Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michigan's Kalamazoo River was contaminated by papermills for decades, including by the release of PCBs. In 1990 the EPA added the River to the National Priorities List of Superfund sites; three paper companies formed KRSG, which entered an Administrative Order on Consent (AOC), agreeing to perform a remedial investigation. KRSG sought a declaratory judgment under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against several firms (not including IP) that the defendants were liable for “any response costs that may be incurred" in the future "in connection with the Site.” In 1998, the district court found KRSG's members and defendants Rockwell and Eaton liable for the contamination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in 2001.In 2010, GP sued NCR, IP, and Weyerhaeuser, alleging that NCR arranged the disposal of PCB-containing substances in the area and that Weyerhaeuser was an owner. IP argued that it was not liable because it owned papermill property only as a secured creditor. The defendants argued that GP’s claims were time-barred under CERCLA’s three-year limitations period for contribution and identified several events in the prior litigation that may have caused the limitations period to begin running. The district court found that the claims concerning 2006–07 Administrative Settlement Agreements and Orders on Consent and one sub-claim from the 1990 AOC were time-barred, but that the remaining claims were not.The Sixth Circuit reversed. When the district court entered the 1998 declaratory judgment in the KRSG litigation, CERCLA’s statute of limitations for contribution claims began running. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP. v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

The Indian Health Service (IHS), operates direct healthcare facilities and funds Contract Health Services (CHS) programs for persons of American Indian descent, 25 U.S.C. 1603(5), (12). Under 25 U.S.C. 5301, tribes may manage and staff their own IHS facilities, contract with private insurers for tribal coverage, and operate their own CHS programs. IHS health programs are “the payer of last resort.” Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance must pay before IHS reimbursement is available. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement Act authorized HHS to demand Medicare pricing from hospitals providing services to tribes through CHS programs, 42 U.S.C. 1395cc. The Tribe, which administers a CHS program, contracted with BCBSM for healthcare coverage. The Sixth Circuit previously reversed the dismissal of the Tribe’s lawsuit based on BCBSM’s alleged failure to insist on “Medicare-like rates” for care authorized by the Tribe’s CHS program and provided by Medicare-participating hospitals. On remand, the district court granted BCBSM summary judgment, concluding that the Tribe’s payments for CHS care through BCBSM's plans were not eligible for Medicare-like rates. The district court interpreted federal regulations as limiting the requirement of Medicare-like rates to payments for care that was authorized by CHS, provided by Medicare-participating hospitals, and directly paid for with CHS funds. The Sixth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court must first address whether the Tribe’s CHS program authorized the care for which they assert they were entitled to Medicare-like rates. If the CHS program authorized this care, the court should then consider BCBSM’s alternative arguments. View "Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan" on Justia Law

Downstream fuel producers pay an excise tax, 26 U.S.C. 4081(a)(1)(A). Revenues from the tax fund the Highway Trust Fund. In 2004, Congress sought to incentivize renewable fuels without undermining highway funding. Under the American Jobs Creation Act, a fuel producer can earn the “Mixture Credit” by mixing alcohol or biodiesel into its products. The Mixture Credit applies “against the [excise] tax imposed by section 4081,” section 6426(a)(1). Under section 6427(e), a producer can also receive the Mixture Credit as direct, nontaxable payments, to the extent the Mixture Credit exceeds the excise tax liability. The Highway Revenue Act now appropriates the full amount of a producer’s section 4081 excise tax to the Highway Trust Fund “without reduction for credits under section 6426,” section 9503(b)(1).In 2010-2011, Delek claimed $64 million in Mixture Credits and subtracted that amount from its cost of goods sold, increasing Delek’s gross income and its income tax burden. In 2015, Delek filed a refund claim (more than $16 million), arguing that its Mixture Credits were “payments” that could only satisfy, but not reduce, the excise tax amount, so that subtracting the Mixture Credit from its cost of goods sold was a mistake. The IRS denied the claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in the government’s favor, rejecting Delek’s “novel theory: The credit is a “payment” that satisfies, but does not reduce, its excise tax liability.” View "Delek US Holdings, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2020, Somberg, a Michigan attorney appearing by video in state court, took a screenshot of the hearing and posted it on Facebook. The county prosecutor sought contempt charges, citing court restrictions on recording or broadcasting proceedings. The court dismissed the contempt charges on procedural grounds. Somberg wanted to continue to record court proceedings. He brought a pre-enforcement challenge in federal court, arguing the recording and broadcasting policy violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court concluded that the First Amendment does not protect the right to record publicly live-streamed proceedings but declined to dismiss the case because the prosecutor had not filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.The district court certified its summary judgment denial for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). The Sixth Circuit denied Somberg’s petition. Section 1292(b) authorizes interlocutory review if a district court makes three findings: The appeal “involves a controlling question of law,” there is a “substantial ground for difference of opinion” about the answer, and “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” An interlocutory appeal would not “materially advance” this litigation; this case does not turn on any disputes of fact, so there is no trial to avoid. The case could proceed to final judgment quickly; the preference for final judgments wins out. View "In re: Somberg" on Justia Law

Dr. Paulus was prosecuted for healthcare fraud. Government consultants reviewed 496 of Paulus’s procedures and concluded that 146 (about 30%) were unnecessary. King’s Daughters Medical Center (KDMC) consultants also reviewed a random selection of Paulus’ procedures. Three experts at trial concluded that Paulus overstated his patients’ arterial blockage and inserted medically unnecessary stents. A jury convicted Paulus. After remand, before sentencing, the government disclosed to Paulus for the first time the “Shields Letter,” stating that when KDMC faced previous legal trouble, it hired independent experts to review 1,049 of Paulus’s cases; they flagged about 7% of his procedures as unnecessary. The defense viewed this evidence as exculpatory and consistent with diagnostic differences of opinion. Before trial, the district court had held that the information was inadmissible and that the parties “[we]re not to disclose” any information about the KDMC Review to Paulus.The Sixth Circuit vacated Paulus’s convictions and remanded, finding that the Shields Letter was material to Paulus’s defense and that failure to disclose it violated Paulus’s “Brady” rights. On remand, the government subpoenaed KDMC for additional information regarding the study referenced in the Shields Letter. KDMC objected, citing the attorney-client, work-product, and settlement privileges. The government filed a motion to compel, which was granted. KDMC sought a writ of mandamus. The Sixth Circuit denied KDMC’s petition. KDMC’s disclosure of some information regarding its experts’ study waived its privilege over the related, undisclosed information now being sought. View "In re: King's Daughters Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1992, Burns, with five accomplices, approached a car in which four men were drinking and smoking. Looking for a fight, Burns and his accomplices robbed the car's occupants, then began shooting them, killing two. Blackman escaped with a minor gunshot wound. Thomas, despite having been shot several times, survived; his testimony was instrumental in the trials. Burns was convicted on two counts of felony murder, receiving a death sentence for one murder and a life sentence for the other. Seeking habeas relief, Burns claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage and that the Tennessee prosecutor wrongfully relied on inconsistent testimony and knowingly presented false testimony at the guilt stage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court has never established that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to introduce, at sentencing, residual-doubt evidence, offered to undermine the prosecution’s case, which led to the conviction. Burns’s counsel did not err by failing to pursue the introduction of residual-doubt evidence at sentencing. Burns’s sentencing counsel did a fair amount of investigation in preparation for the mitigation phase and adopted a strategy of focusing on Burns’s religious background and other signs of good character, which was not unreasonable. Burns fails to establish that the testimony was actually inconsistent or false. View "Burns v. Mays" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Homeland Security’s 2021 Guidance notes that the Department lacks the resources to apprehend and remove all of the more than 11 million removable noncitizens in the country and prioritizes apprehension and removal of noncitizens who are threats to “our national security, public safety, and border security.” “Whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety,” the Guidance says, “requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.” The Guidance lists aggravating and mitigating factors that immigration officers should consider and does not “compel an action to be taken or not taken,” and “is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit.”In a suit by Arizona, Montana, and Ohio, the district court issued a “nationwide preliminary injunction,” blocking the Department from relying on the Guidance priorities and policies in making detention, arrest, and removal decisions. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal. The court noted “many dubious justiciability questions” with respect to standing. The Guidance leaves considerable implementation discretion and does not create any legal rights for noncitizens, suggesting it is not reviewable. The preliminary injunction likely causes irreparable harm to the Department by interfering with its authority to exercise enforcement discretion and allocate resources toward this administration’s priorities. A stay pending appeal should not substantially injure the three states. View "Arizona v. Biden" on Justia Law

Lindke and his ex-girlfriend, Moeller, engaged in a child custody dispute. Moeller obtained a domestic personal protection order (PPO) against Lindke, alleging that Lindke beat her repeatedly, threatened her, and sent nude photos of her to her family, friends, and coworkers. Lindke violated that PPO twice. When it expired, Moeller sought a second PPO, claiming that Lindke continued to harass her online. Michigan state court judge Tomlinson granted another PPO. Moeller obtained sole custody, then sued Lindke in state court, alleging that his “continued harassment . . . on social media” violated the 2016 PPO. Judge Tomlinson found that most of Lindke’s online activity was constitutionally protected speech but that his act of “tagging” Moeller in a specific Facebook post violated the PPO.Rather than appeal that decision, Lindke sued Judge Tomlinson and Sheriff King in federal court, claiming that Michigan’s domestic PPO statute violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). Lindke has previously sued a state-court judge in federal court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that no subject-matter jurisdiction existed in the case against Judge Tomlinson and that Lindke failed to state a claim against Sheriff King. View "Lindke v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

As a full-time Wal-Mart associate, Chelf purchased basic life insurance, an optional Prudential life insurance policy, and short-term and long-term disability insurance; premiums were deducted from his paycheck. Chelf obtained a leave of absence; his last workday was October 17, 2014. When his short-term benefits had maxed out, he obtained long-term disability benefits. Chelf was not required to pay premiums for his disability benefits while he was receiving those benefits. Nonetheless, Wal-Mart continued to charge him those premiums. Chelf paid life insurance premium payments during his leave. Chelf died in April 2016.After denial of her claims for benefits, Chelf’s widow filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461 (ERISA). She alleged Wal-Mart incorrectly treated the life insurance coverage as terminated before Chelf’s death and did not inform him that the policy had terminated; assessed certain premiums in error; failed to inform Chelf of that error; failed to remit premiums to Prudential; failed to inform Chelf that his accrued paid time off could cover his premiums; and failed to notify him of his right to convert his term life insurance policy.The district court dismissed, finding that Chelf’s allegations fell “outside the scope of ERISA’s fiduciary requirements or administrative functions.” The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to allegations concerning the mishandling of premiums. The remaining allegations sought to impose liability for failure to disclose information that is not required to be disclosed under ERISA. View "Chelf v. Prudential Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Beginning in 2008-2009, three partners ran Florida medical clinics and hired Hofstetter, who became the office manager. One of the partners admitted that, over time, pain management dominated their business, so that the other practice areas dwindled, and the clinics eventually became “pill mills.” Clemons, Newman, and Womack were employed as nurse practitioners at these clinics. The clinics displayed numerous indicators of illegal opioid prescription practices, so the government investigated all four women. A jury convicted each defendant of maintaining at least one drug-involved premises. Hofstetter was also found guilty of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, distributing controlled substances, and money laundering.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. With respect to the drug-involved-premises convictions, the court rejected an argument that the underlying statute, 21 U.S.C. 856(a), was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them; the defendants’ conduct put them on notice that they violated the statute, regardless of any potential vagueness when applied to differently situated medical practitioners. Those convictions were supported by substantial evidence and the district court properly instructed the jury; the jury’s verdict was not inconsistent. With respect to Hofstetter’s convictions, the court upheld evidentiary rulings and jury instructions concerning the distribution charge. The court rejected claims of spoliation, Brady violations, and improper remarks during closing arguments. View "United States v. Newman" on Justia Law