Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Harrington, the founder of a nonprofit corporation that engages in anti-abortion protests, sought to demonstrate at the Democratic Party’s presidential-primary debates in Detroit in 2019. In response to security concerns, the Detroit Police Department imposed and enforced several measures that impeded the group’s speech. A “restricted area” blocked access to the debate venue’s immediate vicinity. Protestors were divided into “right-leaning” and “left-leaning” camps and were barred from commingling. Harrington was briefly detained after a confrontation with police. Harrington and his group eventually abandoned the site. They filed suit, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause.The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants—the city and three individual officers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The restricted area satisfies intermediate scrutiny; to hold that law enforcement could not establish a restricted area around such an event without a known, specific threat would make it essentially impossible to guard against terroristic violence. The plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine dispute that the defendants’ asserted security rationale was somehow pretextual or non-existent. Noting that the protestors were not “similarly situated” to other groups, the court rejected equal protection claims. The court further noted that the property that the group was asked to leave was privately owned; when officers began to place Harrington in cuffs, they reasonably believed he was committing criminal trespass. View "Reform America v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Detroit police officers apprehended a fleeing suspect who had run across several yards, including White’s yard. Believing that the suspect had disposed of a weapon nearby, officers called in a canine unit to search. Bodycam and security camera footage captured the events that followed. Officer Cherry arrived with her trained canine, Roky. The White family had two dogs outside, White’s daughter, Mi-Chol, grabbed Chino, a pit bull, to put him inside but he escaped and ran to the front yard. Mi-Chol went inside to grab a leash. As Officer Cherry and Roky reached the corner of the adjoining yard, Chino lurched through the fence’s vertical spires and bit down on Roky’s snout. Roky yelped. Cherry turned and saw Roky trapped up against the fence with his nose in Chino’s mouth. Cherry tugged at Roky’s leash and yelled at Chino to “let go.” Chino began “thrashing.” Unable to free Roky and afraid for the dog’s life, Cherry shot Chino. Six seconds passed between Chino’s attack and Cherry’s shot. Chino died from the shot. The Whites sued. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Officer Cherry acted reasonably. View "White v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 2005, Adolphe was found murdered in front of his apartment building. Adolphe and Carr had been dating. Carr, age 16, was arrested and entered an Alford plea in 2008 to second-degree manslaughter, conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. She was paroled in 2009 and discharged in 2018. In 2019, Kentucky Governor Bevin granted Carr “the full and unconditional pardon she has requested.”A year later, Carr sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants fabricated evidence, coerced false statements, and withheld exculpatory evidence. The district court dismissed Carr’s complaint, finding that her section 1983 claims were not cognizable under the Supreme Court’s “Heck” decision. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While a full pardon does not always indicate that the individual is innocent, Heck did not impose a prerequisite of innocence to seek relief under section 1983; a full pardon in Kentucky removes all legal consequences so that a plaintiff can proceed with her section 1983 claims. View "Carr v. Louisville-Jefferson County" on Justia Law

BDC lent $800,000 to a company owned by the Suggs, who personally guaranteed the loan and secured it with a $200,000 mortgage on their Shaker Heights home. Bank of America and MidFirst Bank held more senior mortgages on the home. The Suggs’ home suffered serious water damage from a burst pipe in 2014. State Farm insured the home for up to $352,130. State Farm denied their claim on the ground that the Suggs had failed to heat their home at a temperature required by their policy.The Suggs sued State Farm in an Ohio state court and sued all three lenders with mortgages on their home, explaining that these lenders “have an interest in the policy proceeds” because the policy entitled them to payment even if State Farm had a valid defense against the Suggs. BDC did not appear. After the case settled, the state court found that BDC had no right to the proceeds. BDC did not seek relief in the state court but filed a federal suit alleging that State Farm, its lawyers, and the Suggs’ lawyers colluded to defraud it. The district court dismissed the suit under Ohio’s claim-preclusion law. The SIxth Circuit affirmed. BDC cannot meet the demanding test required to attack the state court’s judgment in this collateral fashion. View "Business Development Corporation of South Carolina v. Rutter & Russin, LLC" on Justia Law

The Hopkinses kept cattle on their Marshall County, Tennessee farm. Detective Nichols received a complaint about the treatment of those cattle, drove by, and observed one dead cow and others that did not appear to be in good health. Nichols returned with Tennessee Department of Agriculture Veterinarian Johnson. Wearing his gun and badge, Nichols knocked and. according to Mrs. Hopkins, “demanded that [she] escort them to see the cattle,” refusing to wait until Mr. Hopkins returned or until she fed her children. Johnson completed a Livestock Welfare Examination, as required by law, noting that the cattle were not in reasonable health, that they lacked access to appropriate water, food, or shelter, and that major disease issues were present; she determined that probable cause for animal cruelty existed. Nichols returned to the Hopkins’s farm several times and discovered a sinkhole containing the remains of multiple cattle. Nichols and Sheriff Lamb eventually seized the cattle without a warrant and initiated criminal proceedings. The cattle were sold.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion for qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Forced compliance with orders is a Fourth Amendment seizure; words that compel compliance with orders to exit a house constitute a seizure. While the open fields doctrine allowed the officers to lawfully search the farm, it did not give them lawful access to seize the cattle; they lacked exigent circumstances when they seized the cattle. View "Hopkins v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Born in 1967, Carroll was raised by a single mother near Albert Barber's property. Albert’s younger sister was Arlene. Albert died in 1998. . In 2000, Arlene informed the Geauga County Probate Court that she had lost Albert’s will and possessed only an unsigned copy. She filed an application to probate the will. The court found that all interested parties were given appropriate notice and admitted the will. The court distributed most of the estate— land worth $232,000 and slightly over $30,000 in other assets—to Arlene under the will.Carroll claims that in 2018, Arlene told her that Albert was Carroll’s father. Carrol sued, claiming that Arlene submitted an invalid version of Albert’s will to an Ohio probate court and that she should have inherited Albert’s estate. The district court concluded that she lacked standing and that the probate exception to federal jurisdiction barred it from hearing her claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing her lack of standing. Carroll has not plausibly pleaded that the Barbers’ misconduct injured her, that they left her any worse off. Even given an opportunity to contest Albert’s will, Carroll would not have been eligible to contest Albert’s will under Ohio law when he died. View "Carroll v. Hill" on Justia Law

NPF sued a franchisee, SY Dawgs, which operated a fast-pitch softball team in the National Pro Fastpitch League, alleging violation of a non-competition agreement. Two-and-a-half years of discovery disputes and repeated sanctions motions followed. The district court imposed sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 against NPF’s counsel for failure to produce documents and its engagement in other discovery abuses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award of sanctions against the individual attorneys who represented NPF, but vacated the award against their law firm. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 does not allow for law-firm sanctions where, as here, the firm was not a party to the lawsuit. View "NPF Franchising, LLC v. SY Dawgs, LLC" on Justia Law

Ohio’s Necessaries Statute permits creditors to collect certain debts from one spouse incurred by the other.. Seeking to recover outstanding legal defense bills owed by Snyder’s husband, who had been convicted of embezzlement, Finley filed a debt-collection lawsuit against Finley and her husband, asserting joint liability. Snyder contends that the lawsuit was “objectively baseless” and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e.The Sixth Circuit reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Finley. The Ohio Supreme Court has clearly held that the Necessaries Statute does not impose joint liability on a married person for the debts of a spouse. A creditor must first seek satisfaction of its claim from the assets of the spouse who incurred the debt and must show that the debtor-spouse is “unable to pay” for a non-debtor spouse to be liable under the Necessaries Statute. Finley’s claims against the husband remain pending in the Ohio state trial court. View "Snyder v. Finley & Co., L.P.A." on Justia Law

After a judicial foreclosure proceeding for delinquent property taxes, the county generally sells the land at a public auction and pays any proceeds above the delinquency amount to the owner upon demand. Ohio's 2008 land-bank transfer procedure for abandoned property permits counties to bring foreclosure proceedings in the County Board of Revision rather than in court and authorizes counties to transfer the land to landbanks rather than sell it at auctions, “free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.” The state forgives any tax delinquency; it makes no difference whether the tax delinquency exceeds the property’s fair market value. The Board of Revision must provide notice to landowners and the county must run a title search. Owners may transfer a case from the Board to a court. After the Board’s foreclosure decision, owners have 28 days to pay the delinquency and recover their land. They also may file an appeal in a court of general jurisdiction. Owners cannot obtain the excess equity in the property after the land bank receives it.After Tarrify’s vacant property was transferred to a landbank, Tarrify sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the transfers constituted takings without just compensation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Tarrify’s motion to certify a class of Cuyahoga County landowners who purportedly suffered similar injuries. While the claimants share a common legal theory—that the targeted Ohio law does not permit them to capture equity in their properties after the county transfers them to a land bank—they do not have a cognizable common theory for measuring the value in each property at the time of transfer. View "Tarrify Properties, LLC v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

Bell asked why Officer Korkis pulled him over. Korkis responded that Bell first needed to provide his driver’s license, registration, and car insurance and that more officers were on their way. Bell claims the officers forcefully removed him from his vehicle, despite Bell volunteering again to exit on his own. Dash-cam videos show Korkis and Bell arguing for three minutes. Korkis asked for Bell’s information about 20 times, then reached into the window to unlock the door. A physical struggle ensued, not fully visible in the videos. Officers eventually pried open the door and told Bell to get on the ground; he repeatedly refused. Officers wrestled him to the pavement, where he refused to comply. An officer warned Bell about the taser. Bell still did not put his hands behind his back. An officer tased him.Bell sued the officers (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming they violated the Fourth Amendment’s bar against excessive force. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part after holding that the video footage could be considered at the motion-to-dismiss stage to determine whether allegations in the complaint were implausible. The court dismissed the appeal with respect to claims concerning the officers removing Bell from his car, noting that factual issues remain. With respect to claims concerning the tasing, Bell had not shown that the officers violated his clearly established rights. View "Bell v. City of Southfield" on Justia Law