Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officers executing a warrant for Cooper’s arrest on firearms and narcotics charges learned that Cooper was a high-ranking gang member and saw a Facebook photo of Cooper holding a Glock handgun. At the home of Cooper’s girlfriend, Walton, Officer Fox knocked on the door. When Walton answered, Fox saw Cooper inside. Concerned about spooking Cooper, Fox showed Walton a photograph of another individual and asked whether he could come inside to look for the individual. According to Fox, Walton agreed. Fox arrested Cooper while other officers rushed in to conduct a protective sweep. Officer Jensen noticed a lump in the mattress, flipped it, and discovered the Glock handgun depicted in Cooper’s Facebook post. Fox then presented rights-waiver and consent-to-search forms. Walton initialed lines stating that she was consenting freely. Officers then conducted a thorough search but recovered only the hat seen on Facebook.Charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Cooper unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court largely engaged in an attenuation analysis focused on whether Walton’s subsequent consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal protective sweep. That was the wrong analysis The gun was seized during the initial unlawful search, so inevitable discovery is the correct analysis. On remand, the court should focus on whether officers would have sought (and obtained) Walton’s consent to search If the illegal protective sweep had never happened and whether the ensuing consent search would have led to the gun. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Ammex operates a duty-free gas station in Wayne County, Michigan, near the bridge to Canada, but positioned “beyond the exit point” for domestic commerce established by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In 2012, the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD) sought to enforce an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule requiring Wayne County gas stations to dispense low-pressure gasoline in the summer. MDARD, in conjunction with the EPA, implemented this rule to bring Southeast Michigan’s ozone levels into compliance with the Clean Air Act.Because of its unique location and certain sales privileges granted to it by U.S. customs law, Ammex resisted efforts to apply the rule to its gasoline sales. In 2019, the Sixth Circuit determined that MDARD was enforcing federal regulatory law, and was not in violation of the Supremacy Clause or dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Ammex then argued that the environmental rule, properly construed, did not apply to Ammex and that the customs statute giving Ammex the right to sell duty-free goods supersedes the environmental regulation and renders it unenforceable against Ammex. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims. the Summer Fuel Law unambiguously applies to Ammex and does not impact Ammex’s ability to sell gas duty-free. View "Ammex, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Before the end of the 2019–20 academic year, MSU had several Division I sports teams: men’s baseball, basketball, cross country, football, golf, ice hockey, soccer, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, and wrestling; and women’s basketball, cross country, field hockey, golf, gymnastics, rowing, soccer, softball, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, and volleyball. In October 2020, MSU announced it would no longer sponsor the men’s and women’s swimming-and-diving teams after the 2020–21 school year. During the 2019–20 school year, the teams had 29 men and 33 women. Women student-athletes sought a preliminary injunction to prevent MSU from eliminating the women’s swimming-and-diving team, arguing that MSU failed to provide women with substantially proportionate athletic opportunities, as required by Title IX. In the 2018–19 school year, 48.8% of undergraduate students were male and 51.2% were female; and, in the 2019–20 school year, 49.1% were male and 50.9% were female.The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their Title IX claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated, first finding that MSU did not inflate its number of women athletes. The correct inquiry focuses on the number of participation opportunities, not the gap as a percentage of the athletic program. . A school may fail to achieve substantial proportionality even if its participation gap is only a small percentage of the size of its athletic program View "Balow v. Michigan State University" on Justia Law

In 1985, Manning was convicted of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Manning was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Manning’s first and second habeas petitions. Since then, Manning has filed multiple unsuccessful motions for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition.Manning, pro se, again sought an order authorizing a second or successive habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit again rejected his petition. Manning did not make a prima facie showing that his petition relied on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Manning cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held that defendants “under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes” cannot be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Manning sought to extend Miller’s new rule to persons who (like Manning) were 18 years old at the time of their offense. Miller unambiguously applies to only those who were under 18 at the time of their offense; for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, an individual’s eighteenth birthday marks a bright line. View "In re: Manning" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate domestic violence, witness tampering, and assault, 18 U.S.C. 13, 113(a)(8), 113(a)(4), 2261(a), 1512(b). Based on his criminal history, he was sentenced to 864 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Johnson did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The district court erred in allowing Johnson to proceed pro se. During the hearing on defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court asked Johnson if he understood the ramifications of his decision to represent himself without knowledge of the law but a review of the record indicates that the court’s questions did not reflect that the requirements of the Bench Book were met. The judge commented that he had already asked the “taxpayers to pay for two of the finest lawyers in the district to represent [him].” Instead of confirming that Johnson knew the maximum potential sentences, as required by the model inquiry, the court downplayed his potential sentence. Stemming from that error, the court likewise should have directed Johnson’s counsel to file subpoenas and witness lists on Johnson’s behalf. The district court did not adequately apply the section 3553(a) factors when determining Johnson's sentence. The court ordered assignment to a different judge on remand. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Albright was severely injured in a car accident and used opioids to manage her chronic pain. She became addicted to opioids. Seeking treatment for her addiction, Albright turned to Dr. Christensen to administer a one-week in-patient detoxification program. Christensen started Albright with a patient-controlled analgesia pump to supply her with hydromorphone, a pain reliever; he also gave Albright phenobarbital, which depresses the central nervous system. Christensen terminated these treatments after Albright became “anxious and tearful” while the two discussed the treatment. Changing tack, Christensen twice administered Suboxone—an opioid-replacement medication—to Albright. On both occasions, Albright immediately developed muscle spasms, pain, contortions, restlessness, and feelings of temporary paralysis. She refused further treatment and was discharged. Albright still suffers shaking, muscle spasms, and emotional distress.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Albright’s suit against Christensen. The suit sounds in medical malpractice rather than negligence. Michigan’s affidavit-of-merit and pre-suit-notice rules for medical-malpractice actions conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and do not apply in diversity cases in federal court. Federal Rule 3 requires only the filing of a complaint to commence an action—nothing more. The district court mistakenly invoked Erie and applied the pre-suit-notice rule in Albright’s case. View "Albright v. Christensen" on Justia Law

McKinnie, a recidivist drug dealer, was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, based on a career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. He had a 2011 crack cocaine conspiracy conviction and an Ohio attempted trafficking conviction. The enhancement increased McKinnie’s Guidelines range from 60-71 months to 151-188 months. After McKinnie’s sentence became final, the Sixth Circuit decided in “Havis,” that an attempted crime is not a predicate “controlled substance offense” under section 4B1.1. McKinnie then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 The district court denied McKinnie’s petition, reasoning that error in calculating the advisory Guidelines range, such as a Havis error, is not cognizable on collateral review, where relief is available only when a sentence violates the Constitution or a federal statute.McKinnie separately moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the Havis error, his obesity and hypertension, and the risk of contracting COVID-19 as “extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Havis error was not, as a matter of law, an extraordinary and compelling reason. McKinnie’s vaccination against COVID-19 mitigated his COVID-19 risk; his obesity and hypertension were insufficient to grant relief. His potential rehabilitation was not an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. View "United States v. McKinnie" on Justia Law

In subsequently-consolidated cases, various relators sued Community Health Systems (CHS) and others, alleging that CHS submitted fraudulent claims for medically unnecessary hospital admissions to federal public-health insurance programs, such as Medicaid and Medicare. Relators’ counsel performed thousands of hours of work in assisting the government with the investigation. Seven years ago, the relators, the government, and CHS entered into a settlement agreement, disposing of the underlying claims. The settlement agreement left undecided the allocation of attorney fees under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(d). After settling with all the relators, CHS now claims that the relators are not entitled to attorney fees because the FCA’s first-to-file rule and public-disclosure bar precluded their claims. The district court agreed with CHS.The Sixth Circuit reversed. We CHS cannot now rely on these separate provisions of the FCA as a last-ditch effort to deny attorney fees to the relators. After the global settlement reached pursuant to a collaborative process between the government and relators’ counsel, there is no reason to apply the first-to-file and public-disclosure rules. The court remanded with instructions to the district court to determine an award of reasonable attorney fees to relators’ counsel. View "Cook-Reska v. Community Health Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

An undercover Kentucky police detective used a computer program to search for individuals who were illegally trading and downloading child pornography on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, and, on several occasions in May-June 2017, downloaded child pornography from a computer with an IP address located in Independence, Kentucky. Officers used the information to obtain a warrant to search Michael Clark’s residence.In April 2018, officers executed the search warrant. Clark and others were home. The officers seized multiple computers, interviewed Clark, and recorded the interview. They told Clark that he was not under arrest, and they did not give him Miranda warnings. Clark stated that the MacBook laptop was his work computer. The three seized computers were sent to a forensic examiner. An examination of the MacBook computer found 295 images and 62 videos of child pornography, a user profile named “Mike,” and evidence suggesting the former presence of additional illegal content and filesharing programs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Clark’s conviction on five counts of knowingly distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and 192-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the interstate-commerce and “knowing distribution” elements of the conviction, to the admission of the recorded interrogation, to the admission of evidence concerning old computers found in Clark’s home, and to evidence of Clark’s computer knowledge. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Tempo’s convictions and 30-year sentence for drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(C), 846; drug possession and distribution, section 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and drug possession and distribution near a school, sections 841, 860. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that he was sentenced under an unconstitutionally vague sentencing provision.The court upheld Sadler’s convictions for drug conspiracy, drug possession and distribution near a school, felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), conspiracy to obstruct justice (section 1512(k)), and witness tampering, section 1512(a)(2)(A). The court held that jury instructions correctly stated the causation standard under 841(b)(1)(C), where serious bodily injury or death results from the use of the drugs distributed. The court vacated Sadler’s sentence and remanded for a new trial on the sole question of whether Sadler was within the chain of distribution as required before imposing an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) based on the overdoses. View "United States v. Sadler" on Justia Law