Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lawyers brought claims against schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400. After the claims failed, the schools sought their attorney’s fees from the lawyers under the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision. The School Districts alleged that, during the administrative process, the attorneys presented sloppy pleadings, asserted factually inaccurate or legally irrelevant allegations, and needlessly prolonged the proceedings. The lawyers asked their insurer, Wesco, to pay the fees. Wesco refused on the ground that the requested attorney’s fees fell within the insurance policy’s exclusion for “sanctions.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wesco. The IDEA makes attorney misconduct a prerequisite to a fee award against a party’s lawyer, so the policy exclusion applied. The court noted that the legal community routinely describes an attorney’s fees award as a “sanction” when a court grants it because of abusive litigation tactics. View "Wesco Insurance Co. v. Roderick Linton Belfance, LLP" on Justia Law

VanDemark owns the Used Car Supermarket, which sells cars from two lots in Amelia, Ohio. In 2013-2014, VanDemark funneled away his customers’ down payments and left them off his tax returns. He used this stashed-away cash to finance the mortgage on his mansion.The Sixth Circuit affirmed VanDemark’s convictions for helping prepare false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2), structuring payments, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3), and making false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The down payments were taxable upon receipt, not, as VanDemark argued, when customers purchased the cars after leasing them. With respect to his missing 2013 personal return, the court stated that a defendant is guilty even if he helps prepare, without presenting, the fraudulent return. View "United States v. VanDemark" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed an appeal by Antonio, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, from an order denying his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay of removal pending a decision on the merits of his petition, 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(3)(B). "Everyone agrees" that Antonio will likely be tortured if he is removed. The record indicates that Antonio, who was involved with serious drug trafficking gangs that might have control over the Dominican Republic police forces, will not be protected by the government from the torture to which he will be subject upon his return. Antonio has made a substantial showing that one of his torturers in the past was a police officer. In light of his strong showing of irreparable harm, Antonio’s arguments present a sufficient likelihood of success to weigh in favor of granting a stay pending an appeal on the merits. A stay pending a merits decision is necessary to preserve any value in hearing his case on the merits. View "Antonio v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ziesel entered a bank wearing a mask and a hooded sweatshirt, approached the tellers, and said “give me all the money.” At some point, Ziesel told the tellers that “no one was going to get hurt.” Before leaving with the money, Ziesel told the tellers to get on the floor. Ziesel did not have a weapon, nor did he imply he had a weapon. Ziesel pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for “physical restraint” under USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), resulting in an imprisonment range of 46-57 months. Without that enhancement, the range would have been 37-46 months.The judge noted that application of the enhancement was “a close question” but overruled Ziesel’s objection, stating: the simple communication “This is a bank robbery” connotes a certain degree of potential harm, whether a weapon is shown or not, and certainly, control is exercised by the robber ... when you are standing upright, and then to be told to go into prone position by somebody who appears able to exercise substantial force over you …. They believed that you posed a clear and present danger. The Sixth Circuit reversed Ziesel’s 46-month sentence. Neither the plain language of the Guidelines nor precedent supports application of the enhancement under thesed facts. View "United States v. Ziesel" on Justia Law

Brown’s company, TME, owned the House of Blues recording studio in Memphis and leased a studio to Falls. Hanover issued separate insurance policies to TME and Falls. Intruders vandalized and burgled the studio, and committed arson. Hanover made advance payments to TME and Falls, then discovered that Brown had submitted false receipts and had been the target of several similar arson incidents. Hanover sued Brown, TME, and Falls, seeking recovery of the prepaid funds and a declaratory judgment. A jury returned a verdict against Brown but found that Falls was entitled to recover the full insurance coverage. Hanover unsuccessfully moved to overturn that verdict because TME was named as an additional insured on Falls’s policy and his policy voided coverage if “you or any other insured” misrepresented a material fact. Meanwhile, Falls sought monetary damages and declaratory relief against Brown and TME in Tennessee state court.Hanover filed an interpleader complaint against Brown, TME, and Falls in federal court, requesting that the court find the insurance award void under Tennessee public policy or, alternatively, determine to whom Hanover should pay the award. The district court enjoined Falls’s state court action, citing the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Act allows an injunction only for necessity, not simply for efficiency. Because the district court proceedings were not in rem, an injunction was not “necessary” to aid the district court’s jurisdiction. View "Hanover American Insurance Co. v. Tattooed Millionaire Entertainment, LLC" on Justia Law

Freed created a Facebook profile, limited to his “friends.” Eventually, he exceeded Facebook’s 5,000-friend limit on profiles and converted his profile to a “page,” which has unlimited “followers.” His page was public, anyone could “follow” it; for the page category, Freed chose “public figure.” Freed was appointed Port Huron’s city manager. He updated his Facebook page to reflect that title. In the “About” section, he described himself as “Daddy ... Husband ... and City Manager, Chief Administrative Officer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.” Freed listed the Port Huron website as his page’s website, the city’s general email as his page’s contact information, and the City Hall address as his page’s address. Freed shared photos of family events, visits to local community events, and posts about administrative directives he issued as city manager. When the Covid-19 pandemic hit, he posted policies he initiated for Port Huron and news articles on public-health measures and statistics. Lindke responded with criticism. Freed deleted those comments and eventually “blocked” Lindke from the page.Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C 1983, arguing that Freed violated his First Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Freed. Freed’s Facebook activity was not state action. The page neither derives from the duties of his office nor depends on his state authority. View "Lindke v. Freed" on Justia Law

Bell was charged with distribution of a controlled substance that resulted in death, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl, section 841(a)(1). Bell pled guilty to a lesser included, but not indicted, offense--distribution of a controlled substance. The district court accepted the guilty plea but ultimately rejected the plea agreement. The court then sentenced Bell to 30 months’ imprisonment—a sentence approximately 82 percent lower than that contemplated under the plea agreement. The government appealed, alleging a right to withdraw its consent to a plea to a lesser included, but not indicted, offense when a district court rejects a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government’s arguments. Rule 11 contemplates that the rejection of a plea agreement allows the defendant, not the prosecutor, to withdraw or persist in the plea. Where, as here, the defendant pleads to all charges against him and chooses not to withdraw his pleas, there are no remaining charges for which the government may proceed to trial, and a subsequent re-indictment for the greater included offense implicates double jeopardy concerns under the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Alcoa Officers arrested an obviously inebriated Colson following a report that, while driving her SUV, she chased her 10-year-old son in a field and then crashed in a ditch, and transported her to a hospital. Colson then withdrew her consent. to a blood draw. Colson defied repeated orders to get back into the cruiser. During the struggle, an officer's knee touched Colson’s knee, followed by an audible “pop.” Colson started screaming “my fucking knee” but continued to resist. Once Colson was in the cruiser, officers called a supervisor, then took Colson to the jail where a nurse would perform the blood draw. Colson never asked for medical care. At the jail, Colson exited the vehicle and walked inside, with no indication that she was injured. As she was frisked, Colson fell to the ground and said “my fucking knee.” Jail nurse Russell asked Colson to perform various motions with the injured leg and compared Colson’s knees, commented “I don’t see no swelling,” and then left. A week later, Colson was diagnosed with a torn ACL, a strained LCL, and a small avulsion fracture of the fibular head. Colson pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, reckless endangerment, and DUI.Colson sued; only a claim for failure to provide medical care for her knee injury survived. The Sixth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. View "Colson v. City of Alcoa" on Justia Law

Maddux and his wife, Carman trafficked cigarettes in a way that bypassed governmental taxing authorities. They were indicted; Maddux pleaded guilty and Carman was convicted in 2016. Before their sentencing hearings, the government sought two multi-million-dollar money judgments against each of them—forfeiture orders representing the gross proceeds of their scheme. At sentencing, however, the district court failed to enter preliminary forfeiture orders, nor did it include the money judgments as “part of the sentence[s]” announced, 28 U.S.C. 2461(c); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B), (b)(4)(A)–(B). Years after their sentences were affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, the district court imposed the money judgments sought, justifying its late-issued money judgments by calling Rule 32.2(b)’s procedural requirements time-related directives—deadlines that may be violated so long as the defendant receives adequate notice and a hearing.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rule 32.2(b) is not a time-related directive. Its text, context, and purpose indicated that it is a mandatory claims-processing rule—one that ensures forfeiture is resolved fairly and fully before becoming final, which preserves judicial resources by avoiding wasteful appeals over avoidable errors. Once a criminal sentence is imposed, the judgment is final, both as to what it includes and what it lacks. If the government wishes to “enlarge [the] sentence” with forfeiture omitted from the sentence, it must timely appeal. View "United States v. Maddux" on Justia Law

Smith worked for CommonSpirit and participated in CommonSpirit’s defined-contribution 401(k) plan. CommonSpirit's administrative committee administers the plan, which serves more than 105,000 people and manages more than $3 billion in assets. It offers 28 different funds in which employees may invest their contributions, including several index funds with management fees as low as 0.02% and several actively managed funds with management fees as high as 0.82%. The actively managed Fidelity Freedom Funds are the default investment if employees do not choose to place their contributions in a different fund instead; they are “target date” funds and managers change the allocation of the underlying investments over time. Other target-date funds have lower costs. Smith sued CommonSpirit and the administrative committee under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) for breach of fiduciary duty. 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2), seeking to represent a proposed class of similarly situated plan participants and claiming that the plan should have offered a different mix of fund options. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her suit. ERISA does not give courts a broad license to second-guess the investment decisions of retirement plans. It supplies a cause of action only when retirement plan administrators breach a fiduciary duty by, for example, offering imprudent investment options. Smith has not alleged facts from which a jury could plausibly infer that CommonSpirit breached any such duty. View "Smith v. CommonSpirit Health" on Justia Law