Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, an anonymous complaint cited dangerous conditions at KenAmerican’s Muhlenberg County, Kentucky underground coal mine. Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspectors arrived for an unannounced inspection and instructed the dispatcher, Holz, not to tell anyone that they were there. When called to the surface, a miner asked Holz, “do we have any company outside?” Holz responded, “yeah, I think there is.” The miner declined to identify himself. Believing that Holz made an illegal attempt to notify the miner about MSHA’s impending inspection, Sparks issued a citation under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 813(a). At a hearing, Sparks testified that he believed that the miner and Holz were using coded language. The ALJ ruled in KenAmerican’s favor; the Commission again reversed, finding that the ALJ abused his discretion in crediting Holz’s testimony over Sparks’s testimony. The ALJ then assessed an $18,742 penalty.The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, first rejecting an argument that the prohibition on advance notice does not apply to mine operators. Section 103(a) prohibits communication that provides advance notice of an MSHA inspection. It does not bar all communication about MSHA, nor prevent discussion of MSHA inspections after they occur. KenAmerican failed to demonstrate that there is a less restrictive rule that would effectively serve the government’s compelling interests, and section 103(a) is narrowly tailored to allow for meaningful inspections. View "KenAmerican Resources, Inc. v. United States Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

In 2001, Presbyterian, a nonprofit, organized a partnership to operate an affordable housing community under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), 26 U.S.C. 42, program. SunAmerica, the limited partner, contributed $8,747,378 in capital for 99.99% of the $11,606,890 LIHTC credit. The partnership agreement gave Presbyterian (for one year following the 15-year LIHTC Compliance Period) a right of first refusal (ROFR) to purchase the property for less than the fair market value and a unilateral option to purchase for fair market value under specific circumstances. Before the end of the Compliance Period, Presbyterian expressed its desire to acquire the Property. After the Compliance Period, the General Partners told SunAmerica that they had received a bona fide offer from Lockwood and that Presbyterian could exercise its ROFR. SunAmerica filed suit.The district court granted SunAmerica summary judgment, reasoning that the Lockwood offer did not constitute a bona fide offer because it was solicited for the purpose of triggering the ROFR. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. The ROFR provision must be interpreted in light of the LIHTC’s goals, including making it easier for nonprofits to regain ownership of the property and continue the availability of low-income housing. The district court erred in concluding that the evidence “overwhelming[ly]” showed that the General Partners did not intend to sell. View "SunAmerica Housing Fund 1050 v. Pathway of Pontiac, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2016, voters elected Kent to the Ohio House of Representatives; she became a member of the House Democratic Caucus. In 2018, she distributed a press release that accused the Columbus Chief of Police of wrongdoing; another press release accused the Department of failing to take child-abuse reports seriously. She attached a letter from the Ohio Legislative Black Caucus to the mayor. Kent submitted the documents to the Caucus for public distribution. Strahorn, then the Minority Leader, prohibited the communications team from posting the press release online and blocked any publication of the release because the attached letter included unauthorized signatures. Strahorn publicly stated that he would not “tolerate a member of the caucus using staff and tax-payer funded resources to fake, forge or fabricate any claim, request or document to further their own political interest or personal vendetta.” The Caucus voted to remove Kent, who lost access to policy aides, communications professionals, lawyers, and administrative staff. Kent was reelected. In 2019, Kent was blocked from attending a Democratic Caucus meeting. Kent did not run for reelection in 2020.Kent filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, alleging that she suffered retaliation for speech protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her suit, citing legislative immunity. The Caucus is inextricably bound up in the legislative process. “Whatever the lawmakers’ motives, principles of immunity fence [courts] out of the legislative sphere.” View "Kent v. Ohio House of Representatives" on Justia Law

Sunless sells tanning booths and spray tan solution under the “Mystic Tan” mark. Sunless claims that applying Mystic Tan solution in a Mystic Tan booth results in a “Mystic Tan Experience.” Palm Beach owns and franchises tanning salons. It owns several Mystic Tan-branded booths, and previously bought Mystic Tan-branded tanning solution to use in them; the booths were designed to accept only Mystic Tan solution. Palm Beach jury-rigged the booths so that they will operate with its own distinctly branded spray tan solution, unapproved by Sunless.Sunless sought a preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1125, arguing that the jury-rigging is likely to confuse consumers into believing they are getting a genuine “Mystic Tan Experience” when they are not. The district court denied the motion, finding that Sunless had failed to show, at this stage of the litigation, that Palm Beach’s salon customers would be confused. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Palm Beach never conceded that it sells a “Mystic Tan Experience” as an indivisible whole. Palm Beach argued there are two products: booths and solutions, each displaying its own distinct mark. Palm Beach continues to use the Mystic Tan-branded booths (which it owns outright), but neither uses nor claims to use Mystic Tan solutions. View "Sunless, Inc. v. Palm Beach Tan, Inc." on Justia Law

Groom tried to refill a prescription for a drug that treats opioid addiction. A technician informed Groom that he could not use a coupon. Groom grabbed the prescription and left without paying. The pharmacist followed him out, offering a lower-cost drug. Groom kept walking. The dispatcher alerted police officers that a man carrying a large knife had robbed the pharmacy and that the suspect, Groom, ran toward another store. Captain Russ and Officer Lee responded. Russ was familiar with Groom, having heard that Groom suffered from mental illness and had attempted suicide. They spotted Groom in a parking lot and exited their vehicles. Russ announced himself. Groompulled a large knife out of a sheath, saying: “Not today David.” Both officers drew their firearms. Groom ignored several commands to drop the knife and walked toward Russ, waving his knife, stopping 30 feet from Russ. He repeatedly told Russ to shoot him. Lee testified that, although Groom at first was “being very belligerent,” he stopped walking and eventually stopped waving the knife. After 20 seconds, Groom took another step. Russ shot Groom. He died from the wound.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the trial court granted Russ summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing “[p]recedent involving similar facts” putting this case “beyond the otherwise hazy border between excessive and acceptable force" to "provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.” View "Lee v. Russ" on Justia Law

In 2012, Rife moved from Kentucky to Cambodia, took a position as an elementary school teacher, began a relationship with a Cambodian woman, and adopted a young Cambodian girl. For six years, Rife lived and worked exclusively in Cambodia, obtaining annual “Extension of Stay” temporary visas through his U.S. passport. Rife did not visit the U.S. during that period but maintained a bank account and property in Kentucky. In 2018, Cambodian authorities investigated allegations that Rife had sexually assaulted his young female students. Rife’s school terminated his employment. He returned to Kentucky, where federal agents interviewed him. Rife eventually confessed to abusing two female students.Rife was charged with two counts of illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place, 18 U.S.C. 2423(c). The government did not allege that Rife offered anything of value in connection with his abuse of the girls; his “illicit sexual conduct” was non-commercial in nature. Rife argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to punish him for non-commercial acts of sexual abuse that occurred in a foreign country years after he had traveled there. The district court denied Rife’s motion to dismiss, passing over the foreign commerce issue but upholding section 2423(c) as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to implement the Optional Protocol. The court sentenced Rife to 252 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent; section 2423(c) as applied here was within Congress’s power to enact legislation implementing treaties. View "United States v. Rife" on Justia Law

Dorsa joined Miraca, which offers pathology services for healthcare providers. His employment agreement contained a binding arbitration clause. Dorsa claims that, during his employment, he observed Miraca giving monetary donations and free services to healthcare providers to induce pathology referrals, in violation of the AntiKickback Statute, the Stark Law, and the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1). Dorsa lodged internal complaints. Dorsa claims that Miraca fabricated a sexual harassment complaint against him. Dorsa filed a qui tam action against Miraca in September 2013. Days later, Miraca fired Dorsa, citing workplace harassment. Dorsa added an FCA retaliation claim.The government investigated the FCA claims and, in 2018, intervened for purposes of settlement, under which Miraca agreed to pay $63.5 million to resolve FCA claims. Miraca moved to dismiss the remaining retaliation claim, citing the arbitration clause, Dorsa argued that the clause did not apply because his claim was independent from the employment agreement. Miraca then asserted that the court did not have the authority to decide a threshold question of arbitrability. The district court ruled in favor of Dorsa. Miraca later moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of that motion. Miraca forfeited and waived its arguments about the district court’s authority to decide threshold questions of arbitrability and its ruling on the merits. Filing the motion to dismiss was inconsistent with Miraca’s later attempts to rely on the arbitration agreement. View "Dorsa v. Miraca Life Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Portis and Thompson committed several robberies. Each pleading guilty to conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); they “expressly and voluntarily waive[d]” their rights to appeal their convictions or to challenge their convictions through a postconviction proceeding, “including a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255.” Seven years later, the Supreme Court determined, in Davis, that section 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague concerning “crimes of violence,” ultimately requiring the government to prove that a defendant met the requirements of the statute’s elements clause. Davis applies retroactively. After Davis, the Sixth Circuit held that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not count as a predicate “crime of violence” under section 924(c);s residual clause or the elements clause.Portis and Thompson sought habeas relief. The government responded that the men waived their rights to file section 2255 motions and that the robberies (rather than the conspiracy) served as the predicate offenses. The district court denied the motions on the merits. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal. The plea agreement, in no uncertain terms, waives each defendant’s right to challenge his convictions in “a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law

McKenzie purchased 13 firearms from federally licensed dealers. The ATF tracked McKenzie, who signed a federal form acknowledging that he was not purchasing it for someone else, then gave Clark the Glock in exchange for cash. Officers arrested Clark. Text messages from Clark’s phone revealed discussions with McKenzie; they never discussed why Clark did not buy the gun himself. McKenzie made a second purchase weeks later, again signing the "straw purchaser" form. Officers watched him give Schwartz the gun, conducted a traffic stop, and recovered the firearm. Schwartz stated that McKenzie bought the gun for him. McKenzie did not ask Schwartz why he could not buy the gun himself.McKenzie pleaded guilty to making a materially false statement to a licensed firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6). The PSR applied U.S.S.G. 2K2.1, which calls for a higher base offense level if the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm, the defendant was convicted under 922(a)(6), and the defendant “committed the offense with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that the offense would result in the transfer of a firearm or ammunition to a prohibited person[.]” The district court found that McKenzie had reason to believe that Clark and Schwartz were prohibited persons, calculated McKenzie’s guidelines range as 30-37 months, and imposed a 30-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Guideline requires only that a straw purchaser knew of facts creating a fair probability that the true buyer could not possess a firearm. View "United States v. McKenzie" on Justia Law

Morgan was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, ADHD, and depression. While incarcerated at Wayne County Jail, charged with assaulting a prison guard, Morgan suffered from hallucinations, heard voices, and attempted suicide. She was transferred to UCH, a private entity contracted to provide mental health services. Usually, three deputies and two-three UCH employees were present in the UCH ward. Despite blind spots, unlocked bedroom doors, and the necessity that deputies leave the ward to use the restroom, there had never been a reported incident at UCH involving sexual activity between inmates until November 15, 2005. That afternoon, Morgan asked UCH employee Williams for toilet paper. Other staff had left the ward to use the restroom and for lunch breaks. When Williams returned, he discovered Morgan n the room of a male inmate, Miles, apparently engaged in sexual intercourse. Morgan stated that she took “responsibility for everything.” Morgan and Miles declined to continue the investigation. In August 2006, Morgan gave birth to a child, apparently fathered by Miles. Morgan filed suit.The district court granted the county governmental immunity on her state law claims, found that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity, rejected a claim of supervisory liability, and held that Morgan’s Monell claims failed as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of deliberate indifference nor authority for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires men and women to be housed separately. View "Morgan v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law