Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Chattanooga police executed a search warrant at the home of Johnson’s friend, searched Johnson’s person, and did not find any drugs on Johnson’s person. Officers found a revolver lying in a box, digital scales, 0.9 grams of crack cocaine, and 110 pills. Johnson admitted to possessing the firearm and the crack cocaine. He was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. 2; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The court sentenced Johnson to 360 months’ imprisonment, reasoning that he was a career offender and rejecting Johnson’s objection “based on the disparity between crack cocaine and other drugs.”The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018. While the sentence was procedurally reasonable, it is substantively unreasonable. The court unduly weighed the nature of the offense, Johnson’s criminal history and characteristics, and the need to deter future criminal conduct and protect the public, while inadequately considering unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Johnson pleaded no contest in Michigan state court to drug crimes. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, at the bottom of his guidelines range. Johnson later sought state post-conviction relief, seeking to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective, and seeking resentencing because the judge based his sentence on a fact not admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson sought to compel his trial counsel to produce his case files and sit for an interview with Johnson’s new counsel. That interview apparently never took place, but Johnson secured an affidavit from his trial counsel. Johnson did not file that affidavit (or any other evidence) and did not ask for additional discovery, for a date for an evidentiary hearing, or for a ruling on his motion.Johnson filed a federal habeas petition, acknowledging that the state court had not yet ruled on his motion but asserting that special circumstances existed due to “the inordinate delay.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Any delay was attributable to Johnson, particularly his failure to request a state court evidentiary hearing. Johnson’s case is not the extreme instance in which circumstances beyond his control left him “incapable” of remedying the constitutional violations he alleges. View "Johnson v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Russell was a passenger in a car that the East Cleveland Police stopped and searched. They found two handguns, which resulted in a felon-in-possession charge for Russell. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Russell entered a conditional guilty plea.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. To assert a Fourth Amendment claim, Russell must have “standing” to challenge the search; normally a car passenger without a possessory interest in the car lacks such standing. The government failed to object to Russell’s lack of standing before the district court and raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Fourth Amendment standing, unlike Article III standing, is not jurisdictional and can be forfeited or waived. The government’s failure to raise the argument below was a forfeiture, not a waiver because the government took no steps to “expressly abandon” its objection. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the government can raise a forfeited argument for the first time on appeal and prevail if it satisfies the plain-error inquiry under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The government satisfied that test. Even if the government did not object, Russell had at least some burden to establish standing. Allowing Russell to benefit from the exclusionary remedy would lead to a rightfully diminished view of the judicial proceeding. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

Tiwari and Sapkota sought to establish a home healthcare company that would focus on serving Nepali-speaking individuals in the Louisville area. Kentucky restricts the number of such companies that may serve each county. When the Commonwealth denied their certificate-of-need application, Tiwari and Sapkota filed suit, claiming that the regulation violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to earn a living, serving only the illegitimate end of protecting incumbent home healthcare companies from competition, and lacking a rational basis.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, upholding the requirement. Economic regulations, even those affecting an individual’s liberty to work in a given area, are subject to “rational basis” review. While expressing skepticism about certificate-of-need laws, the court concluded that a legislator could plausibly believe that the regulation has a rational connection to increasing cost efficiency, improving quality of care, and improving the healthcare infrastructure in place. View "Tiwari v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

Lexington solicited bids for relocating its city offices, including one from CRM, a local real estate development firm. Wellman was an executive at CRM. While the committee deliberated on the CRM proposal, two City Council members began receiving campaign contributions from CRM employees. These actions prompted an investigation under 18 U.S.C. 666, which prohibits “federal funds bribery.” Agents suspected a straw contribution scheme arranged by Wellman and funded by CRM. Wellman falsified documents and cajoled his straw contributors to lie. Prosecutors opened a separate grand jury inquiry into potential obstruction charges against Wellman.Wellman was convicted on 11 federal charges, including obstruction of an official proceeding and aiding and abetting numerous associates to make false statements to the FBI, and was sentenced to a year and a day in prison with a $10,000 fine. The district court applied a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 but ultimately varied downward based on Wellman’s character and service to the community. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and Wellman’s argument that, at most, he obstructed an investigation into violations of Kentucky campaign finance laws, not federal bribery. A reasonable jury could conclude that Wellman corruptly obstructed, influenced, or impeded a federal grand jury proceeding. View "United States v. Wellman" on Justia Law

After working underground in coal mines for three decades, Casey developed pneumoconiosis (black-lung disease). His widow, Mabel, sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901–44. It took the Department of Labor 17 years to deny her claims. During this time, the claims bounced back and forth between an ALJ and the Benefits Review Board. In the last appeal, the Board also rejected one of Mabel’s main arguments, citing “law-of-the-case,” without reaching the merits. The Department of Labor then delayed things further by filing an incomplete and disorganized administrative record in the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the government’s actions “perhaps could be described as poor customer service, they do not show any reversible legal error.” The Board could lawfully invoke the discretionary law-of-the-case doctrine to avoid reexamining an issue on which it had affirmed the ALJ years before. The credibility findings concerning the conflicting medical opinions concerning whether Casey was totally disabled or had only “moderate impairment” pass muster under the deferential “substantial evidence” test. View "Samons v. National Mines Corp." on Justia Law

The noncitizens, victims of grave crimes, cooperated with law enforcement. They applied for U-visas, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), 1101(a)(15)(U), and authorization to work; two sought derivative U-visas and work authorization for family members. They have waited years for USCIS to adjudicate their applications and remain unable to obtain lawful employment, to visit family members who live abroad, or to attain deferred-action status to protect them from removal. They filed suit. While an appeal was pending, USCIS announced a new program for persons with pending U-visa applications: the “Bona Fide Determination Process,” (BFDP).The Sixth Circuit held that the BFDP did not moot any part of the case. Federal courts are not precluded from reviewing claims that USCIS unreasonably delayed placing principal petitioners on the U-visa waitlist. USCIS is required by 8 U.S.C. 1184(p)(6) and the BFDP to decide whether a U-visa application is “bona fide” before the agency can decide whether principal petitioners and qualifying family members may receive Bona Fide Determination Employment Authorization Documents, so 5 U.S.C. 706(1) permits the federal courts to hasten an unduly delayed determination.The court subsequently held that the plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts that the delayed waitlist determinations have harmed their health and welfare. Plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaints should they wish to challenge any delayed “bona fide” determinations. View "Garcia v. United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Mills and his ex-wife struggled with drug addictions and neglected their four children. The children’s maternal grandparents obtained custody of the children. Around 10:00 p.m. on June 29, 2016, Mills showed up unannounced at their home, picked up his two-year-old daughter and carried her outside, then drove away with the child. The grandparents called the police. Mills ran out of gas, abandoned his vehicle, and walked up the road carrying his daughter. Officers arrived and ordered Mills to stop, but he ignored their commands. Mills fell and released the girl. Officers engaged in a five-minute struggle with Mills, using a taser, striking Mills with a flashlight, kneeing Mills in the face and head, and repeatedly hitting Mills with a baton. An officer eventually shot Mills twice, killing him. According to the officers and bystanders Mills had threatened to harm the officers, fought them with “super-human” strength, and charged at them. One bystander later claimed that the officers brutally beat Mills although Mills did not resist and that they could have easily handcuffed him.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the officers. The testimonial dispute instead raises a classic jury question. Even accepting the testimony, however, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their initial use of force to recover the child, and the local government is entitled to summary judgment on the federal claim. View "Gambrel v. Knox County" on Justia Law

Wood wore a shirt bearing the words “Fuck the Police” to the county fair. According to Wood, police officers ordered him to leave and escorted him from the fairgrounds because of his shirt. While leaving, Wood made several coarse insults directed to the police and the fairground’s administrator. The officers then arrested Wood for disorderly conduct. After the charges were dismissed, Wood filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, alleging false arrest and retaliation. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity on the false arrest claim and insufficient evidence of retaliation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Wood’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. With respect to the retaliation claim, the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the officers were motivated to surround Wood and require him to leave in part because of his shirt. While Wood’s speech was profane, the circumstances did not create a situation where violence was likely to result. Neither proximity nor Wood’s demeanor and volume provided probable cause for arrest. Because there was no probable cause to arrest Wood for disorderly conduct, and because Wood’s right to be free from arrest was clearly established, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Wood v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Washington then age 15, claimed that on January 30, 1989, he encountered Chinn, whom he had met a year earlier and only knew by the nickname, “Tony.” According to Washington, Tony had a gun. He and Tony robbed two men, fatally shooting one. A few days later, police arrested Washington, who confessed and named “Tony” as the killer but could not provide Tony’s last name. Washington helped police prepare a composite sketch, which a newspaper printed. Police arrested Chinn and conducted a lineup for Washington and four other witnesses. Three were able to identify Chinn. Chinn’s classmate and instructor testified that Chinn was present for a midterm examination on the night of the murder, and his classmate testified that Chinn rode home on a bus with her. Chinn’s mother testified that he was at home by 9:30 p.m. and stayed home the entire evening. Some witnesses also considered the shooter to be taller than Chinn.Convicted, Chinn was sentenced to death. The district court denied Chinn’s 2002 petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the prosecution suppressed evidence, in violation of “Brady,” that Washington suffered mental disabilities; the court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial testimony concerning Chinn’s alleged visit to a law office before his arrest; and Chinn was denied his right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer on remand and was sentenced to death without a valid jury recommendation. View "Chinn v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution" on Justia Law