Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mizori pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine; his PSR recommended a finding that Mizori had acted as a manager or supervisor within a conspiracy. A police investigator and an informant testified that Mizori had played a leadership role in the conspiracy. Mizori did not call any witnesses. The district court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.Mizori sought a sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel’s failure to offer any witnesses at the sentencing hearing amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. Mizori attached supporting affidavits from three co-conspirators. Almost four years later the district court denied Mizori’s motion. Mizori, then confined in a high-security Special Housing Unit, “SHU,” had 60 days— until September 15, 2019—to file a notice of appeal but had no access to stamps or a law library. He was confined in the SHU until September 29. Days later, Mizori timely moved, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal.The district court denied his motion, stating that “Mizori has not met his burden of establishing excusable neglect" but did not address whether Mizori had shown “good cause” for an extension, Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), the ground on which Mizori sought relief. The Sixth Circuit held that Mizori does not need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of his Rule 4(a)(5) motion and that the district court abused its discretion by denying that motion. View "Mizori v. United States" on Justia Law

Tomei went to Parkwest Hospital after he injured his foot and leg. He is deaf and communicates using American Sign Language. He asked for an interpreter. Parkwest never provided one. Medical staff gave him an antibiotic and ibuprofen and sent him home. Days later he went to the emergency room, where doctors determined he had blood clots in his leg. Parkwest offered only to connect Tomei with an off-site interpreter via webcam. The connection was so glitchy that Tomei could not effectively communicate. After surgery, Tomei could not tell the medical staff that he was still experiencing pain. Tomei was sent home. Tomei’s family doctor sent him to the University of Tennessee Medical Center, where interpreters helped him through a second surgery. Ultimately, doctors amputated nearly one-third of his leg. About 15 months after he was first denied an interpreter, Tomei sued under section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).The Sixth Circuit rejected an argument that the suit was untimely under Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits. Unless federal law provides otherwise, a civil action “arising under” a federal statute enacted after December 1, 1990, is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). Tomei brought his discrimination claim under the ACA—not the Rehabilitation Act. No statute or regulation explicitly sets a statute of limitations for violating the ACA’s discrimination bar. View "Tomei v. Parkwest Medical Center" on Justia Law

Guzman-Torralva, a 35-year-old Mexican citizen, illegally entered the United States at age 19. He lives in New Jersey and has two children who are U.S. citizens. In 2018, ICE detained him as an alien present without being admitted or paroled. Attorney Krajenke represented Guzman-Torralva at his first hearing, at which he conceded removability; a second hearing was set for November 28, Guzman-Torralva was released on bond. The second hearing was rescheduled. The updated notice again warned Guzman-Torralva that failing to appear could result in an order of removal being issued in his absence. Guzman-Torralva then hired a new attorney, Fuentes, who filed an appearance and moved to change the venue of the hearing. His filings were rejected because Fuentes failed to provide proof of service on Krajenke and to properly sign and paginate the filings. Neither Guzman-Torralva, Krajenke, nor Fuentes appeared at the hearing,Guzman-Torralva was ordered removed in absentia. Guzman-Torralva then hired a third attorney and moved to reopen his removal order, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The immigration court denied the motion because Guzman-Torralva had not filed a bar complaint against Fuentes nor adequately explained the failure to do so. The BIA denied his appeal for the same reason. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Precedent requires more than a statement that the alien is “not interested in filing a formal complaint.” View "Guzman-Torralva v. Garland" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Kentucky temporarily (for about six weeks) barred healthcare corporations like Estes, which operates two dental clinics from providing nonemergency care. Estes lost substantial income as a result. Estes’ property insurance policy required Cincinnati Insurance to pay Estes for lost business income that results from a “direct” “physical loss” to its dental offices.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Estes’ suit against Cincinnati, noting that circuit courts have uniformly interpreted this “physical loss” language not to cover similar pandemic-related claims under the laws of many other states. The court concluded that Kentucky’s highest court would agree with those decisions. The phrase “physical loss” would convey to the “average person” that a property owner has been tangibly deprived of the property or that the property has been tangibly destroyed. COVID-19 and the government shutdown orders caused only intangible or economic harm. View "Estes v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In Ohio, to place an advertising billboard on a highway, you must apply for a permit from the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT). Under the “compliance rule,” ODOT will not process a permit application if the applicant has outstanding fees, changes his billboard without prior approval from ODOT, or maintains an illegal advertising billboard. ODOT put Kenjoh’s billboard permits on hold under the compliance rule, alleging that Kenjoh was maintaining an illegal billboard.Kenjoh sued, asserting that the compliance rule was an unconstitutional prior restraint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims for damages and injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated. While the case was pending on appeal, the Ohio legislature amended a key definition in the statute, which changes how the regulation applies. Before the amendment, a person needed a permit from ODOT to erect a billboard that was “designed, intended, or used to advertise.” Now, a person needs a permit if he will be paid for placing a message on the billboard, regardless of the message. The court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to an ODOT supervisor on a claim for damages despite the amendment, based on the law as it existed at the time of the official action. View "Kenjoh Outdoor, LLC v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

El-Khalil, a podiatrist, joined the Oakwood Taylor medical staff in 2008. During his time there, El-Khalil alleges that he saw Oakwood employees submit fraudulent Medicare claims, which he reported to the federal government. In 2015, Oakwood Taylor’s Medical Executive Committee (MEC) rejected El-Khalil’s application to renew his staff privileges. El-Khalil alleges that the MEC did so in retaliation for his whistleblowing. Pursuant to Oakwood’s Medical Staff Bylaws, El-Khalil commenced a series of administrative appeals. On September 22, 2016, Oakwood’s Joint Conference Committee, which had the authority to issue a final, non-appealable decision, voted to affirm the denial of El-Khalil’s staff privileges. On September 27, the Committee sent El-Khalil written notice of its decision.On September 27, 2019, El-Khalil sued Oakwood for violating the whistleblower provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as untimely under a three-year limitations period, which commenced when Oakwood decided not to renew El-Khalil’s medical-staff privileges, rather than when it notified El-Khalil of that decision five days later. Section 3730(h) contains no notice requirement. As soon as Oakwood “discriminated against” El-Khalil “because of” his FCA-protected conduct, he had a ripe “cause of action triggering the limitations period,” View "El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Polselli underpaid his federal taxes. The IRS has made formal assessments against him; the outstanding balance is over $2 million. While investigating assets to satisfy those liabilities, IRS Officer Bryant learned that Remo used entities to shield assets and that Remo “may have access to and use of” bank accounts held in the name of his wife, Hanna. Bryant served a summons on a bank, seeking account and financial records of Hanna “concerning” Remo. Remo was a client of the law firm Abraham & Rose; Bryant served the firm with a summons. The firm asserted attorney-client privilege and represented that it did not retain any of the requested documents. Bryant then issued identical summonses against banks, seeking any financial records of Abraham & Rose and a related law firm, “concerning” Remo. Bryant did not notify Hanna or the law firms of the bank summonses.After receiving notices from their banks, Hanna and the law firms petitioned to quash the summonses, alleging that the IRS failed properly to notify them under 26 U.S.C. 7609(a). The district court and Sixth Circuit agreed with the IRS that 7609(b)(2) and (h) waived sovereign immunity only for parties entitled to notice of the summonses and because the IRS was seeking the bank records “in aid of the collection” of Remo’s assessed liability, there was no entitlement to notice under 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). The district court, therefore, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Polselli v. United States Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law

The 1949 Federal Property and Administrative Services Act is intended to facilitate the “economical and efficient” purchase of goods and services on behalf of the federal government, 40 U.S.C. 101. In November 2021, the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force, under the supposed auspices of the Act, issued a “Guidance” mandating that employees of federal contractors in “covered contract[s]” with the federal government become fully vaccinated against COVID-19. Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee and Ohio sheriffs’ offices sued, alleging that the Property Act does not authorize the mandate, that the mandate violates other federal statutes, and that its intrusion upon traditional state prerogatives raises federalism and Tenth Amendment concerns.The district court enjoined enforcement of the mandate throughout the three states and denied the federal government’s request to stay the injunction pending appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied relief. The government has established none of the showings required to obtain a stay. The government is unlikely to succeed on claims that the plaintiffs lack standing and the plaintiffs likely have a cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court noted the plaintiff’s concerns about disruptions to the supply chain if workers leave their jobs rather than receiving vaccinations and also stated: Given that expansive scope of the Guidance, the interpretive trouble is not figuring out who’s “covered”; the difficult issue is understanding who, based on the Guidance’s definition of “covered,” could possibly not be covered. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Biden" on Justia Law

Greene was booked into the Crawford County Jail after having his bond revoked for attending a plea hearing while intoxicated. Over the next four days, Greene began hallucinating and exhibiting other symptoms of delirium tremens, a life-threatening complication of alcohol withdrawal that the Sixth Circuit has recognized as an objectively serious medical need. Greene ultimately suffered acute respiratory failure. He died four days later. Crawford County officials did not provide any medical care to Greene before his incapacitation but only sought a mental health evaluation from a Community Mental Health Authority and purportedly relied on that evaluation in deciding not to seek medical assistance.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to Greene’s medical need and that Crawford County is liable for maintaining an unconstitutional policy of not providing medical care to inmates suffering from delirium tremens, the district court denied qualified immunity at summary judgment to some county officials and denied Crawford County summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. Greene experienced a clearly established life-threatening medical condition for at least two days. The defendants did not provide any medical assistance during that time. The court dismissed Crawford County’s interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Greene v. Crawford County" on Justia Law

Long and the Piercys operated a Tennessee quarry. Their agreement was silent as to whether their division of “profit” would be based on gross profit after payment of a royalty or net profit after payment of the royalty plus other costs. Based on the division of labor and respective contributions, Long believed that the four individuals should receive equal shares of the gross profit. When Long complained, the Piercys padlocked him off the property and threatened to call the sheriff, then stopped paying Long. A state court chancellor found that Long was entitled to the difference between what the Piercys had paid him and what Long should have received ($151,670.87) but rejected Long’s claim for lost anticipated profits, declining to find that the Piercys breached the partnership agreement but assessing costs against the Piercys.The Piercys sought Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief. Long initiated adversary proceedings, seeking a declaration that the judgment was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) for debts incurred by embezzlement, or through defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The Sixth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court and district court. Long’s state-court judgment may be declared nondischargeable if Long can produce evidence of wrongful intent. The state-court judgment is unclear as to the basis for its relief and does not preclude a finding of fraud. Under the Tennessee Revised Uniform Partnership Act, partners owe each other fiduciary duties. View "Long v. Piercy" on Justia Law