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them; the defendants’ conduct put them on notice that they violated the statute, regardless of any potential vagueness when applied to differently situated medical practitioners. Those convictions were supported by substantial evidence and the district court properly instructed the jury; the jury’s verdict was not inconsistent. With respect to Hofstetter’s convictions, the court upheld evidentiary rulings and jury instructions concerning the distribution charge. The court rejected claims of spoliation, Brady violations, and improper remarks during closing arguments. View "United States v. Newman" on Justia Law

Barber owns land adjacent to Mill Pond and the Mill Pond Dam (built 1836) in Springfield Township, Michigan. Parts of her property “run directly into the Mill Pond” and include parts of the pond itself. The Township and the County (Defendants) are jointly responsible for maintaining the Dam. In 2018, Oakland County conducted a study. The Township ultimately recommended removing the Dam. Defendants hired engineering firms and allocated money to the project. A local newspaper article titled “Mill Pond Dam to be Removed Next Year,” ran in March 2021. Barber alleges that removing the Dam, among other things, will decrease her property value, interfere with her riparian rights, deprive her of her right to use and enjoy her land, physically damage her property, “will likely pollute, impair and destroy natural resources, including . . . surface water, wetlands, and wildlife and natural habitat,” and “may cause flooding and property damage.” She sought to enjoin the Dam-removal project, alleging that it would constitute a taking under the federal and Michigan constitutions and a trespass under Michigan law.The district court granted the Defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding Barber’s claims ripe, and that she has standing to sue. She plausibly alleges that she faces a risk of “concrete” and “particularized” injuries. Plaintiffs may sue for injunctive relief even before a physical taking has happened. View "Barber v. Charter Township of Springfield, Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2014-2017, Carlson and his friends, using private chartered planes, trafficked about 1,680 kilograms of cocaine, 2,050 pounds of marijuana, 40 pounds of methamphetamine, and between $500 million and $1 billion of cash in drug proceeds, for the Sinaloa Mexican drug cartel. Carlson got caught and turned in his coconspirators, including Matthews and Wallace.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Matthews’ convictions for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), conspiracy to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, sections 846, 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), and the 60-month below-Guidelines sentence imposed on Wallace (one of the pilots) for his guilty plea on one count. Matthews’ convictions were based on sufficient evidence; the district court did not err in providing a deliberate-ignorance jury instruction. Matthews’ confrontation rights were not violated after the court allowed Carlson to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination as to certain questions on cross-examination and she was not prejudiced by a variance between the indictment and proof at trial on conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Battle Creek Officers Ziegler and Kerschen stopped LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante's passenger, Robbins, exited the vehicle. As Kerschen dealt with Robbins, LaPlante exited the vehicle with an open beer and did not comply with orders to put the beer down and stop moving. Ziegler eventually pulled LaPlante to the ground in a prone position. The officers struggled to handcuff LaPlante. It took approximately 90 seconds to effectuate LaPlante’s arrest. Ziegler notified dispatch that LaPlante was experiencing pain and loosened the handcuffs at LaPlante’s request. LaPlante was transported to a hospital before being taken to jail. LaPlante had dislocated his elbow and sustained a small avulsion fracture. LaPlante pleaded guilty to felony DUI and a high misdemeanor charge of attempted obstruction of a police officer. LaPlante had an outstanding felony warrant for absconding parole and the officers recovered marijuana from LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante subsequently sought medical support for a variety of injuries.In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force action, LaPlante alleged that Ziegler threw him to the ground and Kerschen failed to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Ziegler and reversed the denial of qualified immunity as to Kerschen. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LaPlante resisted arrest; the use of a takedown maneuver, in some scenarios, can amount to excessive force. Kerschen did not have enough time to perceive what was going on and intervene. View "LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

The Rice family planned to annex their 80-acre farm into the Village of Johnstown and have it zoned for residential development. The Johnstown Planning and Zoning Commission rejected the Rice application at the preliminary stage. The family claimed that Johnstown had unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Commission, violating its due process rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The district court held that because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in adjacent Monroe Township, the family lacked standing to bring its claim and granted Johnstown summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Whatever the merits of the claim, the family has standing to bring it. Because the Johnstown ordinance has since been amended, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Only the claim for damages survives. Establishing standing at the summary judgment stage requires “a factual showing of perceptible harm.” The family alleges that because of Johnstown’s unconstitutional delegation to the Commission, its zoning application was subjected to a standardless and conclusive review by allegedly private parties who acted for arbitrary reasons; they have shown a procedural injury. While a procedural right alone is insufficient to create Article III standing, the family’s procedural injury is tied to its economic interest in developing its property. Without the Commission’s approval, their development plans could not proceed; the family is no bystander. View "Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio" on Justia Law

Attorney Romanzi referred a personal injury case to his employer, the Fieger law firm; meanwhile, creditors were winning default judgments against Romanzi. The case settled for $11.9 million; about $3.55 million was awarded as attorney’s fees after Romanzi quit the firm. Romanzi’s employment at the firm entitled him to a third of the fees. Before Romanzi could claim his due, his creditors forced him into Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against the firm to recover Romanzi’s third of the settlement fees for the bankruptcy estate. The parties agreed to arbitration.Two of the three arbitrators found for the trustee in a single-paragraph decision that was not "reasoned" to the firm’s satisfaction. The district court remanded for clarification rather than vacating the award. On remand, the panel asked for submissions from both parties, which the trustee provided; the firm refused to participate. The arbitrators’ subsequent supplemental award, approved by the district court, awarded the trustee the fees plus interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the arbitrators’ original award was compromised according to at least one factor allowing vacation under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 10(a); that the act of remanding and the powers exercised by the arbitrators on remand violated the doctrine of functus officio; and that the supplemental award should have been vacated under the section 10(a) factors. The district court’s and panel’s actions fall under the clarification exception to functus officio. View "In re: Romanzi" on Justia Law

Gould responded to an online advertisement that offered to allow someone to “engage in a live online session with an 8-year-old in exchange for child pornography.” That advertisement included a photo of a minor. Gould responded, offering to send money. Gould was speaking to a real individual, but law enforcement apprehended that person. Gould then began speaking with an undercover DHS agent who had assumed the arrested person’s online identity. The agent offered to let “his” minor daughter have sex with Gould, explaining that he would “video” the encounter. Gould sent the undercover agent links to child pornography, and Gould’s password to a cloud account with thousands of images of minors, including toddlers. Gould flew to Tennessee to meet the "daughter" and presented a blood test indicating he had no sexually-transmitted diseases. After he was arrested, Gould admitted that he responded to the advertisement and confirmed that he saw the images of the 8-year-old in that advertisement.Gould was charged with Enticing a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Gould entered a plea agreement with no appellate waiver. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Gould’s 210-month sentence (the bottom of the Guidelines range). A FaceTime call constitutes a “visual depiction” for purposes of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(c)(1) and responding to an advertisement “involved” “offering or seeking by notice or advertisement” under that Guidelines provision. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law

King worked for the Hospital as a registered nurse since 2002; her asthma began worsening around 2013-2014. During particularly bad asthma flare-ups, King called in sick. The Hospital offers up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 29 U.S.C. 2601, to employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours in the past year. Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, employees may seek up to one year of unpaid medical leave even if they are not eligible for FMLA leave. A third-party administrator, FMLASource, handles all leave requests. King received several warnings for attendance issues. King called FMLASource and was told she was ineligible because she had not worked enough hours. The parties dispute whether the call constituted an inquiry or an application King tried to correct the error in calculating her hours through human resources and kept calling in sick. The Hospital terminated her employment. Later, FMLASource retroactively approved King for non-FMLA leave.King sued, alleging interference and retaliation under the FMLA and failure to accommodate and disability discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112. The district court granted the Hospital summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Accepting King’s version of events, the Hospital did not give her all of the benefits of non-FMLA leave and, therefore, failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. The Hospital did not establish that King’s absence, while she tried to obtain leave, caused undue hardship. View "King v. Steward Trumbull Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law