Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the Bankruptcy Court, Harang sought a declaration that his tax debts were dischargeable, notwithstanding 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(1). The IRS answered the complaint, served discovery requests, moved to compel answers, and eventually sought discovery sanctions, which the Bankruptcy Court imposed, stating that “[f]or all purposes in this case ... the Court will presume ... that the Debtor had sufficient income to pay his tax liabilities ... but consciously chose not to do so.” Later, after holding that a witness “refused to appear for his deposition at the direction of” Harang, the Court entered a second sanctions order with additional factual findings. The Court scheduled the trial for February 16, 2021; on January 21, Harang moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding under Rule 41.The Bankruptcy Court entered an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, stating: Given the protracted and tortious [sic] history of this case, the court finds it proper to condition the dismissal ... upon the inclusion of its prior factual findings ...[and] that the dismissal should be with prejudice because that was the request of the Plaintiff ... the United States was ready to proceed to trial. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. A bankruptcy court has the duty and the discretion to address the misbehavior of parties appearing before it. Rule 41(a)(2) creates needed latitude for courts to exercise that discretion. The Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by restating earlier, unchallenged factual findings. View "In re Jack Warren Harang" on Justia Law

For more than 20 years, Glennborough’s developers and homeowners have sought to change the subdivision’s “ZIP Code” by petitions to the Postal Service, two rounds of litigation, and one settlement. The Glennborough Homeowners Association contends that the Postal Service breached a consent judgment entered as part of the earlier settlement by allowing mail addressed to “Ypsilanti” (rather than “Superior Township” or “Ann Arbor,” two other communities in Washtenaw County) to be delivered to Glennborough. In the consent agreement, the Postal Service agreed to “recognize ‘Superior Township, Michigan 48198’ as an authorized last line” for Glennborough “in place of its current last line of address, ‘Ypsilanti, Michigan 48198.’ In its lawsuit, the Association sought an order requiring the Postal Service to alter Glennborough’s ZIP Code.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, first noting that the Association, not a party to the consent judgment, likely lacked standing. The Association’s alleged “injuries,” concerning property values, distance to a post office, utility connections, and eligibility to attend specific schools, are not related to any issue addressed in the consent order. View "Glennborough Homeowners Association v. United States Postal Service" on Justia Law

The Ohio National Guard ended its 45-year collective-bargaining relationship with the Union that represents its technicians, who are dual-status employees because their employment is “a hybrid, both of federal and state, and of civilian and military strains.” The Guard announced that it was not bound by the expired collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that it questioned the applicability of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute to the technicians, then started terminating Union dues deductions. The Union filed Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). An ALJ found that the Guard is an “agency” under the Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(3), the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard, technicians had collective-bargaining rights under the Statute, and the Guard’s actions in repudiating the CBA violated the Statute.The Guard argued that the FLRA cannot regulate state national guards because Congress had not called the militia into service, that its actions were not ULPs, and that the remedies recommended by the ALJ were inappropriate. An FLRA panel adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision. The Sixth Circuit rejected the Guard’s petition for review. The Guard is a federal executive agency in its capacity as the employer of technicians; the FLRA has jurisdiction over the Guard with respect to labor-relations issues under the Statute. It is not unconstitutional for the FLRA to enforce the Statute by issuing orders to state national guards in their role as employers of technicians. View "The Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

In 2014, Detroit Police Officers arrested Jones and others as they demonstrated outside a city water contractor’s facility, blocking the building’s entrance. A police bus took the protestors to a police station. Jones could not board it because he uses a wheelchair, which the bus was not equipped to handle. Officers called for a cargo van, which did not have a wheelchair lift, and lifted Jones into the van; the ceiling height made it difficult for him to sit up straight and the van lacked restraints. An officer braced his feet against the chair to prevent it from moving. Jones claims that the entry into the van and the jostling of the ensuing trip exacerbated existing injuries and damaged his spine. The state declined to prosecute Jones for disorderly conduct.Jones sued the city and police officers in their individual capacities under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, with a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit previously granted qualified immunity to the officers with respect to the excessive-force claims and later affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor on Jones’s failure-to-accommodate claims. Neither the Americans with Disabilities Act nor the Rehabilitation Act permits a claim of vicarious liability. View "Jones v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In November 2021, 5he Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the federal agency tasked with assuring a safe and healthful workplace, issued an Emergency Rule on COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing, 86 Fed. Reg. 61402. The rule does not require anyone to be vaccinated but allows covered employers—employers with 100 or more employees—to determine for themselves how best to minimize the risk of contracting COVID-19 in their workplaces. Employers may require unvaccinated workers to wear a mask on the job and test for COVID-19 weekly; they can require workers to do their jobs exclusively from home. Workers who work exclusively outdoors are exempt. The next day, the Fifth Circuit stayed the rule pending judicial review; it renewed that decision in an opinion issued on November 12. Under 28 U.S.C. 2112(a)(3), petitions challenging the rule, filed in Circuits across the nation, were consolidated into the Sixth Circuit, which dissolved the stay issued by the Fifth Circuit. The language of its enabling act plainly authorizes OSHA to act on its charge “to assure safe and healthful working conditions for the nation’s workforce and to preserve the nation’s human resources.” OSHA’s issuance of the rule is not a transformative expansion of its regulatory power, The factors regarding irreparable injury weigh in favor of the government and the public interest. View "In re: MCP No. 165, Occupational Safety and Health Admin., Interim Final Rule: COVID19 Vaccination and Testing, 86 Fed. Reg. 61402" on Justia Law

Simpson's insurer, the Fund, paid Simpson’s medical costs ($16,225) arising from a car accident. Simpson hired the Firm to represent her in a personal injury suit. The Fund maintained a right of subrogation and reimbursement. Simpson settled her suit for $30,000. After depositing the settlement funds in a trust account, the Firm paid $9,817.33 to Simpson, $1,000.82 to other lienholders, and $10,152.67 to its own operating account for fees and expenses, offering the Fund $9,029.18. The Fund sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) section 502(a)(3), claiming an equitable lien of $16,225. The Firm issued a $9,029.18 check to the Fund, exhausting the settlement funds.The district court issued a TRO requiring the Firm to maintain $7,497.99 in its operating account. The Firm argued that the Fund sought a legal remedy because the Firm no longer possessed the settlement funds; ERISA 502(a)(3) only authorizes equitable remedies. The Fund argued that it sought an equitable remedy because the settlement funds were in the Firm’s possession pursuant to the TRO and cited the lowest intermediate balance test: a defendant fully dissipates a plaintiff’s claimed funds (by spending money from the commingled account to purchase untraceable items) only if the balance in the commingled account dipped to $0 between the date the defendant commingled the funds and the date the plaintiff asserted its right to the funds. The district court granted the Firm summary judgment, reasoning that the Firm dissipated the settlement funds before the TRO issued; the Fund could not point to specific recoverable funds held by the Firm and sought a legal remedy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that no issues had been preserved for review. View "Sheet Metal Workers' Health & Welfare Fund of North Carolina v. Law Office of Michael A. DeMayo, LLP" on Justia Law

McCall, who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015 and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, moved for compassionate release. He cited as“extraordinary and compelling circumstances” warranting his release: the COVID-19 pandemic, his rehabilitation efforts, and the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision, “Havis” that “attempted” controlled substance offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement and a subsequent holding applying the decision to convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He argued that his prior convictions for drug trafficking and assault no longer qualify as predicate offenses for career-offender status, that he has rehabilitated himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favored granting compassionate release. The government argued that McCall raised “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more,” that post-sentence legal developments are not extraordinary, and that McCall poses a danger to the community.The district court denied McCall’s motion in a form order. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court suggested that it thought itself unable to rely on nonretroactive changes in sentencing law and abused its discretion by not considering the disparity in McCall’s sentence post-Havis along with his efforts at rehabilitation and the presence of COVID-19. View "United States v. McCall" on Justia Law

After receiving a tip, Cleveland police arranged for a controlled buy from Hall at his residence, using a confidential informant. The next day, officers executed a search warrant for Hall’s residence. They recovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. This cycle was repeated the next month. Weeks later, officers saw Hall conducting a drug transaction in a parked vehicle; they pulled him over, searched the vehicle, and arrested him. He was released from custody with an ankle monitor. Police received information that Hall was continuing to sell drugs and conducted another controlled buy, followed by a search of Hall’s residence, where they recovered drugs, cash, and a cell phone. Officers monitored his telephone calls from the jail, executed another controlled buy, and recovered from Franklin’s vehicle roughly 500 grams of cocaine, 300 grams of heroin, a loaded gun, and marijuana. They found $1,000 on Franklin’s person, $60 of which was the prerecorded money from that day’s controlled buy, and two cell phones that had used to schedule the controlled buys.Hall and Franklin were convicted of drug and firearm offenses; each was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sentences, the sufficiency of the evidence and to the racial composition of the jury. The court upheld the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence found in Hall’s vehicle and the district court’s admission of certain testimony by officers. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The events were recorded by Officer Bierenga’s dashcam and the White Castle surveillance system. Bierenga attempted a traffic stop. After failing to pull over for several blocks, Gordon came upon a red light at a busy intersection and stopped. Bierenga approached Gordon’s car and spoke to him through the window. Bierenga perceived that Gordon was under the influence of something. When the light turned green and the traffic moved forward, Gordon accelerated. Approximately 15 minutes later, Bierenga spotted Gordon's car at the White Castle drive-thru. Bierenga parked in front of Gordon’s car and walked around Gordon’s car with his weapon drawn. Gordon reversed, bumped the car behind him, and drove forward, crashing into Bierenga’s car while Bierenga stood stuck between the cars and the building. As Gordon maneuvered his vehicle. Bierenga approached Gordon’s rolled-down window, pointing his gun. Gordon backed up, turned his wheels away from Bierenga, then attempted to flee. Bierenga yelled “stop,” fired four shots at Gordon, reentered his vehicle, and followed Gordon. Gordon presumably lost consciousness, then crashed into another car. Gordon later died.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Bierenga’s for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed; precedent cited by the district court is not similar enough to this case to define “clearly established” law. The plaintiff is unable to point to a case that would place every reasonable officer in Bierenga’s position on notice that his use of force in this specific situation was unlawful. View "Gordon v. Bierenga" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Department of Criminal Investigations searches social media for people soliciting sex from children and saw that Hruby, a Texas resident, was advertising as a “[g]randpa looking for open family.” Posing as the mother of two girls under the age of 12, Detective D’Hondt responded; during the sexually charged conversation that followed, D’Hondt concluded that Hruby had molested a child. Hruby flew to Kentucky to meet D’Hondt’s children but was arrested when he landed. After receiving his Miranda warnings, Hruby admitted that his friend “sent” his five-year-old daughter “to bed” with him. Investigators found child pornography on Hruby’s cell phone.Hruby was charged with crossing state lines with the intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The government was permitted to offer Rule 414(a) evidence: Hruby’s online messages regarding his history of child molestations and his post-arrest confession. Under Rule 414(a) a court may admit evidence that a defendant previously molested a child to show that he is inclined to molest children if the evidence is offered on a relevant matter. The court rejected Hruby’s argument that the statements should be excluded under Rule 403 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Hruby’s convictions, rejecting his argument that the government should have to corroborate a Rule 414(a) confession before the jury can consider it. View "United States v. Hruby" on Justia Law