Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Based on convictions for cocaine possession and facilitating second-degree murder Bailey was incarcerated until 2005. In 2008, Bailey was convicted for the possession and distribution of crack and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1). Because Bailey had a prior felony drug conviction, he was subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment for the (b)(1)(A) offenses. Bailey was also classified as a career offender, resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. The court imposed a 360-month sentence. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of cocaine base necessary to trigger certain statutory penalties; the 2018 First Step Act allows courts to apply the change retroactively.Bailey sought a reduced sentence, citing his efforts at rehabilitation, his continuous employment during his incarceration, and his incident-free record in custody. The district court denied Bailey’s request, finding that the First Step Act did not affect Bailey’s guideline range as a career offender and that his sentence was already at the bottom of his Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court had the authority to reduce Bailey’s sentence, but neither Act required it to do so; not reducing his sentence was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The Adamses want to build a home on their Michigan property, but their neighbors, the Schulers, believe that their plans violate a restrictive covenant running with the lakefront land. A state court granted the Schulers a preliminary injunction stopping the construction. After the court’s order, the Adamses filed a third-party complaint against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which had granted a permit that authorized the clearing of over 12,000 square feet of wetlands and the construction of the larger home.The Corps removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), the federal-officer removal statute. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the Adamses’ appeal from the state court injunction for lack of appellate jurisdiction, stating that it has jurisdiction only over injunction orders “of” district courts, not state courts. The court noted that a district court may, after removal, modify or dissolve a state court’s injunction if the injunction conflicts with federal standards; the district court’s action would be reviewable. View "Schuler v. Adams" on Justia Law

IRS Notice 2007-83, entitled “Abusive Trust Arrangements Utilizing Cash Value Life Insurance Policies Purportedly to Provide Welfare Benefits” designates certain employee-benefit plans featuring cash-value life insurance policies as listed “tax avoidance" transactions. A cash-value life insurance policy combines life insurance coverage with a cash-value investment account. The IRS believes these transactions run the risk of allowing small business owners to receive cash and other property from the business “on a tax-favored basis.” The regulation requires reporting of transactions involving cash-value life insurance policies connected to employee-benefit plans.Taxpayers claimed that the IRS skipped the notice-and-comment process before promulgating this legislative rule as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551, 553–59, 701–06. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and found the regulation invalid. The Notice was a “legislative rule,” with the “force and effect of law,” not a policy statement or interpretation. Congress did not expressly exempt the IRS from the APA’s requirements. View "Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Doctors Hills, Alqsous, Elrawy, and Al-Madani were convicted of offenses connected to their employment at a publicly-owned Cuyahoga County hospital, MetroHealth, which receives federal funds. Hills solicited and received bribes from Alqsous, Al-Madani, and Elrawy in exchange for favorable treatment with respect to their employment. Alqsous, Al-Madani, and Sayegh solicited and/or accepted bribes from applicants to MetroHealth’s dental residency program. Hills and an unindicted business partner operated OHE to provide training for dentists with discipline or performance issues. Some of OHE’s business was accomplished using MetroHealth personnel, equipment, or facilities without permission or compensation. Hills received and Alqsous and Al-Madani offered or paid kickbacks for referrals to private clinics. There were recordings of discussions concerning warning a resident to stay quiet, preparing 1099 forms to hide the kickbacks, and telling a grand jury witness to “forget” seeing envelopes of cash. Hills also arranged for his attorney to receive extensive dental work without charge and assigned MetroHealth residents to work at a private clinic.The district court imposed aggregate terms of imprisonment of: 188 months (Hills), 151 months (Alqsous), and 121 months (Al-Madani). They were also ordered to pay restitution, some jointly and severally, in amounts approaching $1 million. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sentences, the loss calculation, the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, the denial of a motion to suppress, and other procedural rulings. View "United States v. Alqsous" on Justia Law

Linda’s daughter, Johnnie Moser, fled to a neighbor’s house one night after Johnnie’s boyfriend (James) physically assaulted Johnnie. The neighbor called the police. Officers Davis and Parton were at the neighbor’s house when Linda approached, visibly upset and worried about her daughter. Parton observed James following behind Linda and moved to arrest him. Linda began shouting that Parton had the wrong man and touched Parton’s arm, despite having been ordered, four times, to sit down. Davis stepped onto the porch, grabbed Linda, took her to the ground, and then pinned her, resulting in a fractured hip and femur. Body-camera footage indicates that Davis could have kneeled on Linda for up to 23 seconds. Linda pleaded guilty to interfering with the arrest of another. Linda sued Davis and the City of Etowah. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Linda, Davis violated her clearly established right to be free from injury-threatening physical force when not actively resisting an arrest. Minimal physical contact does not automatically rise to the level of active resistance. Linda’s subsequent conviction is therefore not determinative of whether Moser actively resisted Parton’s attempt to arrest Ferguson. View "Moser v. Etowah Police Department" on Justia Law

UT instructor Tyger subjected Wamer, a UT student, to inappropriate touching, comments, and text messages and made inappropriate comments in class. Wamer contacted a UT faculty member; each submitted a complaint to UT’s Title IX Office. Wamer alleges that she was afraid of seeing Tyger on campus and of retribution and that UT stated it would pursue the investigation even if she did not come in for an interview. Three weeks later, UT closed its investigation, taking no action. About five months after the harassment began, a more senior faculty member reported Wamer’s allegations. UT then placed Tyger on paid leave and banned him from campus. Wamer alleges that Tyger then attempted to smear Wamer’s reputation. UT investigators found that Tyger had engaged in sexual misconduct.Wamer sued under Title IX, claiming that UT was deliberately indifferent to the initial reports of sexual harassment, which “unreasonably interfered with Wamer’s participation in and enjoyment of the benefits of UT’s educational programs and activities.” The district court dismissed, applying the elements of a deliberate-indifference claim used in cases of student-on-student harassment and finding Wamer did not allege that UT’s actions post-notice resulted in harassment or made her more vulnerable to further harassment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. A plaintiff can satisfy the causation requirement by showing that following the school’s unreasonable response, the plaintiff experienced an additional instance of harassment or that objectively reasonable fear of further harassment caused the plaintiff to take specific reasonable actions to avoid harassment, which deprived the plaintiff of educational opportunities available to other students. View "Wamer v. University of Toledo" on Justia Law

Deputy Johns shot and killed Palma after responding to a 9-1-1 call at Palma's home. Johns knew that there was a dispute about the television and that Palma suffered from mental health issues. Arriving, Johns saw Palma standing outside with his hands in his pockets. Palma did not respond to greetings but began walking toward Johns. Johns repeatedly told Palma to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. Palma did not respond. Johns radioed for backup with “intermediate” priority. Johns warned Palma he would use his taser. Palma did not stop. Johns tased him twice before Palma fell down. As Palma got up, Johns tased him again. Palma walked toward Johns, still not responding to commands. Johns kept retreating; he believed that Palma’s intention was to “perhaps obtain [his] weapon.” Johns pointed his gun at Palma, who did not stop. Johns first shot Palma’s leg. Palma continued to walk toward Johns, who continued shooting until Palma "no longer came towards [him].” Palma never spoke and never reached toward Johns. Palma was unarmed. The encounter lasted eight-10 minutes.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment of qualified immunity. There are genuine disputes of material fact; a reasonable jury could find that Johns used excessive force when he shot at Palma. In cases involving mental health crises, officers should use the least force necessary to subdue the person. View "Palma v. Johns" on Justia Law

Khaytekov, a citizen of Uzbekistan, came to the U.S. in 2001 and overstayed his visa for many years. In removal proceedings, Khaytekov sought asylum. alleging that he had been persecuted “by nationalist[s] and fascist[s]” in Uzbekistan because of his religion, nationality, and political opinion and feared “physical attacks” if he returned. While his removal proceedings were pending, Khaytekov married a U.S. citizen, withdrew his request for asylum, and applied to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident, which required him to show that he was “admissible” 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). An IJ found Khaytekov inadmissible because he had filed a “completely fabricated” asylum application. Khaytekov later admitted that the application contained false information; he had not been persecuted in Uzbekistan. Khaytekov’s subsequent request for a hardship waiver was denied because Khaytekov had knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application, which rendered him “permanently ineligible” for any benefits under the immigration laws, section 1158(d)(6). The BIA upheld the decision.The Sixth Circuit previously denied relief, rejecting a “Pereira” claim in which Khaytekov alleged that he received a defective notice to appear. Following a remand from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit again denied Khaytekov’s petition. To be “permanently ineligible,” an asylum seeker who files a frivolous application must have received adequate notice “of the consequences” of doing so, section 1158(d)(4)(A), (d)(6). The standard asylum application form contains a warning about frivolous applications. The IJ did not give Khaytekov the customary verbal secondary warning, but nothing in section 1158(d) requires an additional warning. View "Khaytekov v. Garland" on Justia Law

After more than a decade of employment, a seizure disorder ended Dr. Autran’s career as a P&G research scientist. Autran received total-disability benefits under P&G’s Health and Long-Term Disability Plan in 2012-2018. The Committee terminated those benefits after concluding that Autran no longer qualified as totally disabled within the meaning of the Plan, and awarded him his remaining 19 weeks of partial disability benefits. Autran sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). He died while the suit was pending.The Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of the Committee. Because the Plan delegates discretionary authority to the Committee to decide benefits claims, the court applied the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious test. The Committee had rational reasons to depart from the earlier total-disability finding. Among other new evidence, a doctor who performed many objective tests on Autran for over six hours found no basis to conclude that he suffered from a debilitating condition. Thorough medical opinions gave the Committee a firm foundation to conclude that Autran did not, in the Plan’s words, suffer from a “mental or physical condition” that the “medical profession” would consider “totally disabling.” View "Autran v. P&G Health & Long Term Disability Benefit Plan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this consolidated appeal are businesses that operate Michigan-based restaurants and entertainment venues that made claims against their commercial property insurance policies, held by Cincinnati Insurance, based on COVID-19 losses. These policies contained three provisions under which Cincinnati Insurance would compensate a policyholder only if the policyholder suffered direct physical loss or damage to its covered property, or if loss to a non-policy holder’s property prevented access to a policyholder’s property. Cincinnati Insurance denied their claims, indicating that neither the presence of the COVID-19 virus nor shutdown orders issued by the Michigan governor constituted physical loss or damage.The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, finding that, under Michigan law, “direct physical loss” to property covers only tangible harm or damage to property, rather than mere loss of use. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Michigan Supreme Court would agree with its interpretation of the law–that COVID-19-related shutdown orders do not constitute “direct physical loss or direct physical damage” to property because “a loss of use simply is not the same as a physical loss.” The plaintiffs alleged “not tangible, physical losses, but economic losses.” View "Dino Drop, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law